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Preface 
Outrageous in places, astonishingly penetrating in others, the 
profound and sweeping view of politics which Thomas Hobbes 
articulated to his scandalized seventeenth-century contem-
poraries provides perennial fascination for political theorists. 
And deservedly so. Hobbes was perhaps the greatest political 
philosopher to write in the English language. He also hap-
pened to write at the time of the intellectual revolution which 
produced our modern Western world. We, therefore, stand to 
learn much from him-about politics and about ourselves-
even if we find his prescriptions ultimately unpalatable. 
In this book, I have tried to shed some added light on two 
principal issues in the ongoing dialogue about Hobbes. First, I 
hope to contribute to the understanding of the relationship 
between Hobbes's natural philosophy and his civil philosophy. 
I argue that Hobbes's political ideas were in fact significantly 
influenced by his cosmological perceptions, although they were 
not, and could not have been, completely derived from that 
source. I also suggest that this influence of Hobbes's conception 
of 'nature' on his view of politics was accomplished largely by 
means of analogical permeation. That is, conceptual patterns 
and models developed to deal with natural phenomena became 
prisms through which he perceived human and political 
phenomena. The intellectual dynamics involved, I contend, 
were essentially those which Thomas Kuhn has described in 
his discussion of the functions of 'exemplar paradigms'. 
The second central theme of this study is the relationship 
between Hobbes and the Aristotelian world view which con-
stituted the philosophical orthodoxy he rejected. Although 
many scattered comments on this question may be found in 
writings on Hobbes, no one seems to have fully recognized the 
highly structured nature of the relationship between Hobbes 
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and Aristotle. Hobbes, in fact, I argue, undertook a highly 
systematic transformation of Aristotelian cosmology. There is 
method and logic both in what he adopted from Aristotle and 
what he jettisoned. He borrowed the form of the Aristotelian 
cosmology, but radically refashioned its substance to accom-
modate the discoveries of contemporaries such as Galileo. 
Therefore, Hobbes's idea patterns paralleled those of Aristotle 
to an astonishing degree even as he drastically refashioned 
their contents. 
These two themes, moreover, interact and overlap. The 
Aristotelian world was a highly coherent one. Perceptions of 
political events and of natural events were tied together by 
concepts which were believed applicable to them both. Hobbes 
saw politics in light of his theory of nature, I argue, partly 
because the intellectual world he created replicated the homo-
geneity of the Aristotelian universe. 
Because these central themes lie at the heart of the intellectual 
task which Hobbes set for himself, the logic of exposition which 
follows approximates very closely, I feel, the 'logic-in-use' 
which Hobbes himself employed. Therefore, I hope that my 
argument will be helpful to the relative newcomer to Hobbes, 
as well as to those who have a fuller familiarity with his thought. 
Many of my teachers, colleagues, and students have contri-
buted to the growth of the ideas presented here. I would par-
ticularly like to acknowledge my debt to John H. Hallowell, 
who thoughtfully supervised and contributed to my first 
systematic explorations into Hobbes, to William H. Poteat, 
whose insights into the intellectual forces at work in the seven-
teenth century have been most helpful to me, and to Norman 
0. Brown, who first introduced me to Hobbes during my 
undergraduate days at Wesleyan. None of them should be 
burdened with the responsibility for any of my intellectual 
sins, but each contributed in his own distinctive way to this 
work. 
I would also like to thank the Duke University Research 
Council for financial assistance in preparing the manuscript for 
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publication and Professor Antony Flew who has contributed a 
stimulating introduction. 
Mrs. L. F. Hall, Mrs. Judy Baldwin, and Mrs. Doris Ralston 
provided invaluable assistance in the typing and preparation 
of the manuscript. David Nordquest helped with the tedious 
task of proofreading. To them I am grateful also. 
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Ann. Her contribu-
tions have been of a different, and more important, order. 
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Foreword 
What surely was and still remains the best critical presentation 
of the whole Hobbes was first published by Richard Peters in 
1956. 1 This seems to have been the first book-length contribu-
tion to Hobbes studies in English since that of John Laird 
twenty-two years earlier. 2 But in the seventeen years since 1956 
a further nine books have appeared dealing with, or purporting 
to deal with, particular aspects of the thought and influence of 
Hobbes: eight by single authors, and one a collection of papers 
from various hands. 3 We need, therefore, some very good reason 
for the adding of yet another volume. 
Dr. Spragens can give two, and both can be developed from 
very characteristic texts in Hobbes. The first comes from 
Chapter XL VI of Leviathan, in the still too rarely appreciated 
Part IV 'Of the Kingdom of Darkness'. Hobbes writes: 'To 
conclude, there is nothing so absurd that the old philosophers 
(as Cicero saith, who was one of them) have not some ofthem 
maintained. And I believe that scarce anything can be more 
absurdly said in natural philosophy, than that which is now 
called Aristotle's Metaphysics; nor more repugnant to govern-
ment, than much of that he hath said in his Politics; nor more 
ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethics.' 
This is fine swinging stuff, the protest of a self-consciously 
anti-Aristotelian intellectual revolutionary. There is plenty 
more. Two paragraphs later Hobbes begins 'to descend to the 
particular tenets of vain philosophy, derived to the universities, 
and thence into the Church, partly from Aristotle, partly from 
blindness of understanding ... '. A little later again, still in the 
same chapter, Hobbes asks: 'But to what purpose (may some 
man say) is such subtlety in a work of this nature, where I 
pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of 
government and obedience? It is to this purpose, that men may 
II 
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no longer suffer themselves to be abused by them, that by this 
doctrine of separated essences, built on the vain philosophy of 
Aristotle, would fright them from obeying the laws of their 
country, with empty names; as men fright birds from the corn 
with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. For it is upon 
this ground that when a man is dead and buried they say his 
soul (that is his life) can walk separated from his body, and 
is seen by night among the graves.' 
Confronted by vehement, total, and systematic rejections of 
this sort the wise historian seeks also for the continuities latent 
beneath the brouhaha of strenuous and ostentatious change. 
Thus Alexis de Tocqueville looks behind the superficially total 
transformation wrought by the great French Revolution of 
1789, and is then able to discover in the subsequent new order 
the intensification and fulfilment of many of the most character-
istic tendencies of l' ancien regime. Similarly in our own time the 
student of Lenin's anti-liberal socialist revolution of October 
1917, if he widens and deepens his historical perspective, can 
see under the collective autocracy of 'the new Tsars' parallel 
intensifications and fulfilments of many of the most characteristic 
policies and ambitions of the old Imperial Great Russia of the 
Romanovs. 
This is what Dr. Spragens, as a wise historian of ideas, has 
done with the much trumpeted Hobbist rejection of the old 
established Aristotelian orthodoxy. Of course he finds that 
Hobbes did make very substantial changes: the revolution was 
no fraudulent intellectual non-event. But these very substantial 
changes were changes within a general framework which 
remained, though certainly not Aristotle's, to a significant 
extent Aristotelian nevertheless. Others before Dr. Spragens 
have, as he himself is rightly the first to insist, emphasized the 
influence of Aristotle upon particular parts of the work of 
Hobbes. Thus Dr. Spragens quotes Leo Strauss: 'The central 
chapters of Hobbes's anthropology, those chapters on which, 
more than anything else he wrote, his fame as a stylist and one 
who knows men rests for all time, betray in style and contents 
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that the author was a zealous reader, not to say a disciple, of the 
Rhetoric.' But what Dr. Spragens has done is to examine 
systematically and thoroughly the ways in which Hobbes 
transformed, while yet in some sense still retaining, an Aristo-
telian framework. 
The treatment by Hobbes of body and soul can serve as a 
small yet important appetizer. For earlier in that same Part IV 
of Leviathan, in which he was to denounce this dangerous 
'doctrine of separated essences, built on the vain philosophy of 
Aristotle', Hobbes wrote: 'The soul in Scripture signifieth 
always either the life or the living creature; and the body and 
soul jointly, the body alive' (Chapter XLIV). What is this if not 
a view of the nature of man which may be Biblical, but which 
is certainly Aristotelian also; and which is most emphatically 
not either Platonic or Cartesian? It was, after all, Aquinas and 
not the master Aristotle himself who argued that the soul as the 
form of the body must be a subsistent thing : something, that is, 
which-unlike a harmony, or a grin, or a temper-could 
significantly be said to exist separately and in its own right.' 
The text for the second lesson comes from the Epistle 
Dedicatory to the de Corpore. Hobbes wrote: 'Galileus in our 
time •.• was the first that opened to us the gate of natural 
philosophy universal, which is the knowledge of the nature of 
motion •.• Lastly, the science of man's body, the most profitable 
part of natural science, was first discovered with admirable saga-
city by our countryman Doctor Harvey. Natural philosophy is 
therefore but young; but civil philosophy is yet much younger, 
as being no older (I say it provoked, and that my detractors 
may know how little they have wrought upon me) than my own 
book de Give.' 
The lesson is that Hobbes intended his 'civil philosophy' to 
be, and believed that it was, a contribution to natural science: 
a contribution strictly on all fours with the great work of 
Galileo, and perhaps especially with 'the most profitable' 
discoveries of 'our countryman Doctor Harvey'. As an aspirant 
science of the state it begins with what purports to be an 
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appropriately mechanical account of human psychology, 
centered upon one most fundamental supposed law of tendency: 
'For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns 
what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is 
death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no 
less than that whereby a stone moves downward.' 5 
It is this fundamental putative scientific law of human nature 
-the law of self-preservation, as we might say-which guaran-
tees that the Hobbist science of the state cannot but be bene-
ficially applied if once it is understood and accepted. It is not, 
I think, as Dr. Spragens at one point suggests, that 'The ethical 
tension between "ought" and "is" is grounded in the onto-
logical tension between essence and existence; and if the latter 
is dissolved, then the former falls apart as well' (page IV-
15 :og8). It is rather-or perhaps this is only a very different 
way of saying the same thing-that, since people by the funda-
mental law of their being cannot help doing what in a cool hour 
they believe will make for their own preservation, they cannot 
but apply the knowledge which Hobbes offers of how a func-
tioning fully sovereign state is the necessary means to that end. 
Hobbes had the very best of reasons for saying in his 'Con-
clusion' to Leviathan : 'Therefore I think it may be profitably 
printed, and more profitably taught in universities • . • For 
seeing that the universities are the fountains of civil and moral 
doctrine, from whence the preachers, and the gentry, drawing 
such water as they find, use it to sprinkle the same (froth from 
the pulpit and in their conversation) upon the people ••. by 
that means the most men . . . will be less likely to serve the 
ambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against 
the state ; and be the less grieved with the contributions 
necessary for their peace, and defence; and the governors 
the~nselves have less cause to maintain at the common charge 
any greater army than is necessary to make good the public 
liberty against the invasions and encroachments of foreign 
enemies.' 
To all this it is relevant, but by no means sufficient, to reply 
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that the law of self-preservation, construed thus as a descriptive 
psychological law, is in fact not true. It is indeed precisely 
because it just is not in fact true that those who ran away from 
some mortal danger, when others did not, are apt to appeal as 
an excuse to this same supposed law-construed equivocally 
as both descriptive and prescriptive. And it was also, surely, 
partly because they constituted recalcitrant and intractable 
falsifying instances against this cherished theoretical funda-
mental that Hobbes was so incensed by those who insisted upon 
cooly risking and accepting martyrdom for their religious or 
political convictions. 
In stressing the scientific aspirations of the 'civil philosophy' 
of Hobbes Dr. Spragens has, of course, again had predecessors. 6 
But the message has still not been received and acted upon. 
There is, therefore, need and room for another attempt to get 
teachers of political theory to see that it will not do to present 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau as the famous three, without 
labouring to show how very different were the ambitions of 
Hobbes from those of the authors of the Two Treatises of Civil 
Government and of The Social Contract. 
In this present case the dykes of prejudice which have to be 
broken down are perhaps more formidable than those thrown 
up by traditional syllabus divisions within what is allowed to be 
one subject. Convenient tradition, for example, groups Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume as the blessed trinity of British Empiri-
cism; and this has in the past surely misled most of the teachers 
as well as the taught to assume that Berkeley loomed as large 
for Hume as he does for us. But in trying to get Hobbes recog-
nized as the would-be William Harvey of the anatomy of the 
state, we are trying to bridge the deepest chasm in British 
education. This is a chasm so profound and so much taken for 
granted that when Sir Charles Snow coined the phrase 'the 
two cultures' as a label for some of its effects, he and almost all 
his British readers parochially assumed that what he was thus 
indicating must be a global phenomenon of our time rather 
than something produced, or at any rate enormously intensified, 
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by certain almost unique peculiarities of British education in the 
last hundred years or so. 
Hobbes, like Hume a century later, had never heard of 'the 
two cultures'; and neither knew that there comes a time when 
all must choose- and the brighter the younger-whether to go 
onto the arts side or the science side. So neither was aware 
that Leviathan and the Treatise were classics, respectively, of 
political thought and of philosophy; and must as such be, and 
have been intended to be, contributions not to science but to 
the humanities. It will take a bulldozer to level the mound of 
misunderstanding in those who, unlike Hume and Hobbes, 
find this obvious. More power to Dr. Spragens' motor. 
Antony Flew 
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I. Hobbes (Harmondsworth and Baltimore : Penguin, I 956. 
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'Immortality' in Paul Edwards (Ed.) Encyclopaedia of Philosophy; 
or my Body Mind and Death (New York: Collier-MacMillan, 
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Indianapolis: Thames and Hudson, and Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), 
Chapter IV. 
5· English Works II, p. 8. 
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found in J. W. N. Watkins Hobbes's System of Ideas (London: 
Hutchinson, 1965). But compare also Richard Peters Loc. Cit. 
and the article 'Hobbes' in D. J. O'Connor (Ed.) A Critical 
History of Western Philosophy (New York and London: Free 
Press, and Allen and Unwin, 1964). 
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Hobbes the Philosopher 
Political theory should not be an antiquarian exercise. Its 
proper task is the clarification of patterns of political order-
those patterns which we inhabit and those for which we should 
strive. Perhaps unfortunately, however, it does not follow that 
we are permitted to ignore or to forget our past. Whether it be 
regarded as an incubus or as a treasure-house, whether we 
agree with Marx or with Burke, we must recognize that we are 
inescapably history-laden creatures. As political animals we 
do not enter upon an empty stage; as political theorists we 
cannot begin writing upon a clean slate. 
Thoughtful students of the political tradition of the West have 
generally agreed that the ideas of that remarkable seventeenth-
century English iconoclast, Thomas Hobbes, comprise one of 
the most important strands of that tradition. Michael Oake-
shott has written : 'The Leviathan is the greatest, perhaps the 
sole, masterpiece of political philosophy written in the English 
language. And the history of our civilization can provide only 
a few works of similar scope and achievement to set beside it.' 1 
And Leo Strauss has concurred: 'Hobbes's political philosophy 
is of supreme importance not only for political philosophy as 
such, i.e. for one branch of knowledge among others, but for 
modern philosophy altogether, if the discussion and elucidation 
of the ideal of life is indeed the primary and decisive task of 
philosophy.' 2 Moreover, this widespread recognition of the 
significance of Hobbes's thought has tended to increase rather 
than to abate in recent years. The years since the Second World 
War have, as Keith Brown recently observed, 'seen a remark-
able increase of interest in the writing of Thomas Hobbes.' 3 
B 
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Since Howard Warrender published his significant study of 
Hobbes's theory of obligation in 1957, at least seven book-
length treatments of Hobbes's thought have appeared.' 
Several probable reasons for this notable level of contem-
porary interest in Hobbes's thought are worthy of mention, 
wholly apart from the more fortuitous and technical academic 
reasons. The first of these is quite simply the depth and pro-
fundity of Hobbes's ideas. While he was sometimes erratic and 
sporadic in his speculations, his thoughts consistently reach the 
most fundamental problems of political life; and they do so 
within the setting of a wide-ranging and largely coherent view 
of the universe. Any system of ideas with these virtues possesses 
a kind of perennial relevance which makes recurrent renewals 
of interest in them a predictable pattern rather than a cause for 
bemusement. 
Another reason for recurrent interest in Hobbes is the recog-
nition that he anticipated some very contemporary problems, 
methods, and descriptive models in his work. For example, 
Hobbes's discussions of psychology possess some interesting 
similarities to comparable discussions in the literature of 
psychological behaviorism. 5 Some of Hobbes's theories about 
the nature and status of law are very close to the theories of 
recent legal positivism. And others have remarked upon the 
similarities of some of Hobbes's comments about language to 
the concerns and methods of contemporary linguistic analysis. 6 
Hobbes especially seems modern in his disillusionment with 
the possibilities of politics and with the instincts of man. Al-
though new currents of ideological utopianism seem to be 
arising, the dominant tendency of the contemporary Western 
intellectual world has been toward a sober modesty in its 
expectations from political man. The early Enlightenment 
faith in the inexorable progress of the human race to ever 
greater heights of order, happiness, and liberty survived into the 
bland optimism of Victorianism; but this optimism has now 
pretty well disappeared under the onslaught both of harsh 
political events and of incisive intellectual attacks. The brutali-
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ties and absurdities of two world wars dispelled any illusions 
about the inevitability or the easy attainability of 'peace in 
our time'. The early bright hopes of some of the Western 
intelligentsia for communism as an inevitable solution to man's 
inhumanity to man largely dissipated when the brave and 
hopeful words of Marx degenerated into the drab and stultifying 
reality of Stalin. In an age where the somber voices of our 
tradition, once a distinct minority, are now being heard with 
attentiveness, Hobbes seems peculiarly appropriate. Like 
Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Freud, he represents a genuine part 
of our intellectual tradition which warns us not to confuse 
our ideals with reality. 
The link between the dispelled illusions of the mid-twentieth 
century and the renewed interest in Hobbes is perhaps best cap-
tured in the words ofR. G. Collingwood, who wrote in 1942: 
It is only now, towards the middle of the twentieth century, 
that men here and there are for the first time becoming able 
to appreciate Hobbes's Leviathan at its true worth, as the 
world's greatest store of political wisdom .... 
The wars of the present century have taught some of us 
that there was more in Hobbes than we had supposed. 
They have taught us that, to see political life as it really is, 
we must blow away the mists of sentimentalism which have 
concealed its features from us since the beginning of the 
eighteenth century. I believe that I am not reporting my 
own experience alone when I say that the dispelling of 
these mists by the almost incessant tempest through which 
we have precariously lived for close on thirty years has 
revealed Hobbes's Leviathan as a work of gigantic stature, 
incredibly overtopping all its successors in political theory 
from that day to this. 7 
If Hobbes can speak to us across the span of centuries with 
meaning and force as, in some ways, a fellow modern man, this 
ability is more than fortuitous. He lived at a crucial turning 
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point in the intellectual history of the West, what has been 
termed the 'intellectual revolution of the seventeenth century' 
or the 'scientific revolution' ; and perhaps more than any of his 
contemporaries he apprehended the truly radical transforma-
tion that had taken place. While Descartes was leaving mind 
and God prophylactically protected from his critical doubt, and 
while Locke was pouring much old wine into new wineskins, 
Hobbes's relentless mind insisted upon following out the im-
plications of the new sensibility to the whole span of reality. 
With this rigorous insistence, Hobbes moved in some areas 
almost instantaneously to conclusions and images which the 
mainstream ofWestern thought reached only step by step, if at 
all. 
Although many new ideas and discoveries have intervened 
between Hobbes's day and ours, we are nevertheless still deeply 
influenced in our apprehension of the world by the ideals and 
beliefs of the seventeenth century. As Alfred North Whitehead 
observed, some of the most fundamental ideas of what he termed 
'the century of genius' are 'still reigning.' 8 Others have made 
similar observations.9 For this reason, when we dissect Hobbes, 
we are likely to find that we are cutting upon some very live 
tissue. Understanding how he viewed the world can help us to 
recognize some of the matrices of our own perceptions. And 
since Hobbes is consciously aware of propositions which have 
since drifted into the level of tacit, hence unarticulated and 
unexamined, assumptions, reading him with understanding 
becomes an especiallyvaluableexperiencein self-understanding. 
Hobbes provides an especially fertile source of insight into 
our intellectual tradition, since the linkages to the Aristotelian 
components of the tradition can be recognized in him, even as 
he attacks the central substantive models of Aristotelianism. We 
therefore gain a further appreciation of the continuity of our 
intellectual tradition, and we can understand how Whitehead 
could say that 'science started its modern career by taking over 
ideas derived from the weakest side of the philosophies of 
Aristotle's successors.' 10 
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Given the intrinsic fascination of Hobbes's ideas and the 
pivotal position which he occupies in the history of Western 
thought in general and Western political thought in particular, 
it is not surprising that a considerable variety of interpretations 
of his ideas have been expounded. The possibility of various 
interpretative emphases is also enhanced by some important 
problems and ambiguities in his corpus. Different pictures of 
Hobbes can emerge from different judgments as to what is 
central and what is peripheral in his work, and, in cases of 
apparent contradiction or superfluous multiple explanations, 
from different judgments as to what reflects his real intent. No 
single, final, and unequivocal account of the meaning and 
significance of Hobbes's political theory is therefore likely to 
arise. This is not necessarily a situation to be deplored, however. 
Profound and fecund thinkers will always contain heuristic 
possibilities which are not all mutually compatible simply 
because they touch profoundly the complexity of reality. 
Hobbes's own contemporaries reacted to his thought with 
virtually unanimous horror. The clergy, Aristotelian and 
Platonic philosophers, divine right royalists, and lawyers all 
found Hobbes indigestible for a diversity of reasons. To one 
Norfolk divine, Hobbes was 'the hideous monstrosity and British 
beast, the Propagator of execrable doctrines, the Promulgator 
of mad wisdom, the Herald and Pugilist of impious death, the 
Insipid Venerator of a Material God, the Renowned Fabricator 
of a monocondyte Symbol, the Depraved Renewer of old 
heresies to the faith, the Nonsensical roguish vendor of falsifica-
tions.'11 Like Machiavelli, Hobbes became a quasi-demonic 
symbol to most men of his time. His alleged atheism, his 
materialism, his political absolutism, his alleged libertinism 
all were perceived as bound up in one frightening package, 
potent but wholly unacceptable, worthy of being taken seriously 
but only as an adversary. 
More recent commentary on Hobbes has tended to centre 
around two principal problems: the relationship of his political 
thought to other parts of his world view such as his natural 
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philosophy, his psychology, and his rationalist methodology; 
and the structure of his theory of political obligation. 
In his book on Hobbes published in x886, George Croom 
Robertson took issue with the conventional assumption that 
Hobbes's political ideas had sprung from the womb of his philo-
sophical materialism.12 According to Robertson, Hobbes's 
historical and personal circumstances, rather than a more 
systematic and abstract philosophical doctrine, was the real 
source of his political ideas. 'More than of almost any other 
philosopher,' Robertson argued, 'it can be said of Hobbs that 
the key to a right understanding of his thought is to be found in 
his personal circumstances and the events of his time.' 13 
Methodologically, said Robertson, Hobbes proceeded not by 
drawing out the implications of his general principles for 
politics, but rather by following up the consequences of what he 
directly had observed on a relatively ad hoc basis about human 
psychology and political realities. 'There can be little doubt, 
however Hobbes might wish by afterthought to connect his 
theory of political society with the principles of his general 
mechanical philosophy, that it sprang originally from a different 
line of consideration. Direct analysis ofthe notions ofJustice and 
Law, in relation with such knowledge of human appetites and 
passions as any man "that will but examine his own mind" 
has by experience, remained for him always a sufficient basis 
for civil philosophy, without going deeper.'14 
The problem to which Robertson directed his attention here 
is both interesting and vexing for several reasons. As a general 
problem, it is significant as one seeks to understand the structure 
of political theory which, in its classic form, often purports to 
make precisely the kind of connections between cosmology 
and sociology that Robertson minimizes in Hobbes. With 
specific relation to Hobbes himself, the problem is complicated 
by Hobbes's own apparent ambivalence on the issue. On one 
side of the question stands the fact that Hobbes wrote his 
Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Sociery (De Give) 
before writing De Corpore and De Homine, which treated the 
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more fundamental principles of his general philosophy. If 
Hobbes's political ideas were in fact derived from his materialist 
philosophy, the logical, hence chronological, relationship should 
have been reversed. 
Hobbes was aware of this problem. The departure from 
logical order, he said, was an outgrowth of the political situation; 
and it did not disturb him greatly because he felt that De Give 
could stand by itself. 'Therefore it happens, that what was last 
in order, is yet come forth first in time. And the rather, because 
I saw that, grounded on its own principles sufficiently known 
by experience, it would not stand in need of the former sec-
tions.'15 Since Hobbes himself attests that the principles of 
De Give may be 'sufficiently known by experience,' then 
Robertson's view that Hobbes's attempt to ground his political 
ideas in his natural philosophy was an ex post facto gloss seems 
quite sustainable. 
On the other hand, Hobbes clearly felt that a fundamental 
unity pervaded his work, that his political principles did have 
logical footing in his natural philosophy, and that the former 
depended upon the latter for their demonstrability. 'Such 
things as I have said are to be taught last (i.e., civil philosophy),' 
he wrote, 'cannot be demonstrated, till such as are propounded 
to be first treated of (i.e., natural philosophy) be fully under-
stood.'16 It is also clear, moreover, that even if De Give pre-
ceded De Corpore and De Homine, Hobbes had previously 
articulated his basic principles of natural philosophy. 17 The 
order of publication of De Give, De Homine, and De Corpore 
therefore cannot be taken as representative of the path by which 
Hobbes arrived at his conclusions. The problem remains a live 
one. 
Agreeing with Robertson that 'the real basis of Hobbes's poli-
tical philosophy is not modern science,' Leo Strauss argued 
that the actual foundation of Hobbes's political theory was his 
conception of natural right. 18 Strauss conceded that Hobbes 
explicitly wanted to ground his political theory on the new 
ideas of modern natural science, but, said Strauss, he was 
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thereby engaged in intellectual self-delusion. Earlier theorists 
could draw political principles from cosmological models be-
cause their cosmologies contained human features such as 
purpose, meaning, and order. With the new cosmology, how-
ever, this connection could not be made because the cosmos of 
modern natural science was fundamentally ahuman. Hobbes 
therefore was engaging in the impossible task of trying to draw 
conclusions from utterly insufficient premises. In Strauss's 
words: 
As traditional moral and political philosophy was, to some 
extent, based on traditional metaphysics, it seemed neces-
sary, when traditional metaphysics were replaced by modern 
natural science, to base the new moral and political philo-
sophy on the new science. Attempts of this kind could never 
succeed : traditional metaphysics were, to use the language 
of Hobbes's successors, 'anthropomorphistic' and, there-
fore, a proper basis for a philosophy of things human; 
modern science, on the other hand, which tried to interpret 
nature by renouncing all 'anthropomorphisms,' all con-
ceptions of purpose and perfection, could, therefore, to say 
the least, contribute nothing to the understanding of things 
human, to the foundation of morals and politics.19 
Not only did Hobbes's preoccupation with natural philosophy 
not contribute to his political theory, Strauss continued, it 
actually was responsible for his confusions and apparent con-
tradictions. By attempting the impossible Hobbes succeeded 
only in obscuring the true source of his principles of political 
obligation, namely the theory of natural right. Strauss went 
on to say that 'all the contradictions of any consequence' 
which occur in Hobbes may be explained as a product of the 
discrepancy between his 'original view of human life' and 'the 
conceptions provided by tradition or modern science.' 20 The 
task of the interpreter of Hobbes, therefore, is systematically to 
disentangle the scientific encumbrances from his ideas to reveal 
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the fundamental coherence of his thought. The conception of 
natural right which provided the source of this coherence, 
Strauss argued, 'stands midway between strictly moral prin-
ciples (such as those of the traditional natural law) on the one 
hand, and purely natural principles (such as pleasure, appetite, 
or even utility) on the other.' 21 
Strauss's elaboration of this basic thesis is both illuminating 
and provocative. At th(}same time, one must remain somewhat 
wary of an interpretative methodology which postulates a 
fundamental coherence to the ideas of a theorist and then pro-
ceeds to use that postulation as a standard to reject large chunks 
of the theorist's contentions as 'confused' or 'contradictory.' It is 
dangerous to separate on a priori grounds thoughts which their 
author clearly conceived to be interrelated. Shortly I shall argue 
that, while Strauss is illuminating in what he affirms about 
Hobbes, he is misleading in what he denies; and this difficulty 
stems from his overly narrow conception of the way in which one 
set of ideas can influence ideas about other realities. 
A somewhat different approach to Hobbes's thought was 
taken by the distinguished British political theorist Michael 
Oakeshott, in his introduction to a new edition of Leviathan in 
1947. Most interpretation of Hobbes, Oakeshott felt, was 
basically divided between two camps: those who saw Hobbes's 
thought as a single, materialistic system, and those who saw it as 
composed of two or more distinct and not wholly reconcilable 
components. Both of these views Oakeshott found inadequate. 
Hobbes's thought, Oakeshott argued, was indeed a coherent 
system; but, he argued, the nature and origin of the coherence 
and hence of the system itself had been fundamentally mis-
conceived. 
For Oakeshott, the unity of Hobbes's thought is not the unity 
of a logical pyramid, with each level systematically laid on top 
of the more basic propositions, but instead is the unity of a 
complex whole tied together by a cohering theme. And this 
unifying strand that runs throughout Hobbes's thought is a 
consistent conception of what philosophy is all about. 'The 
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coherence of his philosophy, the system of it, lies not in an 
architectonic structure, but in a single passionate thought that 
pervades its parts .... And the thread, the hidden thought, is the 
continuous application of a doctrine about the nature of 
philosophy.' 22 In Oakeshott's view, Hobbes is systematic 
because he is consistently 'rationalist' in a particular sense: 
'Philosophy for him is the world as it appears in the mirror of 
reason; civil philosophy is the image of the civil order reflected 
in that mirror.' 23 Oakeshott did not deny the mechanistic 
features of Hobbes's doctrine, but he argued that these were 
essentially derivative features which followed from Hobbes's 
conception of rational method. For Hobbes, the realm of 
reason is the realm of cause and effect. The operations of reason 
proper are to resolve and compose the object of analysis into its 
parts and to discover its antecedents and consequents. Anything 
not subject to this form of knowing is not the proper object of 
philosophy. 24 This, in effect, Oakeshott argued, is to make 
reasoning into the 'elucidation of mechanism' since it is 
essentially the study of the 'combination, transfer, and resolu-
tion offorces.' 25 The picture which Hobbes draws ofpolitics is, 
therefore, part of an overall system, and this system is 'mechani-
cal' ; but the origin of both system and mechanism is the per-
vasive application of this particular conception of reason. 
Hobbes is systematic and mechanical, but these are traits 
derivative of a consistent and distinctive methodology, not 
autonomous substantive doctrines. 'The civil order is conceived 
as a coherence of powers, not because politics is vulgarly 
observed to be a competition of powers, or because civil 
philosophy must take its conceptions from natural philosophy, 
but because to subject the civil order to rational enquiry un-
avoidably turns it into a mechanism.' 26 
Oakeshott's interpretation has some genuine virtues. It brings 
out with clarity and force some of the peculiarities of Hobbes's 
conception of rational inquiry and demonstrates both that 
Hobbes took this conception quite seriously and that it therefore 
exercised a significant structuring impact upon his thought. 
HOBBES THE PHILOSOPHER 
How he asked his questions, what he thought to be the require-
ments of 'rational' answers, left an undeniable mark on his 
whole corpus. Moreover, this central observation by Oakeshott 
is well worth generalizing beyond the particular case of Hobbes. 
Too often methods are thought to be merely technical contri-
vances that may be devised, adopted, rejected, or exchanged 
without having any significant impact on the form of the results. 
Oakeshott's interpretation indicates that the impact of different 
methods is not neutral, that in fact a particularly potent and 
consistently applied methodology may deeply structure the 
substance of the final theory. In political science, as well as in 
other sciences, as students of 'scientific method' are now point-
ing out, an abstractive methodology possesses a real tendency 
to generate its own ontology. 27 
Oakeshott nevertheless may well have overstated his case. 
Hobbes's conception of reason played a significant part in shap-
ing his doctrines, but it is questionable whether its impact was as 
autonomous and dominant as Oakeshott indicated. In the first 
place, there is always the question of how autonomous epistem-
ology is in its relationship to ontology. Ever since Descartes, 
there has been a strong tendency to focus upon epistemological 
issues as central, but one can make a very good case that 
epistemological and methodological revolutions actually rest 
upon transformed visions of what is 'real'. That is, ontology is 
logically prior to epistemology, since one who wishes to know 
reality rather than to fabricate it must conform his approach to 
that reality rather than vice versa. 28 Philosophical theorists and 
scientific researchers alike may become fascinated with a par-
ticular method, but they do so out of a conviction, often warran-
ted by particularly striking cases, that the method is peculiarly 
appropriate to the reality they wish to know. Otherwise, they 
become like the drunk who looked for his wristwatch under the 
lamppost where there was more light, even though he lost it in 
the dark alley. 
In the particular case of Hobbes, this line of argument has 
added force if one examines carefully Oakeshott's account of 
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Hobbes's conception of reason and its consequences. Basically, 
Oakeshott argues that, first, 'reasoning,' for Hobbes, 'is con-
cerned solely with causes and effects.' 29 Second, this doctrine 
means that reasoning, being a study of cause and effect, is 
essentially 'elucidation of mechanism.' 30 It therefore follows 
that a rational account of anything for Hobbes must have 
strong mechanistic overtones, however derivative they may be. 
The critical hidden assumption here, however, comes in the 
second premise: namely, it is assumed that an analysis of cause 
and effect is ipso facto a mechanistic analysis. This assumption is 
not itselflogically necessary, nor is it methodologically derived; 
instead it depends upon a prior substantive assumption about 
the nature of causation. And, in fact, it was precisely a trans-
formation in the understanding of causality that was one of the 
key elements in the transformed cosmology of the seventeenth 
century. Hobbes differs in his conception of rational inquiry 
from the Aristotelian tradition not in that he considers it inti-
mately bound up with an account of cause and effect, but in 
what he saw to be genuinely causative. Therefore, Oakeshott's 
thesis as to the priority of rational method in the structure of 
Hobbes's thought is cast into question. 
A somewhat distinctive strand of Hobbes's interpretation has 
been developed which insists upon the separation of Hobbes's 
psychological postulates and his political theory. A. E. Taylor 
provided the most important opening contribution to this 
approach to Hobbes in an article on 'The Ethical Doctrine of 
Hobbes,' published in 1938.31 He contended there that 
'Hobbes's ethical doctrine proper, disengaged from an egoistic 
psychology with which it has no logically necessary connection, 
is a very strict deontology, curiously suggestive, though with 
interesting differences, of some of the characteristic theses of 
Kant.' 32 In 1957 Howard Warrender published what must be 
considered the magnum opus of this interpretative standpoint, 
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation. 33 
Warrender's argument differed from that of Taylor in some 
significant details, but it shared enough in common with 
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Taylor's view to generate the designation: the Taylor-
Warrender thesis. The differences between Taylor and 
Warrender center mostly around the parallels which Taylor 
finds between Hobbes and Kant and also around the central 
significance which Taylor assigns to covenanting as a source of 
obligation. 34 The two agree on several fundamental contentions, 
however, which are both significant and controversial. 
In the view of Taylor and Warrender, Hobbes's theory of 
political obligation must be separated analytically from his 
natural philosophy and his psychology. The principal grounds 
for this alleged analytical necessity are logical; that is, it is not 
logically possible to derive a moral theory from an empirical 
theory, an account of how men should behave from an account 
ofhow they do behave. If Hobbes thought he could do this, the 
contention runs, he was simply mistaken, and we must look 
elsewhere to see if a viable theory can be pieced together from 
his writings. 
Specifically, Warrender argues, it would be impossible for 
Hobbes to assert the presence of a moral obligation to obey the 
will of the sovereign unless some basis of moral obligation exists 
prior to and beyond the institution of the sovereign. As he puts 
it, 'A moral obligation to obey the civil law cannot logically be 
extracted from a system in which man has no moral obligations 
before or apart from the institution of that law. Any view that 
assumes otherwise, contains a hiatus in the argument that 
cannot be surmounted, and if, in fact, this is Hobbes's position, 
he must be held to have failed in his main enterprise.' 35 It 
therefore follows that the presence of moral obligations must be 
found in the 'state of nature' (which represents the human con-
dition antecedent to civil society) if Hobbes is to be granted as 
having any real theory of political obligation. 
This requirement Hobbes is held to have satisfied with his 
account of the law of nature. He clearly distinguishes between 
law and counsel; only the former are fully obligatory in the 
strict sense. And Hobbes, as Taylor observes, 'always describes 
the items of the natural law as dictamina, or dictates, never as 
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consilia, or pieces of advice.' 36 Therefore, the account often 
given of Hobbes's theory that makes political obligation 
derivative solely upon the ipse dixit of the sovereign is not 
accurate: 'Hobbes always lays it down that obligation is not 
created by the sovereign when he issues his orders backed by 
threats of penalties. The moral obligation to obey the natural 
law is antecedent to the existence of the legislator and the civil 
society.' 37 The law of nature is obligatory even in the state of 
nature, although it obliges only in foro interno. The existence of 
the sovereign, then, to use Warrender's term, is not the ground 
of political obligation, but merely one of the validating con-
ditions. That is, the sovereign's will does not create obligation; 
his power merely renders an already existent obligation opera-
tive. Men are already obliged to 'seek peace and follow it' in the 
state of nature, but the insecurity of that state makes the 
obligation relatively ineffectual. By supplying security, and by 
serving as interpreter in disputed cases, the sovereign permits 
the obligation to take effect. 
Alternative explanations are given by Taylor and Warrender 
as to why the laws of nature are obligatory. In one way or 
another, however, these explanations tend to emphasize the 
status of the laws of nature as commands of God. As Taylor says: 
'I can only make Hobbes's statements consistent with one 
another by supposing that he meant quite seriously what he so 
often says, that the natural law is the command of God, and to 
be obeyed because it is God's command.'38 This interpretation 
makes sense, given the premises, because Hobbes clearly 
equated law with command; hence, if natural laws are truly 
laws, they must be someone's commands, and if obligatory they 
must be the command of one who commands by right. God, 
clearly, as the omnipotent creator of nature, is the only logical 
candidate for this role. 
The whole controversy surrounding the Taylor-Warrender 
thesis is extremely complex and tricky. 39 The difficulties here 
arise partly from ambiguities and complexities in Hobbes. They 
also arise from the ambiguities inherent in the notion of obliga-
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tion itself. If one pauses to reflect upon the multitude of mean-
ings that can be given the term oblige, he will understand this 
aspect of the problem. This whole issue warrants closer atten-
tion, but such attention falls beyond my scope here. The basic 
organizing hypothesis of this work does contain implications for 
this issue, however, and these will be unfolded in due course. 
For the moment, only the following caveat will be entered. 
Although the Taylor-Warrender thesis has illuminated some 
significant aspects of Hobbes's political theory, it has a clear 
tendency to change the overall image which Hobbes seemed 
to have of his own work. In the first place, it makes absolutely 
central what Hobbes deemed to be relatively peripheral- e.g. 
the status of laws of nature as divine commands-and makes 
peripheral what Hobbes deemed important-e.g. the relation-
ship of self-interest and duty. Moreover, the whole thesis 
involves a laborious separation of what Hobbes equally labor-
iously strove to reconcile, namely, his psychological postulates 
and his account of the origin ofpolitical obligation. This trans-
formation may be justified on the grounds that it is necessary 
to save Hobbes from the 'logical blemish'40 of deriving an 
'ought' from an 'is.' This justification, however, raises the 
question of how far one is entitled to interpret a person's thought 
after rejecting his premises. While this task may be a legitimate 
enterprise from the standpoint of abstract political theory, it 
makes questionable the historical accuracy of the conclusions 
reached. Finally, it is worth considering whether Hobbes's 
logical assumptions about the relationship of 'moral' and 
'empirical' realities are as faulty as many modern thinkers so 
readily assume. 
In contrast to the tendency of Strauss, Robertson, and 
Warrender to distinguish and disentangle allegedly logically 
unconnected parts of Hobbes's thought from each other, one 
recent commentator argues quite persuasively that these 
different strands do link up into a reasonably coherent system 
of ideas. In his 1965 study of Hobbes, J. W. N. Watkins con-
cludes that the essentials ofHobbes's political theory are implied 
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by his more general philosophical doctrines. 41 Watkins in effect 
contends that denials of the systematic features of Hobbes's 
thought stem from an overly rigid standard for accrediting 
ideas as systematic. A very real systematic connection of ideas 
can be present even though they do not form a simple system 
of axiomatic premises and logical deductions. As Watkins 
observes: 
A philosophical proposition cannot by itself entail a pro-
position having a political content which the former 
lacks. But the introduction of a philosophical theory 'p' 
into an existing circle of statements 'q' may make it 
possible to derive a new political conclusion 'r'; in which 
case 'p' implies that if 'q' then 'r.' Moreover, if 'r' is con-
troversial, whereas 'q' consists of uncontroversial back-
ground assumptions ... then the philosophical idea bears 
the chief responsibility for the political conclusion, and the 
latter may be said, by a pardonable ellipsis, to be an 
implication of the philosophical idea. 42 
After examining the 'Tract on First Principles,' sometimes 
referred to as the 'Little Treatise,' which Hobbes wrote around 
I63o, Watkins concludes that 'Hobbes was a mechanical philo-
sopher before the main lines of his political doctrine were 
fixed, and his early theorizing spilt over into his political 
theorizing.' 43 The basic ideas on cosmology, psychology, and 
ethics contained in the 'Little Treatise' persisted largely intact 
into Hobbes's later writings and play a significant role there. 
In response to Warrender's painstaking attempt to sever a 
coherent theory of obligation from the larger pattern ofHobbes's 
philosophy, Watkins argues that 'Warrender mistook the 
theological top layer of a single system for a separate system 
existing alongside what is really its psychological or naturalistic 
basis.' 44 In deriving obligations from factual premises, Hobbes 
was not committing a simple logical faux pas, for the pattern 
of obligation he presents is not fundamentally a set of categorical 
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imperatives. Instead, they are a framework of hypothetical 
imperatives, contingent on the presupposition that any man 
naturally will seek to preserve himselffrom a violent death. The 
prescriptive laws of nature which Hobbes offers his readers are 
not moral imperatives in the strict sense, but they are impera-
tive nevertheless. In Watkins's words, 'they are more like 
doctor's orders of a peculiarly compelling kind.' 45 Their 
peculiarly compelling character, in turn, rests upon the givens 
of human nature and its constituent passions. 
Sheldon Wolin finds himself largely in agreement both with 
Watkins and with Oakeshott. With the former, he agrees that 
'scientific modes of thought had permeated (Hobbes's) political 
philosophy.' 46 Strauss's argument to the contrary, Wolin 
argues, is 'brilliant but overly ingenious.' 47 And, with Oake-
shott, Wolin feels that central to Hobbes's enterprise is a per-
vasive and distinctive new type of methodological rationalism 
that shapes the form of his inquiry and influences his conclu-
sions in the process. 
Wolin places a distinctive and illuminating emphasis upon 
the role of stipulated rules in Hobbes's political thought. Hobbes, 
he observes, had to face up at the very outset of his work to the 
problem posed by the 'interest-ridden nature of the new 
politics,' 48 a problem brought into prominence by Machiavelli. 
The crucial and extreme manifestation of this breakdown in 
community was the dissolution of a commonly held political 
language. Since men interpreted meanings according to their 
own self-interest, the state of nature was 'a condition distraught 
by an anarchy of meanings.' 49 The most fundamental task of one 
who would lift men out of this chaotic condition, therefore, was 
to provide certain rules of correct belief and conduct which 
could deliver society from a morass of subjectivity-a subjec-
tivity which found its behavioral expression in the 'war of all 
against all.' 
The key to providing these certain rules Hobbes found in the 
methods of the new scientific philosophy, as he understood them. 
Hobbes's model for scientific method, as many commentators 
c 
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have noted, was heavily geometric. Thus, the methods of the 
new science were to provide the axioms needed for the political 
society and to make the necessary and proper deductions from 
them that would guide men's actions. 'Just as there were basic 
rules or conventions governing the usages of geometers, there 
were rules or propositions distinctive to political life and 
necessary for its survival.' 60 
Hobbes's philosophical nominalism prohibited him from 
appealing to some objective Reason as the source for the 
necessary rules. Therefore the problem of how these rules were 
to be stipulated converged with the explicitly political problem 
of authority; that is, political authority would inhere pre-
eminently in epistemological authority. The source of co-
herence in society must be a single voice which is empowered 
to lay down the basic political definitions of the society- the 
common framework of meanings to which each individual 
citizen must subscribe. This single voice was, of course, that of 
the sovereign, who based his sovereignty upon his fundamental 
role as a Great Definer. As Wolin puts it, 'the Hobbesian 
sovereign occupied a truly awesome position. He was the un-
challengeable master of the system of rules or stipulative defini-
tions fundamental to political peace.' 61 
Another interpretation argues that the central structuring 
element of Hobbes's political theory is sociological rather than 
philosophical. In his study of Hobbes, C. B. MacPherson offers 
a perceptive example of this approach as one variant of the 
political theory of 'possessive individualism.' 5 2 Like Rousseau, 
MacPherson contends that Hobbes's construct of the state of 
nature does not actually represent a genuinely presocial order, 
but instead retains traits which are products of social condition-
ing. 63 Specifically, Hobbes's model of the state of nature, like 
all his models, is permeated by features of a competitive 
market society. It is the incorporation of this form of social 
order into his assumptions that provides one of the essential 
foundations of Hobbes's psychology, MacPherson contends: 
'his postulate that the power of every man in society is opposed 
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to the power of every other man requires the assumption of 
a model of society which permits and requires the continual 
invasion of every man by every other.' 54 Furthermore, the 
model of a competitive market society serves not only as the 
link between Hobbes's physiological postulates and his psycho-
logical doctrines but also as the basis of his theory of political 
obligation: 'The real basis of Hobbes's political obligation is ... 
the rational perception of men in possessive market society 
that they are all irretrievably subject to the determination of 
the market.' 55 While this theory of obligation, built as it is 
upon a recognition and acceptance ofthe dynamics of a market, 
is not likely to be appealing to most humanist morality, 
MacPherson concludes, Hobbes nevertheless cut through to the 
heart of the politics of a competitive and individualistic 
bourgeois society. 
This form of interpretation, centering as it does on the socio-
logical determinants of Hobbes's theoretical model, probably 
tends to localize and constrict the significance of his thought 
more than is necessary. For example, contemporary ethological 
investigations into the sources of aggression in animal and 
human behavior would indicate that the libido dominandi is 
neither confined to, nor predominantly the product of, any 
particular form of social organization. Hobbes's model of 
human vainglory and quest for power, therefore, has more 
perennial relevance than MacPherson's analysis tends to imply. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that no social theorist writes in a 
sociopolitical vacuum, and some of Hobbes's ideas were in fact 
peculiarly applicable to the type of society which the com-
mercial revolution was bringing to seventeenth-century Eng-
land. MacPherson's analysis astutely points out this congruency 
and its significance both for our understanding of Hobbes and 
for our use of Hobbes to understand aspects of contemporary 
society. 
This survey of various interpretations of Hobbes's thought 
is by no means exhaustive. 56 It does serve, however, to give an 
indication of some ofthe principal views which have been held. 
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Moreover, it also gives some indication of the principal issues 
which have generated controversy among Hobbes scholars. 
This tradition of Hobbes interpretation, finally, provides a 
suitable background against which the distinctive features of 
the account presented in the following chapters can be dis-
cerned. 
The ideas of writers like Hobbes are too multifaceted to be 
encompassed in any single interpretation. Moreover, the ideas 
of a truly profound writer generally possess meanings and 
implications which even they themselves could not have seen 
or articulated. In theoretical inquiry, especially, it is true, as 
Michael Polanyi has said, that 'we say more than we know.' 
These heuristic features of important theoretical frameworks 
are, of course, not defects, but rather an index of their value. 
They do, however, make interpretative efforts more difficult and 
make humility an appropriate stance for the interpreter. 
Although the interpretations cited offer a range of genuine 
insights into Hobbes, there remain some important charac-
teristics of his philosophy which have not been given systematic 
exposition. These characteristics, furthermore, are not peripheral 
aspects of his thought which heretofore have been overlooked 
because of their relative triviality, but are some central con-
stitutive and structuring elements of his fundamental world 
view. Understanding these aspects of Hobbes's philosophy 
provides not only a better understanding of the substance of 
his thought but also insight into some of the central con-
ceptual models of Western intellectual history and greater 
appreciation of the formal process of political theorizing in the 
classical mode. 
This study focuses largely upon the relationship of natural 
philosophy and political philosophy in Hobbes. My view, like 
that of Watkins, is that there is considerable interaction 
between the two and that the results of this interaction are 
significant for the final content of Hobbes's political theory. 
The impact of Hobbes's natural philosophy upon his political 
philosophy is not the product of purely deductive derivation. 
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As Leo Strauss correctly observed in his study of Hobbes, this 
kind of relationship is simply a logical impossibility. If there is 
no human substance in a natural cosmology, there is no way to 
deduce the content of a political cosmos from it. The human 
mind works in many ways other than deduction, however; and 
it is consequently quite conceivable that theories which cannot 
be related deductively may be related significantly in other 
ways. I hope that some of these other ways will be illuminated 
in the following chapters. 
The focus of any study in political theory tends to be in large 
part a function of the author's view of what is the central task 
of political theory. This particular case is no exception to the 
general pattern. The implicit view of political theory which has 
helped to structure the focus of this particular inquiry is that, 
classically and properly, the central task of political theory is to 
relate sociology and cosmology, or at least to relate politics and 
human nature. In other words, the political theorist is one who 
examines the implications for political order of a pattern of 
order which contains but transcends the realm of politics. It is 
clear that political order is not purely autonomous and insula-
ted from other patterns of order-whether the ecological order 
of the environment, the moral order of divine will, or the 
emotional order of the human psyche. Distinctive views of these 
transpolitical patterns of order will inevitably have a structur-
ing impact upon views of politics. The case of Hobbes should 
be taken as an example of, not an exception to, this general 
contention. 
Certainly it cannot be contested that Hobbes was nurtured, 
however reluctantly, by a tradition of political speculation 
which insisted upon making such connections between political 
order and cosmological order. This tradition therefore must be 
taken into account when trying to understand Hobbes. The 
human intelligence, Descartes notwithstanding, is incapable 
of beginning inquiry utterly devoid of presuppositions. As a 
result, even the most revolutionary thinker will retain certain 
assumptions of the tradition against which he is reacting. These 
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assumptions are largely tacit, serving not as the focus of 
inquiry but rather as the footing or the conceptual grounding 
of inquiry. The thinker himself may not even be particularly 
aware of the assumptions, either because he takes them so 
largely for granted or simply because the specific object of his 
intellectual concern lies elsewhere. They are, nevertheless, 
important in shaping his final intellectual product in spite of 
their relative neglect as focal points of inquiry; indeed, they 
may be even more pervasive in their impact precisely because 
of their tacit status. 
The intellectual tradition in which Hobbes was instructed 
and against which he reacted was thoroughly infused with 
Aristotelian premises. As a student at Oxford from I603 to 
I6o8, Hobbes's principal course of study was Aristotelian logic 
and Aristotelian physics. Like many other seventeenth-century 
figures who soon were to become exponents of the intellectual 
revolution of that century, Hobbes found the problems and 
concepts of Aristotelian scholasticism generally barren and 
uninteresting. After leaving Oxford, therefore, he largely 
abandoned philosophy for humanistic and historical studies. 
He did not re-enter the philosophical arena until Galileo had 
opened for him 'the gate to natural philosophy'; and when he 
did so, Aristotle was clearly an explicit object of attack. Along 
with his compatriots in the 'scientific revolution,' Hobbes 
happily jettisoned Aristotle as unproductive and obscurantist. 
'I believe,' he wrote in the Leviathan, 'that scarce anything can 
be more absurdly said in natural Philosophy, than that which 
is called Aristotle's Metaphysiques, nor more repugnant to 
Government, than much of what he hath said in his Politiques; 
nor more ignorantly than a great part of his Ethiques.' 57 
Despite this vehement outburst, Hobbes clearly considered 
Aristotle an important philosophical antagonist. He does not 
merely dismiss him out of hand, but is constantly engaged in 
shaping his own contentions by contrasting them with corres-
ponding Aristotelian notions. If Hobbes is explicitly in revolt 
against Aristotle, then, his work is nevertheless heavily shaped 
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by, indeed saturated by, the very Aristotelian framework 
whose content he is rejecting. Almost all commentators on 
Hobbes have noted the presence of Aristotle in Hobbes's mind 
at one point or another in his writings. Together, these observa-
tions comprise an impressive list. 
To begin with, Leo Strauss has demonstrated how closely 
Hobbes structured his anthropological reflections upon corres-
ponding reflections in Aristotle's Rhetoric. In passage after 
passage, Hobbes replicates the form and sometimes the content 
of Aristotle's observations about the human passions. Strauss 
concludes: 'It would be difficult to find another classical work 
whose importance for Hobbes's political philosophy can be 
compared with that of the Rhetoric. The central chapters of 
Hobbes's anthropology, those chapters on which, more than on 
anything else he wrote, his fame as a stylist and as one who 
knows men rests for all time, betray in style and contents that 
the author was a zealous reader, not to say a disciple of the 
Rhetoric.' 58 
In regard to his natural philosophy Hobbes's ideas were 
governed closely by Aristotelian speculations, even where they 
were rejected. 59 In considering the problem of sensation, which 
Hobbes clearly conceived to be centrally important, Hobbes 
draws upon Aristotle in several ways. He assumes, for example, 
that touching is a necessary condition for things to influence 
each other, an assumption which, as Brandt observes, 'is an old 
Aristotelian conception.' 60 The supplementary conceptions of 
agent and patient which Hobbes 'would certainly have con-
sidered as being self-evident' are 'of Aristotelian origin.' 61 
Hobbes also follows in the Aristotelian tradition with his formal 
definitions and the alleged implications of substance and 
accident. He, in Brandt's words, 'takes the Aristotelian con-
conceptions, accident and substance, and consistently maintains 
them.' 62 
When Hobbes turns to the problem of the relationship of 
time, instant, and local motion, once again his speculations 
depend upon Aristotle's ideas. Brandt states: 'Hobbes's text is 
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not understood from the context. Comprehension must be 
sought historically, and the explanation lies in Aristotelian 
premises.' 63 Considering the relationship of motion to that 
which attracts it, Hobbes relies upon Aristotle's definition of 
good as that toward which all things are moved. Hobbes makes 
some important changes in the Aristotelian notion of the good, 
as later will become evident, but the basic formal definition is 
clearly modeled upon Aristotle. 64 Brandt concludes his treat-
ment of the 'Little Treatise,' in light of these considerations, 
by arguing that Aristotle predominates among the sources of 
Hobbes's basic conceptions. Aristotle, 'to a degree which is now 
difficult to realize, dominated the philosophy of that age.' He 
was 'the solid foundation, which one either tried to add to ... 
or tried to pull down.' 66 In his philosophy of nature, Brandt 
demonstrates, just as Strauss showed with respect to his 
philosophical anthropology, Hobbes was no exception to this 
pattern. 
Similarly, Richard Peters points out that Aristotelian con-
cepts strongly influenced Hobbes's ideas about human thought 
processes. When Hobbes turned to consider 'trains of thought,' 
Peters observes, he, 'for all his devotion to the new sciences, was 
more influenced in his account by Aristotle than by mechan-
ics.'66 Moreover, 'Hobbes's account of regulated thinking owed 
a lot to and was an improvement on Aristotle's analysis of 
deliberation.' 67 Quite recently, Morton Kaplan wrote that 
'despite his supposed modernity, Hobbes accepted Aristotle's 
definition of the theoretical but differed with him primarily in 
claiming that politics was a theoretical subject.' 68 
In light of all these indications of the impact of Aristotelian 
ideas upon Hobbes's thought, it is not surprising to find Howard 
Warrender writing in the preface to his The Political Philosophy 
of Hobbes: 'I had hoped originally to provide some historical 
explanation of Hobbes's views, and such material as I had 
collected to this end suggested that Hobbes's dependence upon 
Aristotle is even greater than has been supposed, despite 
Hobbes's own protests against his Aristotelian studies in 
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Oxford.' 69 Warrender, however, excluded this material from 
his study on the grounds that he was interested not so much 
'with the problem of how Hobbes's theory originated or how it 
is to be explained, than with the prior question of what his 
theory is.' 70 Although quite in accord with Warrender's belief 
that understanding what Hobbes's theory is is more important 
than tracing its intellectual genealogy, I believe this distinction 
presents too simple a dichotomy. Only by understanding both 
that Aristotelian concepts are important in Hobbes and how 
they are important, do we really understand what his theory is. 
In other words, the question of Hobbes's relationship to 
Aristotelian ideas is one of intellectual substance, not simply 
one of intellectual pedigree. 
It is not really sufficient for an adequate understanding of 
Hobbes and his indebtedness to Aristotle to compile a list of the 
ways in which the two philosophers are in agreement and a 
corresponding list of their differences. In some ways, such a 
compilation is illuminating, but only rather peripherally. It is 
requisite, instead, to perceive whether there is any systematic 
pattern to the relationship. If there is such a systematic pattern, 
then understanding it becomes fairly central to appreciating 
the vision of the thinker who was responsible for creating and 
using the pattern; if not, then the relationship becomes con-
siderably more fortuitous and less interesting. The thesis of this 
study is that Hobbes's world view does exhibit quite a systematic 
relationship to the Aristotelian model of the world and that the 
logic and coherence of Hobbes's thought is therefore brought 
into relief by perceiving the structure of this relationship. 
Hobbes was quite consciously and systematically engaged in 
a task of radically transforming a traditional cosmological 
paradigm. This paradigm transformation, when completed, 
moreover, inevitably carried with it some significant implica-
tions for political theorizing, partly because the corresponding 
implications of the original paradigm had been consciously 
drawn out by some of its adherents. 
The notion of paradigm transformation calls for some 
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elaboration. The term paradigm is borrowed and adapted 
somewhat from the meaning given it by Thomas Kuhn in 
his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 71 Other terms could 
conceivably serve the same purpose, but this one has the 
advantage of a previous systematic elaboration and the 
derivative advantage of being a somewhat familiar concept. 
As Kuhn points out, every mature science proceeds on the 
basis of certain fundamental models of order which provide the 
systematic grounding for the basic concepts and methods of 
the discipline. Without such a model, or paradigm, the threshold 
of coherence and organization necessary to sustain organized 
inquiry and discourse would be lacking. From time to time, the 
fundamental paradigm, or paradigms, of a discipline become 
an insufficient framework for the fruitful investigation and, 
interpretation of the problems faced by the discipline. The 
discipline then faces a kind of theoretical crisis which cannot 
be resolved until a new model or paradigm is devised which 
can both perform the functions of the old one and at the same 
time satisfactorily accommodate the perceptions which were 
anomalous for its predecessor. Scientific revolutions, Kuhn 
concludes, are best understood as instances of this kind of 
supplantation of one fundamental paradigm by another. 
This concept of a fundamental paradigm and its functions is 
quite applicable beyond the scope of science, narrowly defined. 
It is both meaningful and illuminating to speak of a cosmologi-
cal paradigm, for example: that is, a basic model of the funda-
mental realities of the cosmos and their interrelationship. In 
fact, the speculations of the great Greek cosmologists were 
precisely of this sort; they wished to supply a basic pattern or 
framework which could make intelligible the basic pattern of 
order in nature as a whole. In the early seventeenth-century 
tradition which served as the background of the scientific 
.revolution, the cosmological paradigm had been supplied by 
Aristotle. His speculations provided the basic matrix for 
intellectual inquiry into the structure of the universe, a charac-
terization of the basic realities of the world, and a format of 
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how they were related to each other. This Aristotelian cos-
mological paradigm possessed the virtues of breadth of scope, 
depth, and coherence; and these features combined to give the 
model a profound and pervasive potency. 
This Aristotelian cosmological model is what Hobbes sets out 
systematically to transform. The structure of this transformation 
bears some elaboration in the abstract before its concrete 
documentation, especially since the nature of the change is 
somewhat more complex than the pattern of revolution des-
cribed by Kuhn. In the typical situation which Kuhn analyzes, 
one paradigm is substituted for another. The classic illustration 
of this phenomenon is the abandonment of the Ptolemaic model 
of astronomical movements for the Copernican model. In some 
cases, the previously accepted paradigm may be retained in a 
limited capacity; for example, the Newtonian model con-
tinues to have its genuine use, but only when applied to a 
limited situation within the more comprehensive Einsteinian 
model. These classic cases could be called, respectively, 
examples of paradigm replacement and paradigm transcendence. 
The movement from Aristotle's cosmos to the world of Thomas 
Hobbes shares common features with these examples, but it has 
features peculiar to it which warrant the designation of 
paradigm transformation. 
The broad-ranging cosmological paradigm of Aristotelian 
discourse was not a single, simple model. It is more fruitful to 
conceive of it as composed of at least two levels related to each 
other by a kind offunctional complementarity. The distinction 
between these two levels and the nature of their relationship is 
perhaps best characterized in terms which Michael Polanyi 
has employed in his epistemological reflections. 72 He argues 
that an analytically significant distinction can be made between 
'tacit' and 'explicit' or between 'focal' and 'subsidiary' com-
ponents in the operations of the human intelligence. These 
functionally related components are features both of visual 
perception and theoretical conception. In both of these cog-
nitive operations, the human mind relies upon beliefs, assump-
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tions, underlying patterns of order, as a footing from which to 
attend to its conscious concerns. In a particular cognitive act, 
the footing is functionally 'subsidiary' and the concerns are 
functionally 'focal.' Because the mind relies upon, rather than 
concentrates upon, the underlying framework of assumptions, 
these may also be characterized as 'tacit' components of know-
ledge in contrast with the 'explicit' components which are the 
object of attention. The designations of tacit and explicit are 
not attributes permanently affixed to any particular ideas, but 
are designations of functional roles which may be shifted 
according to the demands of the situation. 
Numerous examples of this pattern are easy to cite from 
various manifestations of the human intellect. Both conceptually 
and perceptually, for example, it could be said that we rely 
upon certain tacit assumptions about space and time which 
serve to orient us in our observations of day-to-day events. 
Kant's categories of the understanding perform in this manner. 
Linguistically, we rely upon particular words or sounds in order 
to attend to the complex thought which they are being used to 
convey. If the mind instead turns to focus upon what should be 
the subsidiary features of the complex whole, then the thought 
is dissolved, as when, late at night, one is apt to complain that 
his tired eyes are reading 'just words.' Complex bodily achieve-
ments, which also are intelligent acts, exhibit the same pattern, 
as when a tennis player relies upon his grip, stance, and stroke 
in order to attend to the flight of the ball. As any tennis player 
can attest, this skilled operation also dissolves if the appropriate 
tacit-explicit relationship is abrogated. From his analysis, 
Polanyi concludes that the tacit dimension performs an 
irreducible role in all aspects of human knowledge. 
The significance ofPolanyi's analysis in the present context is 
that the Aristotelian cosmological paradigm was a complex 
whole whose various components, when deployed, were often 
functionally related in the focal-subsidiary pattern described. 
For our present purposes, I shall distinguish as one component 
of the Aristotelian paradigm what may be designated the tacit 
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matrix. This component includes a number of assumptions 
about what the principal constituent features of the universe 
are and what their relationship is to each other. It is a matrix 
because it is a kind of structuring framework within which 
somewhat more localized problems about the nature of 
reality may be pursued. It is designated tacit in this context not 
because of its essential properties (for tacit and explicit are 
functional rather than essential designations), but because of 
the role that it plays in Hobbes's thought. The other 
component may be designated the focal model. This com-
ponent is the basic analogy used, within the framework of the 
tacit matrix, to characterize reality. It answers the question 
'what is reality like?' more than the question 'what is the 
underlying framework of things?' It is here characterized 
as focal because it was the conscious object of Hobbes's 
attention. 
The relationship of Hobbes's cosmological paradigm to the 
Aristotelian paradigm can now be stated in the following way: 
Hobbes accepted the underlying framework of the Aristotelian 
paradigm, and this component was perpetuated in his thought 
as the tacit matrix of his own paradigm. He rejected, however, 
the focal model of the Aristotelian paradigm and replaced 
it with quite a different model which he found more satisfactory. 
This overall pattern may be characterized, then, as a paradigm 
transformation- a change in which the paradigm is systematic-
ally altered, but altered within the channels established by the 
original paradigm. In such a transformation, the resultant 
paradigm is a hybrid of the old and the new; the influence 
of the older paradigm persists, even though its face has been 
changed beyond recognition. 73 
This pattern of interpretation goes a long way, I believe, 
toward resolving some of the apparent paradoxes of Hobbes's 
thought and its relationship to the Aristotelian tradition. On the 
one hand, many analysts have noted the persistence of Aristote-
lian concepts and approaches throughout Hobbes's writings. 
At the same time, it is clear from Hobbes's explicit statements 
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and from even a cursory reading of his work that there is a 
radical departure from the Aristotelian tradition in progress. 
Distinguishing between the different functional levels of the 
Aristotelian paradigm reconciles this apparent contradiction 
by explaining how it is possible for Hobbes to be both heavily 
Aristotelian in some ways and adamantly anti-Aristotelian in 
other respects. The pro- and anti-Aristotelian features are not 
simply conflicting items to be serially recounted, but instead 
comprise the systematically related particulars of two distinct 
functional levels of a single, complex intellectual model. 
The constituents of both the focal and the tacit components of 
Hobbes's revolutionary cosmological paradigm will be unfolded 
in the chapters which follow. To a certain extent, the per-
sistence of the Aristotelian framework as the tacit matrix of 
Hobbes's system of ideas will be exemplified as much as it will 
be stated. That is, it is reflected throughout in the systematic 
parallelism which holds between the exposition of Hobbes's 
ideas and the exposition of the corresponding Aristotelian 
notions against which he was reacting. It is possible, however, 
to state more explicitly, if rather sketchily, some of the assump-
tions which continue to form this persistent tacit framework. 
Hobbes, just as much as Aristotle, would have given his 
assent to a series of propositions which runs roughly as follows: 
I. The created order of the world may be designated by the 
term nature. 
2. Nature is a unified whole, with the same fundamental 
principles operative throughout. 
3· Man himself is a part of nature; in fact, he is 'that 
Rationall and most excellent worke ofNature.' 74 
4· The constituents of nature are a) change, or motion, 
b) substance, or that which remains constant through 
change, c) accidents, or the perishable attributes of sub-
stance (although Hobbes considers figure and extension 
to be peculiar accidents in that they cannot perish without 
the body in which they inhere perishing also). 7 5 
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5· Methodologically, one must understand nature by looking 
at its simplest elements, primary conditions, and first 
principles. 
6. Among these first principles, the nature of motion is of 
peculiar importance, for it must be understood before 
nature can be understood. 
These propositions indicate the basic structure of the tacit 
framework of the Aristotelian paradigm which persists into 
Hobbes's ideas. The revolutionary component of Hobbes's 
system grows from the radically different focal model which he 
develops in answer to the questions 'what is the pattern of 
motion; and what does remain through change?' Derivatively, 
he is led to give a correspondingly radical answer to the 
question 'is nature ordered and, if so, how?' And, finally, a very 
different kind of answer from that given by Aristotle is given 
to the problem 'what must man do to accommodate his 
political life to the realities of natural forces?' The answers to 
these questions form the central parts of Hobbes's world view. 
Moreover, they are interrelated answers, with the most basic 
answers exercising a profound influence on the answers provided 
the larger and more complex questions. This pattern of 
systematic relationship is mirrored in the organization of the 
following chapters, which, reflecting the tacit similarities 
between Aristotle and Hobbes, has a form appropriate to the 
exposition of the ideas of either and which elaborates the explicit 
differences that occur within this common framework. The 
analysis begins, then, where Hobbes, as Aristotle before him, 
began his analysis, namely, with an inquiry into the nature of 
motion. 
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2 
Inertia and the End of the Finite Cosmos 
'The fulfillment of what exists potentially, in so far as 
it exists potentially, is motion.' -Aristotle 
'Motion is nothing but change ofplace.'-Hobbes 
Vast conceptual revolutions often turn around very small 
hinges. The intellectual revolution of the seventeenth century, 
which shattered the medieval synthesis of Christianity and 
Aristotelianism, can be taken as a striking instance of this sort. 
It would, of course, be a gross oversimplification to attribute 
such a remarkable intellectual cataclysm to the transformation 
of a single concept. Nevertheless, the more that one examines 
the logical structure of the seventeenth-century intellectual 
transformation, the more he is impressed by the absolute 
centrality to the whole process of a new view of motion. As 
Herbert Butterfield has observed: 'Of all the intellectual 
hurdles which the human mind has confronted and has over-
come in the last fifteen hundred years, the one which seems to 
me to have been the most amazing in its character and the most 
stupendous in the scope of its consequences is the one relating 
to the problem of motion.' 1 
This radical and important change in the understanding of 
how things move was a genuine paradigm switch of the kind 
described by Kuhn. It was a change in the way that people 
looked at things that went right to the fundamentals of con-
ceptualization-so deep that it constituted a perceptual 
'gestalt shift' such as those described by psychologists of 
perception. 2 What those who had become conceptually 
reoriented looked at-the data-were the same phenomena as 
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before, but what they actually saw was something quite 
different. The change was in many ways as sudden as it was 
profound, for a gestalt shift is not accomplished simply by the 
addition of a new piece of data, but instead happens all at 
once, just as the eye instantaneously may transform the famous 
'duck-rabbit' sketch now into a duck and then back into a 
rabbit (see figure 1). 
FIGURE I 
Butterfield analogizes this process of profound intellectual 
reorientation to picking up the opposite end of the stick, and 
he points out how pervasive the implications of such a change 
can be. In the case of the transformed view of motion, 
it altered much of one's ordinary thinking about the world 
and opened the way for a flood of further discoveries and 
reinterpretations, even in the realm of common sense, 
before any very elaborate experiments had been embarked 
upon. It was as though science or human thought had 
been held up by a barrier until this moment- the waters 
dammed because of an initial defect in one's attitude to 
everything in the universe that had any sort of motion-
and now the floods were released. Change and discovery 
were bound to come in cascades even if there were no 
other factors working for a scientific revolution. 3 
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Hobbes's infatuation with the whole problem of motion 
exudes from practically all his philosophical and political 
works. He was, as Richard Peters has said, 'a man almost 
bemused by the wonder ofmotion.' 4 The Leviathan is ostensibly 
a treatise on politics, but Hobbes thinks it logical and appro-
priate to begin with a consideration of sensation, in which he 
alleges sensible qualities to be 'but so many several motions of 
the matter.' 5 He is only a couple of pages into his subject, 
moreover, before he is immersed in a discussion of the principle 
of inertia. All this intrusion of the problem of motion into 
places the modern reader would deem to be unlikely can be 
rather puzzling, but it reflects the accuracy of the characteriza-
tion of Hobbes as 'the great metaphysician of motion.' 6 Any 
account of Hobbes's thought, therefore, must begin by examin-
ing the substance of, and the reasons behind, this infatuation 
with motion. Only after such an examination can the implica-
tions of Hobbes's natural philosophy for his political theory 
be assessed knowledgeably. 
The problem of change, or motion, was not novel in the 
seventeenth century. In fact, the cosmological speculations of 
the Greeks which provided the starting point for both the 
philosophical and the scientific traditions in the West centered 
very largely around this problem. Parmenides and Heraclitus 
had posed the problem of the reality of change by taking 
essentially polar positions on the question. For the one, nothing 
ever really changed, while for the other change was the only 
reality. The task of resolving this antinomy was taken up 
by Plato, and it led him into the formulation of some of his 
most profound and characteristic cosmological ideas. The 
famous Platonic theory of the Forms, in fact, was the 
foundation of the answer he provided to the riddle of change 
and permanence. The Forms themselves were unchangeable, 
immutable, eternal. They supplied the vehicle of cosmic 
stability and permanence within which change, which was 
also real, took place. The Ideas were the 'really real' 
constituents of the cosmos, but the flux of phenomenal 
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existence had reality as well, by virtue of participation in 
these Ideas. 
The Aristotelian model of motion which persisted with such 
profound influence into the medieval scholasticism of Western 
Europe owed a great deal to this Platonic formulation. True, 
Aristotle attacked the Platonic doctrine of Forms, but this 
assault was not against the concept of Forms itself, but against 
what Aristotle felt was Plato's tendency to view the Forms as 
existing in some eternal realm wholly outside the phenomenal 
world. His concern was not to repudiate the Forms, but, quite 
the contrary, to explain how they are effectual; for if the Forms 
were transcendent, Aristotle argued, they would be irrelevant. 
As he says in the Metaphysics: 'Again, it would seem impossible 
that the substance and that of which it is the substance should 
exist apart; how, therefore, could the Ideas, being the substances 
of things, exist apart?' 7 Having rejected the transcendence of 
the Forms as an impossibility, Aristotle brought the Forms 
within the sensible world of things. The naturalized, immanent 
Forms are the 'substances' which give order and coherence to 
the world. 'For the substance is the indwelling form,' says 
Aristotle, 'from which and the matter the so-called concrete 
substance is derived.' 8 
This theory of immanent forms provides the setting for the 
Aristotelian model of motion, for substance is that which remains 
unmoved within a process of change. 'In respect of substance 
there is no motion.' 9 Movement, then, is visualized as some-
thing which takes place within the immutable boundaries of 
immanent form. Therefore, movement is limited and finite. 
Change has a definite beginning and an equally definite end, 
with this end in fact constituting an irreducible cause of the 
motion. 'Every change,' as Aristotle says, 'is from something to 
something, as the word itself [metabole] indicates.' 10 This 
formulation then leads Aristotle to his famous definition of 
motion as the synapse of potential to actual. In the Physics, 
Aristotle gives this definition in the following way: 'The 
fulfillment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists 
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potentially, is motion.' 11 This model of motion is well known, 
but its extensive and important implications are often not 
fully appreciated. These implications warrant some exploration, 
for they go a long way toward filling in the structure of the 
cosmological model which governed Western thought into the 
seventeenth century. 
Aristotelian motion, in the first place, carries pervasive 
connotations of completion, wholeness, and satisfaction. When 
something moves naturally, for Aristotle, it does so because it 
is attaining its natural essence- its essential 'whatness'; it is 
becoming what it truly is, what it is intended to be. In a word, 
motion is a sort offulfillment. 'Motion, we say, is the fulfillment 
of the movable insofar as it is movable.' 12 
Aristotelian movement is teleological. It is caused by 
attraction toward an end, a purpose, a goal. In seeking to 
understand a movement, one must consider the final cause, 
'that for the sake of which' a thing is done. The Metaphysics 
refers to 'the purpose and the good' as 'the end of all generation 
and change.' 13 Consequently, Aristotle believed that the nature 
of a particular movement is determined by its intended 
destination. To identify a movement or change as being of a 
particular kind, the crucial consideration is the telos, not the 
immediate or efficient cause. 'It is the goal rather than the 
starting point of motion that gives its name to a particular 
process of change.'14 
From the conception of movement as the actualization of 
potential, the reaching of an appointed goal, it becomes 
apparent that Aristotelian movement is a result of a basic 
tension. Movement is caused by the tension of actual and 
potential, of essence and existence, of wholeness and incomplete-
ness. This tension, then, a feature of the basic model of motion 
for Aristotle, is a characteristic of the entire classical universe, 
and the loss of this tension in the Hobbesian motion-model 
entails broad and sweeping transformations. 
The expression of the tension within a particular organism or 
substance is an innate striving to attain completion. The 
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inhabitants of Aristotle's universe possess a desire to become 
what they really and essentially are. This striving is represented 
by the theory of 'natural tendency' (horml). Everything that 
moves naturally moves because it is striving-i.e., has a dis-
tinctive natural tendency-to act in a certain proper way. A 
dog has a natural tendency to bark, a stone to fall, and a man, 
says Aristotle, to seek knowledge. This basic model of striving to 
attain fulfillment and overcome the tension between potential 
and actual is applicable to different types of motion, moreover. 
The model may be basically organic, but it is extended to 
include human and physical phenomena as well. And in its 
various manifestations, this reference to horml served Aristotle 
and the Scholastics as a principle of explanation. Gravitational 
force was explained therefore by the desire of earth to find its 
'proper place' ,just as the existence of the polis was explained by 
man's social nature. The motive force of acceleration observed 
in falling bodies could be attributed by some Scholastics, 
applying the same principle, to the 'jubilation' of the falling 
bodies as they neared their 'proper place.' 
In the Aristotelian concept of movement inertia was equated 
with rest. It was always movement and not the lack of move-
ment or the ending of a movement that required explanation. 
No external principle or force was considered necessary to 
account for the cessation of movement, for movement was 
expected to terminate itself by completing the actualization 
of that which was moved. A physical object was thought to 
come to rest of itself when it arrived at its proper place, for 
there was no reason left for it to move. When the final cause 
was eliminated through fulfillment, one of the necessary 
conditions of movement was eliminated, and therefore it was 
entirely natural for the movement to cease. Rest, for Aristotle, 
is the contrary to motion, 'for rest is the privation of motion and 
the privation of anything may be called its contrary.' 15 In 
other words, according to Aristotle, something moves only 
under the application of some external force, such as the 
influence of a final cause. If the outside force is removed, then 
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the moving body must come to rest-i.e., to a stop. It was 
wholly inconceivable to Aristotle and the Aristotelian Scholastics 
that anything should move unless under force. A constant 
force, for them, meant constant motion, not constant 
acceleration. 
This equation of inertia with rest became an extraordinarily 
important interpretative principle when analytically deployed 
to interpret particular events or actions. Given the Aristotelian 
doctrine of inertia, it followed that all motion must involve 
agency, or as Aristotle says, 'everything that is in motion must 
be moved by something.' 16 Since motion as the mere per-
sistence of a body in a movement which originated from a force 
no longer present was not conceivable, all movement implied 
the presence of some sort of guiding force or aspirant desire. 
This element of active, 'intelligent' guidance was one essential 
component in any explanation of movement. 'A universe 
constructed on the mechanics of Aristotle had the door half-
way open for spirits already; it was a universe in which unseen 
hands had to be in constant operation, and sublime Intelligences 
had to roll the planetary spheres around. Alternatively, bodies 
had to be endowed with souls and aspirations, so that matter 
itself seemed to possess mystical qualities.' 17 
This model of movement, with its whole congeries of 
implications as to teleology, inertia, and tension, was taken over 
virtually intact and incorporated into the speculations and 
analyses of medieval scholasticism. The influence of the 
Aristotelian paradigm of motion is vividly reflected in the 
formulations of Thomas Aquinas, who was the principal 
vehicle for the entrenchment of Aristotelian concepts in later 
medieval philosophy. Aquinas's account of motion is pure 
Aristotle, plus a little holy water: 'Everything moved, as such, 
tends as towards a divine likeness, to be perfect in itself; and 
since a thing is perfect in so far as it becomes actual, it follows 
that the intention of everything that is in potentiality is to 
tend to actuality by way of movement.' 1 8 
This impressive conceptual framework concerning the 
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phenomenon of motion was totally abandoned as a piece of un-
intelligible and obscurantist nonsense by the principal thinkers 
of the seventeenth century. Its rejection stemmed from a fatal 
blow in its Achilles heel, its theory of the motion of projectiles 
and falling bodies. The Aristotelian explanation of projectiles 
and falling bodies had to remain consistent with the idea that 
motion always involved a contiguous source of impetus, 
and it therefore used the 'rush of air' hypothesis. The original 
source of motion of the projectile was said to have imparted 
the power of being a 'movent' to the medium in which the 
projectile was traveling, and the motive power was seen as 
consecutively transmitted during the projectile's flight. The 
motion finally stopped 'when one member no longer caused the 
next member to be a movent but only caused it to be in motion. 
The motion of these last two,' continues Aristotle, 'must cease 
simultaneously, and with this the whole motion ceases.' 19 The 
corresponding theory of falling objects explained the accelera-
tion of these bodies as a result of the increasing weight of air 
above them. 
The various difficulties with these accounts had inspired 
considerable controversy from the fourteenth century on-
wards, 20 but these difficulties had never led to the abandon-
ment of the basic model, since no substitute model had been 
developed which could compel widespread acceptance. Alterna-
tive theories were developed, but none of them were deemed 
sufficiently superior to the Aristotelian theory to outweigh 
. the analytical scope and power which the latter possessed. The 
Aristotelian model of motion continued to prevail into the 
seventeenth century, therefore, even if its acceptance was 
somewhat uneasy. 21 
The guiding genius and principal agent in the development 
of the new view of motion which sparked the seventeenth-
century intellectual revolution was Galileo. His decisive 
conceptual breakthrough was produced by his famous thought 
experiments, and it had two essential components. First, it 
involved the transposition of the problem of motion into the 
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abstract world of geometry; and second, it involved the assump-
tion that bodies would continue to move in a straight line 
unless deflected by an outside source. This combination of a 
geometricizing method and a new model of inertia proved to be 
such a potent source of simple and lucid theoretical explanation 
that it quickly dominated the minds of the leading intellectuals 
of the seventeenth century. 
Descartes offers a profound example of this impact. For the 
new consciousness which he represents, the Aristotelian account 
of motion was completely useless. The transformation was so 
total and unqualified that the abstract spatial-i.e., geometrical 
-idea of motion, an idea quite foreign to centuries of scholars, 
catapulted into the charmed circle of Descartes's clear and 
distinct ideas. 'The learned,' complains Descartes, 'have a 
way of being so clever as to continue to render themselves 
blind to things that are in their own nature evident.' 22 The case 
of motion is the outstanding example of this blindness, Des-
cartes says: 'They define motion, a fact with which everyone is 
quite familiar, as "the actualization of what exists in potentiality, 
in so far as it is potential!" Now who understands these words? 
And who at the same time does not know what motion is? Will 
not everyone admit that those philosophers have been trying to 
find a knot in a bulrush?' 23 
Hobbes was of like mind. In fact, he went further than the 
somewhat more conservative Descartes, who freed such 
spiritual concepts as 'mind', 'soul', and 'God' from the confines 
of mechanical motion by assigning them a separate realm. 
Hobbes was a resolute monist who saw motion as comprising 
the whole of reality. As a result, Hobbes's acceptance of the 
motion model had more far-reaching implications, extending 
into his anthropology and political thought, than the similar 
acceptance by Descartes. The problems of a dualist like 
Descartes were to be found in epistemology, where the dualism 
had to be surmounted, while the problems of the monistic 
Hobbes arose from the attempt to compress the whole universe 
into the confines of his monism. Similarly, the monistic 
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Spinoza's entire world view was influenced far more pro-
foundly by his hypostasization of the new view of inertia in his 
conatus sese conservandi, than was the world view of Descartes. 
Descartes, in fact, did not concern himself extensively with a 
weltanschauung; for him, geometry was a method more than 
an ontology. 
For Hobbes, however, the geometricization of movement was 
not simply an approach to certain problems, but was also a 
revelation of the nature of the universe itself. He saw geometry 
not as an abstract, formal science, but as a revelation of the 
form of motion. 24 In his view, Galileo had not simply provided 
the basis for a science of mechanics, but had produced the 
foundation of an entire cosmology. The task he took upon 
himself was the elaboration of the motion model into a complete 
natural philosophy. In his dedicatory epistle to De Corpore 
Hobbes explicitly states the possibility of developing this new 
natural philosophy and acknowledges his indebtedness to 
Galileo. 'Galileus in our time ... was the first that opened to 
us the gate of natural philosophy universal, which is the 
knowledge of the nature of motion. So that neither can the age 
of natural philosophy be reckoned higher than to him.' 25 
This belief that motion holds the key to nature, a conviction 
which is both methodological and ontological, is not novel. 
It is important to realize that Hobbes is here actually following 
the lead of Aristotle, who also saw the knowledge of the nature 
of motion to be the 'gate of natural philosophy.' Aristotle's 
expression of this proposition is as follows: 'Nature has been 
defined as a principle of motion and change, and it is the 
subject of our inquiry. We must therefore see that we under-
stand the meaning of motion; for if it were unknown, the 
meaning of "nature" too would be unknown.' 26 In keeping 
with our basic analysis of the pattern of tacit-framework-
persistence and explicit-model-replacement in the shift from 
Aristotle to Hobbes, then, it is possible to say that Hobbes 
insists upon the profound ramifications of the new model of 
motion precisely because he is, formally speaking, a good 
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Aristotelian, even while he is jettisoning Aristotle's view of 
what motion is. 
To begin his natural philosophy, then, Hobbes, like Aristotle, 
begins with the study of motion. But whereas Aristotle had 
turned principally to biological growth and human deeds 
Hobbes turns to geometry to find this crucial knowledge: 'and 
such writers or disputes thereof, as are ignorant of geometry, do 
but make their readers and hearers lose their time'. 27 The 
nature of motion which geometry reveals, says Hobbes, is 
'nothing but change of place.' 28 Moreover, Hobbes asserts 
that 'all mutation consists in motion.' 29 Together, these two 
basic assumptions make up the proposition that Hobbes tries 
to maintain throughout his consideration of everything from 
physics to politics: all change is really nothing but change of 
place. To complete the chain of definition, it should be noted 
that 'place' for Hobbes has none of the warm and amiable 
characteristics that it sometimes had for Aristotle-e.g., in the 
concept of 'natural place.' Aristotelian 'place' had 'homes' in 
it, but Hobbesian 'place' is an empty geometrical abstraction. 
The 'motion' which Hobbes sees as the very life of the 
universe is far different from Aristotle's 'movement.' Where 
Aristotelian movement was finite, Hobbesian movement is 
infinite. It has no order, no structure, no end or limitation. 
It is endless, aimless motion. It is not 'from ... to ... ,' as 
Aristotle assumed, but rather an endless chain without a goal. 
Hobbes therefore deletes from change the connotation of 
fulfillment which formed a part of Aristotle's definition of 
motion as the actualization of potential. 'Potentiality' Hobbes 
consigns to oblivion as another vain and empty phrase of the 
Scholastics. As he says in his Answer to Bishop Bramhall: 'There 
is no such word as potentiality in the Scriptures, nor in any 
author of the Latin tongue. It is found only in School-divinity, 
as a word of art, or rather as a word of craft, to amaze and 
puzzle the laity.'ao 
The pervasive teleological character of motion in the 
Aristotelian-Scholastic model, therefore, disappears completely 
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in the Hobbesian model. End-less motion is, by definition, 
motion without a telos. This disappearance of teleology from 
the Hobbesian universe is seen in Hobbes's discussion of 
causation. 
All causes are motions for Hobbes. 'Universal things,' he 
tells us, 'have all but one universal cause, which is motion ... 
and motion cannot be understood to have any other cause 
besides motion.' 31 The Aristotelian understanding of causation 
as a complex of material, efficient, formal, and final elements is 
therefore dispensable, and causation becomes a sort of constant 
succession, like the transmission of momentum along a row of 
billiard balls. Efficient cause, seen as momentum, subsumes the 
Aristotelian formal and final causes, which thereby lose their 
previous force. 'The writers of metaphysics reckon up two 
other causes besides the efficient and material, namely the 
essence, which some call the formal cause, and the end, or final 
cause; both which are nevertheless efficient causes.' 32 
The consequences of this conceptual transformation are 
radical and far-reaching. As Brandt says, these lines consigning 
final causes to the trash bin 'must have had the effect of the 
blow of a bludgeon on Hobbes's Aristotelian contemporaries. 
A whole world perished with the giving up of the final 
causes.' 33 
For Aristotle, force exerted by a contiguous agent was 
necessary for any movement. This was the efficient cause. 
But the force of this contiguous agent was not in itself a 
sufficient explanation of movement. On the contrary, it was the 
final cause or telos which was not only necessary, but was 
pre-eminent; the name of a movement came from its goal. 
When defining or characterizing a specific movement, Aristotle 
looked first to 'that for the sake of which.' Hobbes quite 
emphatically abandons this view and asserts that the force of a 
contiguous body is entirely sufficient to explain any motion; in 
fact, there is no other cause to consider. 'There can be no 
cause of motion,' he says, 'except in a body contiguous and 
moved.' He continues: 
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For let there be any two bodies which are not contiguous, 
and betwixt which the intermediate space is empty, or, if 
filled, filled with another body which is at rest; and let one 
of the propounded leaders be supposed to be at rest; I 
say it shall always be at rest. For if it shall be moved, the 
cause of that motion ... will be some external body; and 
therefore, if between it and that external body there be 
nothing but empty space, then whatsoever the disposition 
be of that external body or of the patient itself, yet if it be 
supposed to be now at rest, we may conceive it will con-
tinue so till it be touched by some other body. 34 
The notion of 'agency' is therefore reduced by Hobbes to 
merely 'the aggregate of all such accidents,' 35 that is, the sum 
total of external forces exerted by bodies 'contiguous and 
moved.' 
The same principle, Hobbes says, is seen in the new doctrine 
of inertia: 
The same reason may serve to prove that whatsoever is 
moved, will always be moved on in the same way and with 
the same velocity, except it be hindered by some other 
contiguous and moved body; and consequently that no 
bodies, either when they are at rest, or when there is an 
interposition of vacuum, can generate or extinguish or 
lessen motion in other bodies. There is one that has written 
that things moved are more resisted by things at rest, than 
by things contrarily moved; for this reason, that he con-
ceived motion not to be so contrary to motion as rest. 
That which deceived him was, that the words rest and 
motion are but contradictory names; whereas motion, 
indeed, is not resisted by rest, but by contrary motion. 36 
There really is no such thing as 'rest' for Hobbes; there are only 
motions and contrary motions. This viewpoint marked a 
decisive shift from the Aristotelian idea. Rest for Aristotle 
E 
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enjoyed an ontological primacy; rest was the repose of 
something that had reached its end or fulfillment. Rest was a 
mark of wholeness and completion, a completion toward which 
all motion was striving. In a sense, then, rest was really the 
'cause' of movement, a source of impetus. Motion was a 
function of rest, and this relationship par excellence symbolized 
the finitude of the universe. 
Hobbes sees no impetus in rest; impetus resides only in a 
body contiguous and moved. In effect, then, he abolishes rest 
in the Aristotelian sense altogether. His world is 'rest-less.' 
The only use he gives rest is to signify a basically accidental 
absence of motion. The Hobbesian position, in short, is a fully 
conscious elaboration of the new idea of inertia. Whereas 
Aristotle and the Thomists, beginning with the ontological 
primacy of rest, saw movements as problematic departures 
from this state, Hobbes makes rest merely one possible con-
figuration of motion, qualitatively no different from any other 
vector of forces. Rest is no longer peculiarly natural. A body 
at rest is no different, except accidentally, from an unopposed 
body continuing its motion indefinitely in the same direction. 
Rest in the Aristotelian sense of absence of movement is no 
longer primary, but merely one possible type of unaccelerated 
motion, which is now given ontological primacy. The Aris-
totelian cosmology revolved around the distinction between 
movement and rest; the new distinction is between continuous 
motion and acceleration, and the Aristotelian distinction is 
rendered inconsequential and meaningless. 
The obliteration of the Aristotelian distinction and the 
substitution of the new distinction, the replacement of the 
ontological primacy of rest by the ontological primacy of sus-
tained motion, brings with it a transformation in the whole 
root conception of change. No longer does movement imply 
tension. Natural movement is no longer a striving to attain, 
but rather a simple continuation. The direction of a motion is 
not formal and substantive, but vectorial. Movement is not 
structured by a goal, but is wholly guided by a preceding 
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concatenation of motions. The basic characteristic of motion, 
therefore, is not to grow, or develop, or reach fulfillment, but 
to persist, to continue ad infinitum. Any modification of an 
original force is a deflection, not a maturity. 
Finally, motion is homogeneous for Hobbes. He regards all 
movements as simply one form or another of simple change of 
place. Therefore, the Aristotelian distinction between natural 
and violent motion disappears. In a sense, both are absorbed, 
and hence dissolved, under the principle of necessity which for 
Hobbes encompasses the universe. All the motions in Hobbes's 
world form a conceptual amalgam that corresponds rather 
closely to the Aristotelian conception of spontaneity or chance, 
i.e., incidental motions, which would by definition be contrary 
to nature in things which had a natural motion. (Natural, in 
this context, means for Aristotle, for its given purpose; the 
whole distinction turns around the notion of teleology.) The 
Aristotelian term for spontaneity is to automaton-things that 
move for no reason. Hobbesian movement is all 'automatic,' 
and life itself for Hobbes consists in automaticity. 'Why may 
we not say,' he asks, 'that all automata (Engines that move 
themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an 
artificial life?' 37 Aristotle would answer that life involves 
purposeful striving, as automaticity does not. But Hobbes 
would consider this objection to be merely a function of the 
outmoded Aristotelian idea of movement. The Aristotelian 
distinction between natural and automatic movements had 
been abandoned by Hobbes with the abandonment of the 
dichotomy between rest and movement. Violent motion for 
Hobbes is accelerated motion, and the distinction between 
natural and automatic motion is no longer involved in any 
natural/violent motion distinction, but can rather be resolved 
in favor of automaticity. Natural movements are automatic 
for Hobbes. 
Just as Aristotle applied his potency/actuality model of 
movement, based on the conception of inertia as rest, to 
all types of natural movements, whether they be physical, 
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biological, or human, Hobbes applied his idea of motion, the 
purposeless, automatic preservation of an original impetus, to 
all types of movements. In the finite cosmos of Aristotle and the 
Thomists, 'everything that comes to be moves toward an 
end' ;38 in the Hobbesian world everything that comes to be 
moves ad infinitum. Motion reigns throughout the entire phe-
nomenal universe, which for Hobbes unlike Descartes is the 
whole of reality. When Descartes geometricized motion, he 
removed himself and God from this mechanism, and philoso-
phers began to puzzle over the connection between these 
'ghosts' and the machine of the world. However anti-Scholastic 
Hobbes may be, he shared the characteristic Aristotelian 
rejection of all such dualisms. The unified world view of Aris-
totle suited his resolutely monistic sensibility very well, once he 
transformed the 'obscurantist' idea of movement into his 'clear' 
idea of motion. AsJ. H. Randall observed in his book Aristotle, 
'in many fundamental respects, Hobbes remained a good 
Ockhamite Aristotelian.' 39 
Hobbes undertook the universal transformation of movement 
into motion with a methodical thoroughness. He felt motion to 
be the basic principle not merely of physical bodies, but of all 
the constituents of the universe, including nature, life, and 
mind. That is, having developed and articulated his basic model 
of motion, Hobbes applies it systematically to the entire furni-
ture of the cosmos. This universal application of a root-para-
digm is a step which once more was prefigured, hence invited, 
by Aristotelian cosmology. Aristotle, too, applied his own 
paradigm of motion to all realms of reality: physical, biological, 
and human. The formal patterns of Hobbes's cosmology are, 
therefore, once more taken as prefabricated from the structure 
of the Aristotelian framework. The only differences, albeit 
crucial ones, are in the nature of the explicit model being used 
and the direction of its movement from one cosmological level 
to another. The explicit Aristotelian model is finite and teleolo-
gical, the Hobbesian counterpart is infinite and inertial. The 
Aristotelian model is basically biological in origin and trans-
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ported from there into the physical and political realms; the 
Hobbesian model originates in the interpretation of physical 
events and is thence exported into biological and social analyses. 
The first critical step that Hobbes takes in his transposition of 
the motion model from the realm of physical motion to the 
whole of reality appears with his concept of'vital motion.' Living 
bodies, of course, move, but is it possible to conceive of their 
movements as another species of inertial motion? Hobbes was 
convinced that they could be so conceived. His immediate 
inspiration with regard to this question was the work of William 
Harvey, who made his discovery of the principle of circulation 
almost wholly on the basis of arithmetic calculations. Harvey's 
methods were instinctively appealing to Hobbes, who was con-
vinced that geometric tools provided the only effectual means 
for understanding anything that moved. Proceeding on this 
basis, Harvey considered the physiological functions of the 
circulatory system as a mechanical system. He spoke of the 
heart, for example, as 'a piece of machinery in which though 
one wheel gives motion to another, yet all the wheels seem to 
move simultaneously.' 
Seizing this image of the mechanism of circulation, Hobbes 
identifies it with the principle of life itself. Circulation is 'vital 
motion.' 'Now vital motion is the motion of the blood, per-
petually circulating (as hath been shown from many infallible 
signs and marks by Doctor Harvey the first observer of it) in 
the veins and arteries.' 40 It is difficult to overemphasize the 
significance of the interpretative leap which Hobbes makes 
here. By identifying vitality, or life in its biological aspect, with 
the motion of the circulatory system, Hobbes converts vitality 
into a mechanism. The perpetually circulating blood, which is 
a kind of circular inertial system, becomes life itself. The 
'original of life,' as Hobbes says, is 'in the heart,' 41 which has 
been identified as a mechanical pump. Consequently, it is 
possible to say, as Hobbes does, that life is 'but a motion of 
limbs.' 42 
Inertial motion, by definition, involves a tendency to persist 
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in its movement. Hobbes uses this aspect of his motion model, 
then, to extend it to the more complex manifestations of life, 
such as the will and the passions of living creatures. Life is 
motion, says Hobbes; this much is established. Motion tends 
to persist, and this tendency constitutes the striving of the 
organism. 
But if vital motion be helped by motion made by sense, 
then the parts of the organ will be disposed to guide the 
spirits in such manner as conduceth most to the preserva-
tion and augmentation of that motion, by the help of the 
nerves. And in animal motion this is the very first en-
deavour, and found even in the embryo; which while it is 
in the womb, moveth its limbs with voluntary motion, for 
the avoiding of whatsoever troubleth it, or for the pursuing 
of what pleaseth it. And this first endeavour, when it tends 
towards such things as are known by experience to be 
pleasant, is called appetite, that is, an approaching; and 
when it shuns what is troublesome, aversion, or flying from 
it. 43 
Once again an established Aristotelian concept- in this 
instance, that of horme-has been transformed. Like Aristotle, 
Hobbes sees organisms as characterized by natural tendencies, 
by inherent strivings; but this is the striving to persist, not the 
desire to reach a telos. The central phenomenon of endeavour 
is, in Hobbes's view, a kind of biological inertia, an in-finitized 
horme. 
The spread of the motion model as the paradigm of all the 
manifestations of life proceeds next to the will. This step follows 
quite easily, for Hobbes sees the will as essentially identical with 
appetite. 44 The only reason for their having different names, 
Hobbes says, is that will is appetite which succeeds deliberation. 
But deliberation effects no real transformation of the appetite 
before it issues into will; nor in fact could it, for deliberation too 
is seen by Hobbes on the model of a vector of mechanical 
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motions. Deliberation is, in fact, simply the vicissitude of con-
tending appetites and aversions. 45 Hence, the will is the 
resultant vector which emerges from the whole welter of various 
appetites. And since the will is one species of appetite, it too is a 
species of motion, for the appetites and aversions are 'motions 
of the heart.' 46 
Not only are the passions motions, in Hobbes's view, but 
cognition also can be conceived as a form of motion. That is, the 
intellectual faculties as well as the emotional strivings of living 
creatures are, at bottom, nothing but motion. The reduction of 
cognition to motion is mediated in Hobbes's system through the 
pivotal concept of sensation. The problem of sensation was a 
principal focus in the 'Little Treatise' in I63o, and it remained 
central in Hobbes's mind throughout his philosophical specula-
tions. (The first chapter of the Leviathan, for example, is en-
titled 'Of Sense.') Again, this approach to the phenomenon of 
cognition through an examination of sensation is patterned 
after Aristotle, whose epistemological reflections proceed in the 
same way. 47 
The Aristotelian tradition made the senses the basic organs 
of the understanding. Nothing was held to be in the mind that 
was not previously in the senses. The senses, moreover, were 
trusted as a source of knowledge; what they revealed to the 
mind were genuine aspects of external reality. If the mind saw 
colors, then colors were sensible qualities, features of the real 
world. 
In the Cartesian version of the seventeenth-century intel-
lectual revolution, the Aristotelian view of sensation is doubly 
challenged. Both the unavoidable reliance of the mind upon the 
senses and the essential trustworthiness of the senses are denied 
by Descartes. Descartes began his epistemology from a stance of 
radical distrust of the senses. This distrust, in fact, was the real 
substance of the famed Cartesian doubt. The senses, he felt, had 
led men into gross errors in their search for knowledge; there-
fore, the senses had to be circumvented. As Descartes put it in 
his first Meditation: 'All that up to the present time I have 
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accepted as most true and certain I have learned either from 
the senses or through the senses; but it is sometimes proved to 
me that these senses are deceptive, and it is wiser not to trust 
entirely to any thing by which we have once been deceived.' 48 
Descartes's solution to the unreliability of the senses was neo-
Platonic. He felt that it is possible to rely upon intuition, which 
can give knowledge of clear and distinct ideas that are not 
contingent upon sensation. Mathematical ideas are of this 
class and so are the ideas of God and the soul. Descartes felt 
certain that these ideas do not come from the senses. 'Even the 
philosophers in the Schools hold it as a maxim that there is 
nothing in the understanding which has not first of all been in 
the senses, in which there is certainly no doubt that the ideas of God 
and of the soul have never been.' 49 In other words, one challenge to 
the Aristotelian account of sensation served to save Descartes 
from the potentially disastrous consequences of the other 
challenge. The possible dangers of the unreliability of the senses 
are staved off by the denial that we have only the senses to 
rely upon as a source of knowledge. By making important areas 
of knowledge 'angelic,' Descartes can circumvent the unreliable 
senses. 
Hobbes's notion of senses is rather curious, but important. 
He, like Descartes, knows the senses to be deceptive, but he 
will have none of the Cartesian mysticism of mental powers 
detached from the senses. He retains the Aristotelian-Scholastic 
conjunction of the mind with the senses: 'For there is no 
conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first, totally, or 
by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.' 50 Rather 
than separate the mind from the senses and give greater 
reliance to the former, as Descartes does, Hobbes transforms 
the senses into a species of motion and then extends this model 
into the mind. Sensible qualities, which Aristotle and the 
Scholastics considered to be qualities of the object of sense, are 
removed from the world by Hobbes. What really is there as the 
cause of sensation is the motion of the object; the colors, sounds, 
and odors are 'apparitions.' 'Whatsoever accidents or qualities 
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our senses make us think there be in the world, they be not 
there, but are seeming and apparition only: the things that 
really are in the world without us, are those motions by which 
these seemings are caused.' 51 If sensible qualities are not in the 
object, though, they are not in us either. 'Neither in us that are 
pressed, are they anything else but divers motions.' 52 
This formulation leaves Hobbes with some insuperable 
difficulties. For one thing, by rejecting the nonsensible per-
ceptions of Descartes he leaves himself dependent upon the 
very senses which he knows to be potentially deceptive. More-
over, he never provides any satisfactory account of the nature 
or the location of the 'apparitions' or 'fancies' at all. They are 
not in the object, but they are not in the mind either. 53 Never-
theless, whatever its inherent difficulties, this formulation 
enables Hobbes to achieve his intended goal, namely, the 
reduction of knowledge as well as the passions to a form of 
motion. 
The reduction of knowledge to motion is accomplished 
through the following equations. There are two kinds of 
knowledge, and 'both of these sorts are but experience.' 5 4 But 
all experience is memory, and hence knowledge is just memory. 
'All experience being, as I have said, but remembrance, all 
knowledge is remembrance.' 55 Memory is the same as imagina-
tion. 'Imagination and Memory, are but one thing, which for 
divers considerations hath divers names.' 56 But 'imagination ... 
is nothing but decaying sense.' 57 And because sense is nothing 
but 'divers motion,' the chain of reductive equations is com-
pleted, and all knowledge becomes motion. 
Such, then, is the nature and the scope of the new concept of 
motion which played on Hobbes's imagination and thence-
forth served him as an analytical paradigm of universal 
applicability. In Hobbes's world the Aristotelian configuration 
of purposeful, finite movements had disappeared entirely. In 
their stead remained a homogeneous swarm of incoherent, aim-
less perpetuations of momentum that had no capacity for 
growth, for fulfillment, or for rest. The new universe was 
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open-ended rather than finite, literally restless, and completely 
without intrinsic ordering purposes beyond the striving to 
persist in its motion. 
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The Corporealization of Substance 
'Substance is the starting point of everything.'- Aristotle 
'Substance and Body signifie the same thing.' -Hobbes 
The Aristotelian cosmos was composed of substance and 
movement. The notion of'substance' was the correlate of 'move-
ment', for it was within substance that movement occurred, 
connecting the potential and the completed actuality. The 
Hobbesian universe is composed, in contrast but in parallel, of 
motion and 'body', ideas as closely interconnected as substance 
and movement. The rejection of one member of each pair 
involves the corresponding rejection of the other member. 
Therefore, the results of Hobbes's disavowal of movement was a 
parallel disavowal of substance, and vice versa. The Aristotelian 
rubric of substance/movement remains as a form in Hobbes's 
body/motion, but the content is no longer there. Part of 
Hobbes's transformation of the classical cosmos, it can literally 
be said, involved draining the universe of its 'substance.' 
Aristotle's concept of 'ousia' is very difficult to understand. 
The noted Aristotle scholar W. D. Ross, for example, termed 
Aristotle's principal treatment of 'ousia', the Metaphysics, a 
'desperately difficult' work. Not only do textual and philological 
problems impede our understanding of Aristotle, but many 
knowledgeable scholars believe that Aristotle himself, using the 
concept heuristically as much as purely denotatively, was not 
fully clear in his own mind concerning 'ousia.' 1 The apparent 
inconsistencies and virtually irreconcilable uses of the term in 
the Aristotelian corpus make it possible to refute almost any 
77 
THE POLITICS OF MOTION 
general interpretation a commentator might suggest. The 
tendency is to read into the text one's own presuppositions, 
since there is sufficient leeway to do so if the commentator takes 
some liberties with the text. In spite of all these difficulties and 
temptations, however, a few general statements about the 
functioning of the notion of 'ousia' in Aristotle must be risked if 
the impact and full meaning of Hobbes's parallel concept of 
body are to be appreciated. 
The most striking feature of the concept of 'ousia' in 
Aristotle is its omnipresence. Just as Hobbes felt that 'every 
part of the universe is body,' Aristotle felt that every thing in the 
universe was substance.2 'As in syllogisms, substance is the 
starting point of everything.' 3 Everything that can be said to be 
at all has its being by virtue of its relation to substance. 'We 
have treated of that which is primarily and to which all the 
other categories of being are referred-i.e.-of substance. For 
it is in virtue of the concept of substance that the others also are 
said to be.'' The substance of something is simply that by which 
it is what it is-its formula, its identity, its essential whatness. 
In Aristotle's view, to define anything was to give an account 
of its substance, and conversely the substance of an entity was 
equivalent to its essential definition. Morphologically, 'ousia' 
was formed from the feminine singular of the present participle 
of the verb 'to be.' 5 Linguistically, the concept of'ousia' was the 
transmutation into a noun form of the verb which indicated 
simple existence, and the philosophical realism of Aristotle was 
based partly upon the attribution of ontological significance to 
this linguistic form. 
Obviously, as Aristotle took great pains to point out, there 
are many different kinds of substance just as there are many 
different uses of the verb 'to be.' Much of the Aristotelian 
corpus, in fact, consists of a bewildering array of distinctions 
among the various kinds of substance and among the different 
meanings of that term which Aristotle perceived. Some sub-
stances are primary, some not. 6 Some substances are perceptible, 
some intelligible but not perceptible. 7 Substance 'is of two 
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kinds, the concrete thing and the formula,' 8 with the former 
capable of destruction while the latter is not. Substance is not a 
universal,9 but it is nevertheless separable from matter, at least 
in principle. 10 Since some of these distinctions and the implica-
tions that should follow from them are not maintained con-
sistently, moreover, it becomes extremely difficult to know 
precisely what Aristotle did mean substance to be in any general 
sense. Perhaps the simplest explanation he gives is his statement 
that substance is 'what makes this thing flesh and that a 
syllable.' 11 And that which makes something what it is is 
basically its 'indwelling form.' 12 
Relative to the radical reformulation that the problem under-
lying the concept of substance (i.e., what is it that maintains 
identity through change?) received in the seventeenth century, 
two characteristics of the Aristotelian notion of 'ousia' are 
especially important. The first characteristic is the incredible 
breadth of the single concept and, consequently, the great 
burden which it carried in the system as a whole. Through its 
application to a vast array of disparate phenomena, 'ousia' 
represented an attempt to encompass within a single format the 
entire realm of being. Everything that existed in the realm of 
nature-i.e., the ordered world-took its place within the 
bounds of a particular substance from which its own individual 
existence was derived. Despite Aristotle's generally keen eye for 
subtle distinctions, his application of this common format across 
the different realms of being- the physical, the biological, the 
conscious-tended to blur the important differences among 
them. The capstone of the Aristotelian imposition of a homo-
geneous format upon heterogeneous subject matter was his 
concept of 'nature,' which will be examined more carefully in 
the following chapter. The common format provided by the 
universal application of the concept of 'ousia' permitted the use 
of central concepts such as desire, natural tendency, rest, 
purpose, and end throughout the Physics as well as De Anima. 
The continuity of all the orders of being was emphasized. The 
human, the biological, and the physical were all 'substantial' 
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and hence subject to a basically similar set of ground rules. 
The concept of 'ousia,' then, represented the common 
principles of finitude and coherence which together charac-
terized the Aristotelian natural cosmos. The concept, therefore, 
carried a great burden and has been subject to various interpre-
tations. Functionalists have found that the notion of 'ousia' was 
in many uses a functional and dynamic concept; medieval 
theologians applied 'ousia' to the divine activity of God; 
leading seventeenth-century thinkers found 'ousia' to be 'sub-
stance' in the material, atomistic sense that the word has come 
to have in modern times. In a sense, all these interpretations 
are right. The naturalist interpretation is right in that 
Aristotle saw the natural elements and certain physical 
properties as 'ousiae.' 13 The functionalist interpretation is right 
in that 'ousiae' were often defined in terms of process, as for 
example in the discussion of the faculties of the soul.14 The 
theological interpretation is right in that the completion of the 
defining movement of an 'ousia' -i.e., a movement in which 
the end is present-was considered an activity. 15 
That each of the above interpretations has some validity is 
perhaps not as significant as the fact that all of them are to some 
extent valid. The partial validity of all the interpretations 
reflects the role of the concept of 'ousia' as a framework within 
which disparate phenomena are given common principles of 
existence. In effect, the status of 'ousia' could be given to any-
thing that could be put into the form of an irreducible noun-
i.e., a noun that cannot be resolved without destroying its 
essential whatness. As a result, the brace of 'ousiae,' within 
which movements occurred and which together made up the 
realm of Aristotelian nature, extended as a continuum from the 
lowest substance to the divine substance. In the application of 
this common framework, the lower end of the continuum 
became somewhat overendowed while the upper end became 
relatively impoverished. Thus the elements themselves took on 
aspects of desire and purposiveness, while Aristotle's treatment 
of human emotions was often rather wooden. 16 Taken simply 
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as an analogical principle of ultimate similarity, which was one 
of its central roles within the Aristotelian system, the concept of 
'ousia' provided a channel through which characteristics of one 
realm of being could pervade another realm. As long as the 
general direction of flow was from anthropomorphic regions 
into the physical realm, political speculation could be reason-
ably healthy at the expense offailures in the physical disciplines. 
When the direction was reversed, however, the health of 
physics was purchased at the expense of political sanity by those 
who, like Hobbes, maintained the fundamental Aristotelian 
analogy throughout the realms of being. 
The second characteristic of the Aristotelian concept of 
'ousia' important for grasping its dissolution in the seventeenth 
century is its incipient materialism. By materialism in this con-
text is not meant the crude atomism of Democritus or the 
spatialism of the seventeenth century, but rather a congeries of 
attributes which suggest a root intellectual model that sees the 
world in terms of things. This model is a spatial model, though 
not in the seventeenth-century sense of space since Aristotelian 
space is impregnated with sensibility and perfectibility. Being 
was characterized by finitude and by a human, valuational con-
tent oflocation. Human purposes and attributes were 'placed,' 
opening the way for the comfortable 'interpenetration of space 
and destiny' that characterized Scholastic theology, based as it 
was on Aristotelian notions. 
Part of this peculiarly Aristotelian incipient materialism was 
linguistic in origin. The Stagirite's relentless quest for the basic 
principles of Being was essentially noun-oriented. As the 
primary data of reality, Aristotle took 'ness-es' instead of 'ings,' 
subjects and predicates instead of verbs. Before attempting to 
investigate the nature of anything, he almost invariably 
converted it into a noun form. Even the central concept of 
'ousia' is the transposition of the most simple verb, 'to be,' into 
a noun. The objects of inquiry, then, were almost always 
'ness-es' and things, 'properties,' 'parts,' and 'accidents.' 
Whatever was ultimately a subject of predication 17 was seen 
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as ultimately real, and not only real, but impenetrably so. 
Viewing these ultimate nouns as irreducible categories of being 
then tended to freeze the lines of reality from which they were 
drawn, and the consequence was a whole host of philosophical 
dilemmas that have plagued Aristotle's heirs ever since-e.g., 
the theological problem of how the divine and human 'ousiae' 
may be conjoined and the epistemological problem of how 
subject and object 'ousiae' can meet. 
The second strand of Aristotle's incipient materialism was the 
significance attributed to place. 'Place' was a potent force in the 
Aristotelian cosmos and was a correlate of the doctrine of rest. 
Things came to rest when they reached their natural place, and 
therefore movements could be explained by the attempt to 
reach these spatial 'homes.' Aristotelian space was hetero-
geneous and valuational, and these two features were inter-
related. What something was, its position in the natural order, 
was related to where it was. Myth was woven into cosmology and 
emotions into motions-hence the 'jubilation' offalling bodies 
and the perfection of the highest heaven. When the seven-
teenth-century thinkers homogenized space, they were logically 
led to homogenize, and consequently destroy, values as well. 
Hierarchy and order in Being were tied in with hierarchical 
space and disappeared with it. 
Aristotle had no intention of being materialistic in any way. 
His linguistically induced tendency to view substance as that 
which made matter into some 'definite thing,' 18 and his 
basically spatial consciousness were susceptible to materialistic 
conclusions, however; and, realizing this tendency, Aristotle 
carefully distinguished his views from explicit materialism. 
The ultimate foundation of Aristotle's intellectual attack on 
materialists, however, was his conception of movement which 
was discarded with the seventeenth-century view of inertia. 
Aristotle argued that a purely corporeal view of the universe 
could not explain movement: 'Those, then, who say the 
universe is one and posit one kind of thing as matter, and as 
corporeal matter which has spatial magnitude, evidently go 
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astray in many ways. For they posit the elements of bodies 
only, not of incorporeal things, though there are also incor-
poreal things. And in trying to state the causes of generation 
and destruction, and in giving a physical account of all things, 
they do away with the cause of movement.' 19 Aristotle, there-
fore, with good reason but nevertheless quite fatally, hinged 
his conception of 'ousiae' upon his conception of finite teleolo-
gical movement. When his conception of movement suc-
cumbed to the Galilean theory of impetus, the way was cleared 
for the reduction of substance to mere matter, a reduction 
contrary to the whole intention of Aristotle's philosophy. 
Aristotle would have considered such a corporeal universe 
completely unknowable: 'matter is unknowable in itself.' 20 The 
generation of Descartes, Hobbes, Galileo, and Mersenne found 
this to be no problem, for the language of matter and the key 
to the principles of motion were revealed to them by geometry. 
The language of numbers superseded the language of nouns, 
and substance disappeared from the universe. 
Whatever the philosophical differences that may have 
existed among Hobbes's contemporaries, they shared in 
common a view of substance that was a radical departure from 
the significance that term held for Aristotle. The problem for 
which the notion of 'ousia' served as an answer to Aristotle-
i.e., what are the finite channels within which movements take 
place?- no longer bothered them. The new concept of inertia 
removed the problem for them. Whereas Aristotle saw sub-
stances as the stable patterns or entities within which move-
ments took place, the seventeenth-century thinkers saw 
substances as something very similar to Aristotle's 'material 
substratum.' The common element in the Aristotelian and 
seventeenth-century uses of the term is its designation for that 
which remains stable throughout change, but there is a radical 
shift in the conception of what does remain unchanging. The 
retention of a common functional use of the term leads in the 
new world view to its application to an entirely different 
referent. In a sense, then, it can be said that the modern 
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meaning of substance is almost diametrically opposite to the 
meaning it had for Aristotle. 21 
Descartes conceived of two basic substances, mind and body, 
the former having the power of thought but no extension and 
the latter having extension but no power of thought. Locke saw 
substance as an unknowable something that served as an empty 
vehicle for qualities: 
So that if any one will examine himself concerning the 
notion of pure substance in general, he will find that he has 
no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he 
knows not what support of such qualities which are 
capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities 
are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, 
what is the subject wherein color or weight inheres, he 
would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts; 
and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and 
extension inhere in, he would not be in a much better 
case than the Indian before mentioned, who, saying that 
the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked 
what the elephant rested on; to which his answer was-
a great tortoise: but being again pressed to know what 
gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied-
something, he knew not what. 22 
For Hobbes substance becomes simply that which is extended-
'body,' and the aggregate of bodies comprises the entire 
universe. 'The word "Body" in the most general acceptation, 
signifieth that which filleth, or occupyeth some certain room, 
or imagined place, and dependeth not on the imagination, but 
is a reall part of what we call the Universe. For the Universe, 
being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no reall part thereof 
that is not also Body; nor any thing properly A Body, that is 
not also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe .... 
And according to this acceptation of the word, Substance and 
Body signify the same thing.' 23 
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In arriving at this formulation of the content of the universe, 
Hobbes is explicitly critical of Aristotelian philosophy and the 
doctrines of Scholasticism based on Aristotle. Having enumera-
ted what he considers to be some disastrous aspects of this mode 
of philosophy, he concludes with one ofhis inimitable diatribes: 
'And I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said 
in natural Philosophy, than that which now is called Aristotle's 
Metapqysiques, nor more repugnant to Government, than much 
of that he hath said in his Politiques; nor more ignorantly than 
a great part of his Ethiques.' 24 
The fuming of the old Englishman was not wholly empty 
irasdbility. His personal distaste for some of Aristotle's beliefs, 
for example the Stagirite's anti-egalitarianism and approval of 
the mixed polity, was buttressed by a keen eye for critical weak 
points of the Aristotelian system. When he passes beyond 
generalized charges to specific criticisms of Aristotelian sub-
stantialism Hobbes often returns to the linguistic source of some 
of Aristotle's difficulties 25 and to the inadequacies of Aris-
totelian mechanics. Both in De Corpore and in the Decameron 
Physiologicum, Hobbes contends that the whole Aristotelian 
concept of substance originated in puzzles arising from the use 
of the copulative 'to be.' Citing that the concepts of substance 
and essence derive 'from the Latin verb est' 26 Hobbes argues 
that the elimination of that particular verb form would have 
eliminated the derivative concepts and the resulting difficulties. 
Historically, he points out in support of his argument, other 
languages without an analogous term managed to avoid the 
problem of essences. 
For having said in themselves (for example): 'a tree is a 
plant,' and conceiving well enough what is the signification 
of those names, knew not what to make of the word is, 
that couples those names; nor daring to call it a body, they 
called it by a new name (derived from the word est), 
essentia and substantia, deceived by the idiom of their own 
language. For in many other tongues, and namely in the 
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Hebrew, there is no such copulative. They thought the 
names of things sufficiently connected, when they are 
placed in their natural consequence; and were therefore 
never troubled with essences, nor other fallacy from the 
copulative 'est.'27 
As a corollary to this line of argument, Hobbes asserts that 
many problems of Aristotelian modes of thought stem from the 
reification of accidents into abstract names, a process which the 
use of the copulative facilitates. Abstract names 'could have no 
being till there were propositions, from whose copula they 
proceed.' 28 Once these abstract names have been devised, he 
continues, men find that they can deal with them in thought as 
though they might be separated from all bodies. The confusion 
of separability in thought with separability in fact leads to 'the 
gross errors of writers of metaphysics,' allowing them to speak 
for example of'insignificant words' such as abstract substance or 
separated essence. 29 Actually, Aristotle himself strove diligently 
to maintain that substances were not separate, only separable, 
from matter; herein lay the crux of his metaphysical dissent 
from Plato. 30 Aristotle did, however, believe that 'there are also 
incorporeal things,' 31 and this belief alone was enough to incur 
Hobbes's condemnation. 
The real heart of Hobbes's assault upon the ontological 
status of abstract names was his radical nominalism. The 
Aristotelian tradition placed great significance in the definition 
ofwords, for the definition was the expression of the formulable 
essence of the thing described. The accurate, irreducible 
definition of a word was a revelation ofthe essential whatness of 
the substance represented by that word. 32 Consequently, defi-
nitions were beyond the whim of human will and served as the 
very basis of knowledge itself. 33 Furthermore, definitions 
served explanatory functions, for as Aristotle said, 'the "why" is 
reducible finally to the definition.' 34 Finally, the concept of 
definition expressed the order of creation or, to put it more 
accurately, 'imitative generation' within the Greek world 
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view. 'Each substance,' Aristotle held, 'comes into being out of 
something that shares its name.' 35 
All these critically significant functions and attributes of 
definition are denied by Hobbes. Names, he says, do not express 
any immutable order in the world beyond the way in which we 
perceive it. The relationship of the name to the object is, in 
fact, dissolved by Hobbes, who considers names to be 'signs of 
our conceptions' and manifestly 'not signs of the things 
themselves.' 36 Since definitions are not expressions of any 
objective order, they are also no longer to be seen as in-
dependent of human will. Men, not the cosmos, are the source 
of words, and the invention of words may therefore be 'at 
pleasure.' 
A name is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, 
which may raise in our mind a thought like to some 
thought we had before, ... And it is for brevity's sake that 
I suppose the original of names to be arbitrary, judging it a 
thing that may be assumed as unquestionable. For con-
sidering that new names are daily made, and old ones laid 
aside; that diverse nations use different names, and how 
impossible it is either to observe similitude, or make any 
comparison betwixt a name and a thing, how can any 
man imagine that the names of things were imposed from 
their natures?37 
Hobbes's strongest attack against the Aristotelian, realist 
notion of definition is levied against its function in explanation. 
As Basil Willey has observed in this context, the idea of ex-
planation is itself not an immutable concept. 38 Something is 
termed a satisfactory explanation when it removes intellectual 
puzzlement, and there are various types of puzzlement. One 
of the chief features of the seventeenth-century's intellectual 
revolution, then, was a widespread shift in the type of puzzle-
ment it felt and therefore in the nature of explanation which it 
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accepted. To the seventeenth-century mind, the statement that 
something behaved in a particular way because that was its 
nature to do so may have constituted reassurance, but it cer-
tainly did not constitute an explanation. Such statements were 
for Hobbes and his contemporaries a part of a natural theodicy, 
perhaps, but they had no place in natural science. In an 
ultimate sense, of course, even modern natural science, when 
pushed by the question 'why?' can finally do no better than 
something like 'because that's just the way things are,' an 
expression logically though not psychologically parallel to the 
Aristotelian 'because that's according to nature.' The problem 
with the Scholastic version of Aristotle, however, was that this 
'ultimate' kind of response came into play so early in the 
sequence of inquiry that it precluded the development of other 
legitimate, if more proximate, forms of explanation. It was 
largely this premature recourse to an ultimate mode of explana-
tion that was responsible for the aridity of so much later 
Scholasticism, the paradigm of which was Moliere's doctoral 
candidate who was applauded for answering the question 'why 
does opium induce sleep?' with the response 'because of its 
dormative properties.' 39 
When the Galilean and Cartesian recourse to geometry as a 
method of inquiry led to the understanding of natural regulari-
ties which the Scholastic mode of inquiry had not even begun to 
clarify, the leading thinkers of the seventeenth-century's revo-
lution were quick to substitute the new method for the older 
one. The general feeling was that the new light shed by geo-
metry relieved them of the great, dull burden of the meta-
physical subtleties that Hobbes derides as 'nothing else but 
Captions of Words.' 40 As Strauss has observed, Hobbes's 
praise of Plato is based upon his idea that Plato had 'freed 
himself from the spell of words.' 'Plato,' says Hobbes, 'that was 
the best philosopher of the Greeks, forbad entrance into his 
Schoole to all that were not in some measure geometricians.' 41 
Unfortunately, however, the whole conception of teleology, 
purpose, and reason in the Aristotelian system was bound up 
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with the critical role of definition, and the general glee with 
which the seventeenth-century thinkers unleashed themselves 
from the finite cosmos obscured but did not prevent the discard 
of these vital notions. 
It was in the realm of physical mechanics that the new 
geometrical method was most fruitful and the older scheme 
more irredeemably barren by contrast. Therefore, Hobbes 
feels most secure in his nominalist attack when he couples his 
barbs against the explanatory function of Aristotelian definition 
with comments upon its sterility in the field of physics. When 
Aristotle attempted to explain the motion of bodies upward and 
downward, he appealed to their 'lightness' and 'heaviness' 
which he considered to be essences. 'But, be it noted, this is the 
question we are trying to answer-how can we account for the 
motion of light things and heavy things to their proper situa-
tion? The reason for it is that they have a natural tendency 
respectively towards a certain position: and this constitutes the 
essence oflightness and heaviness, the former being determined 
by an upward, the latter by a downward, tendency.' 42 By 
contrast with the mathematical regularities of falling bodies 
discovered by Galileo, this sort of account seemed poor fare 
indeed to Hobbes. 
Then for Physiques, that is, the knowledge of the subordin-
ate, and secundary causes of natural events; they render 
none at all, but empty words. If you desire to know why 
some kind of bodies sink naturally downwards toward the 
Earth, and others goe naturally from it; the School will 
tell you out of Aristotle, that the bodies that sink downward 
are Heavy; and that this Heavinesse is it that causes 
them to descend: But if you ask what they mean by 
Heavinesse, they will define it to be an endeavour to goe 
to the center of the Earth: so that the cause why things 
sink downward, is an endeavour to be below: which is as 
much as to say, that bodies descend, or ascend, because 
they doe. 43 
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Having satisfied himself of the sterility of the Aristotelian 
realism and substantialism and perceiving the intimate con-
nection between the two, Hobbes dismisses the Scholastic 
natural philosophy as 'rather a Dream than Science.' 44 The 
linguistic and ontological essentialism of Aristotelian thought 
had allowed natural causation to be accounted for by 'their 
own Ignorance, but disguised in other words.' 46 The elimina-
tion of substance from the universe removes the blockage to an 
understanding of natural causation, Hobbes feels, by rendering 
the universe susceptible of intelligibility through purely 
geometric and quantitative methods. In contrast to Aristotle, 
who saw matter as unintelligible in itself and substance 
therefore as an epistemological necessity, Hobbes sees the 
resolution of the world into 'body' as an epistemological 
breakthrough; for 'body' is 'Quantity,' the language of 
mathematics. 46 
Hobbes's conception of'body,' the real 'stuff' of the universe, 
is basically a homogeneous, undifferentiated material sub-
stratum. The Aristotelian term materia prima is acceptable to 
Hobbes as a designation of 'body in general.' 'And what then 
is [Materia Prima] ? A mere name; yet a name which is not of 
vain use; for it signifies a conception of body without the 
consideration of any form or other accident except only 
magnitude or extension, and aptness to receive form and other 
accident.' 47 The definition of'body' then, is 'that, which having 
no dependence upon our thought is coincident or coextended 
with some part of space.' 48 Body is 'the thing placed,' 49 res 
extensa. It is 'objective,' existing independently of mind, 'real 
space' as contrasted with 'imaginary space' which is 'an effect 
on our imagination.' 50 It is equivalent to all real parts of the 
universe; and, considered as subject to accidents, it may be 
called substance. 51 
Now, strictly speaking, as Basil Willey has observed, the 
statement that 'all the universe is Body' has little or no positive 
meaning. Number, being abstract, has no real content, and 
'body', as hypostasized number, is similarly empty. 52 The 
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negative significance of the reduction of the universe to 'body' 
is far more potent, however; for the order and coherence of the 
universe had been expressed in the finite categories of substance. 
To reject the conception of substance, then, leads to an in-
escapable dissolution of the conception of universal order 
which it contained, unless some other expression of order is 
devised to provide a substitute. Clearly, 'body' does not 
provide this substitute. Any order that Hobbes leaves in his 
brave new world, then, comes through his idea of motion 
rather than through its correlate notion of body. 
One clear example of this transposition of order and content 
from the substance/body aspect of the universe into motion is 
Hobbes's treatment of the notion of 'spirit.' In the language 
of the Schools, says Hobbes, spirits were conceived of as 
incorporeal substances. But since 'substance and body signifie 
the same thing' 53 the phrase 'incorporeal substance' constitutes 
a self-contradiction. The proper meaning of the word spirit, 
then, Hobbes concludes, is to refer to 'subtile bodies' which 
are nevertheless real and corporeal; 54 any other usage of the 
term must be 'metaphoricall', and these metaphorical 
uses of 'spirit' actually represent some form of motion 
or emotion. Thus the expression 'full of the Holy Spirit' 
may be understood as signifying zeal55 or a 'working on 
their hearts,' 56 or simply 'life,' 57 which it must be recalled is 
merely a motion of limbs. Any time the word spirit is used, 
then, if it does not refer to an actual body, it must signify 
some kind of motion and not any impossible incorporeal 
substance. 
In some ways this liberation of a human concept like 
'spirit' from the substantialism of the Aristotelian tradition is a 
welcome achievement. The finitude and impenetrability of 
'essence' and 'substance' language were not very cordial to 
philosophical accounts of personality, as the Church fathers had 
discovered at Nicea and Chalcedon. Hobbes is himself aware of 
these difficulties: 'And thus we have the exact meaning of the 
word "person," The Greek tongue cannot render it; for [the 
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Greek term signifies] properly a face, and metaphorically a 
vizard of an actor upon the stage. How then did the Greek 
Fathers render the word "person," as it is in the blessed 
Trinity? Not well. Instead of the word "person" they put 
"hypostasis," which signifies substance; from whence it might 
be inferred, that the three persons in the Trinity are three 
Divine substances, that is, three Gods.' 58 However, the virtue 
of the liberation which Hobbes effects is vitiated by the 
formlessness of the concept of motion which must bear the 
burden of providing the order and meaning that 'substance' 
gave, whatever defects that concept may have had. Con-
sequently, the universe is liberated by Hobbes from the 
shackles of impenetrable substance only to be delivered into the 
anarchy of purely inertial motion. 
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The Disordering of .Nature 
'Nature is everywhere the cause of order.' -Aristotle 
'Nature dissociates, and renders men apt to invade 
and destroy one another.'-Hobbes 
The critical transformations which Hobbes performs upon the 
root concepts of motion and substance lead quite logically to 
an equally new, radically transformed concept of nature. In 
the Aristotelian system, substance and movement were the two 
components which together comprised the realm of nature, so 
the sharp change in the way the parts were envisaged implied 
a corresponding change in the complex whole which they were 
seen to form. In short, once again Hobbes follows the formal 
pattern of the basic Aristotelian world-framework, after having 
effected his key substantive changes. 
The linkage between the concept of motion and the image of 
nature is quite clear and direct in both Aristotle and Hobbes. 
Hobbes's utter infatuation with the Galilean view of motion 
rests upon his conviction that it provides the key to under-
standing the entire natural world. This conviction Hobbes 
makes manifest in his dedicatory epistle to De Corpore. The 
direct link between nature and motion is the reason Galileo is 
viewed as having opened the 'gate of natural philosophy 
universal.' 
Formally and methodologically, Hobbes is simply following 
Aristotle's path. The very definition of 'natural' for Aristotle 
turned around the possession of the capacity for movement. 
'All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ 
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from things which are not constituted by nature. Each of them 
has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in 
respect to place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of 
alteration) ... which seems to indicate that nature is a source 
or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it 
belongs primarily.' 1 Since nature 'is a source or cause of being 
moved,' inquiry into nature logically must begin with an 
inquiry into motion, for the structure of movement determines 
the structure of nature. 'Nature has been defined as "a principle 
ofmotion and change," and it is the subject of our inquiry. We 
must therefore see that we understand the principle of"motion,'' 
for if it were unknown, the meaning of "nature" too would be 
unknown.' 2 
The Aristotelian analysis of movement which followed upon 
this methodological program led to the model of movement as 
'the fulfillment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists 
potentially.' 3 On the basis of this analysis, then, nature was 
depicted as a hierarchical series of finite substances, each 
moving in an orderly fashion toward its telos. Nonteleological 
movements were not considered by Aristotle to belong to 
nature at all; they belonged to the category of pure chance, or 
'spontaneity.'' Nature itself, Aristotle insisted, 'belongs to the 
class of causes which act for the sake of something.' 5 
In Aristotle, the concept of nature in combination with the 
idea of the 'unmoved movers' assumed the role of organizing 
principle in the universe which had been given by Plato 
largely to the soul. 6 All living things, and even the inanimate 
simple bodies, became endowed by Aristotle with the inherent 
tendency to movements of a particular sort, and teleology, 
'working for the sake of a cause,' was made a feature of the 
entire natural order. The whole natural universe was made 
'rational,' modeled on the paradigm _of purposeful action. 
'When one man said, then,' contended Aristotle, 'that reason 
was present-as in animals, so throughout nature-as the cause 
of order and all arrangement, he seemed like a sober man in 
contrast with the random talk of his predecessors.' 7 
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Throughout the whole Aristotelian discussion of nature, then, 
ran the omnipresent theme of order. In the eighth book of the 
Physics, Aristotle summarized the coherence and orderliness 
which he saw as definitive of nature, saying 'that which is 
produced or directed by nature can never be anything dis-
orderly: for nature is everywhere the cause of order.' 8 Things 
formed by nature, like those formed by human techne, were 
envisioned as formed 'for the sake of an end.' 9 To continue this 
analogy between the working of nature and the working of 
human craft, Aristotle spoke of 'mistakes' in nature, as when 
monstrosities are produced, as reflecting a 'failure in the 
purposive effort.' lO 
The view of nature as a coherent whole which everywhere 
worked for order exerted a profound influence on the political 
ideas of the Aristotelian and Scholastic traditions. The broad 
scope of nature, after all, encompassed that rational animal, 
man, and his social life as much as it encompassed the move-
ments of plants, insects, and animals. The human community, 
or polis, was itself seen as a product of nature, a fruition of some 
of the natural tendencies or strivings inherent in the human 
psyche. The organization of the polis constituted a natural 
telos. 'Because it is the completion of associations existing by 
nature, every polis exists by nature, having itself the same 
quality as the earlier associations from which it grew. It is the 
end or consummation to which those associations move, and 
the nature of things exists in their end or consummation; for 
what each thing is when its growth is completed we call the 
nature of that thing, whether it be a man or a horse or a 
family.' 11 
Man is, therefore, 'by nature an animal intended to live in a 
polis.' 12 Anyone who does not live in a political order is either a 
beast or some sort of god, for the immanent strivings of human 
nature depend upon a political setting for their fulfillment. 
Some of man's peculiar faculties, such as his capacity to 
perceive good and evil and his linguistic abilities, are intrinsically 
social faculties. Only through political intercourse are they 
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put to use; and since nature makes nothing in vain, nature 
obviously intends man to be a political animal. A man without 
a polis is without the necessary environment to be what he is by 
nature. He is 'in the position of a solitary advanced piece in a 
game of draughts.' Is 
The polis was prior to the individual, for in Aristotelian 
nature 'the whole is necessarily prior to the part.' 14 For this 
reason, and because man is dependent on the existence of the 
polis for the fulfillment ofhis own nature, it follows that nature 
itself is a source of political obligation. That is, a man is 
bound to behave such and such a way with respect to his 
fellows and with respect to the polis because that is his nature. 
He must respect the necessities of political organization and 
behave accordingly, or he thwarts the requirements of his own 
fulfillment. It becomes possible, therefore, to speak of natural 
laws which have political content. The commands of natural 
law were the logical consequences for action derived from the 
teleological order of nature, and they made sense only because 
of the tension between the potential and the actual which was 
seen as characteristic of nature as a whole. Violations of the 
natural law were 'mistakes' in the sense that Aristotle used that 
term, acts which led to a corruption of the 'natural' develop-
ment of the human and political world toward its telos. It will 
be necessary to return to this problem shortly, but for the 
moment the essential point is the dependence of the natural 
law notion upon the holistic and teleological conception of 
nature which produced it. 
Visualizing man and politics as a part of 'nature' so conceived 
generated some conceptual difficulties. Some of these problems 
grew from the overextension of the teleological model to apply 
it to the phenomena of physical motion. The broad scope of 
the model gave it its breadth and nobility. But by extending 
the model of purposeful movement beyond its genuinely 
applicable range, Aristotle gave his whole concept of nature 
an Achilies heel which led to its virtual destruction in the 
seventeenth century. 
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The other principal locale of conceptual difficulties attendant 
upon the application of the model of 'natural movement' to the 
full range of reality came at the human end of the hierarchy. 
These problems appeared most sharply in the attempt to 
embody certain theological ideas in Greek philosophical 
terminology. The incredible battles fought in the early Church 
councils over the relationship of person and substance were but 
one expression of the inadequacies of substantialism in dealing 
with human affairs. Other examples were the difficulties of 
conceiving the Christian God in terms of the Aristotelian 
unmoved mover, difficulties reflected in Pascal's observation of 
the difference between the God of Abraham and the deity of the 
philosophers, and the problems encountered in characterizing 
time and history. 
Hobbes was aware of both of these key areas of anomaly in 
the use of the Aristotelian concept of nature. Time and again 
he heaps scorn upon the Scholastic teleological accounts of 
physical motions. And, especially in his debates with Bishop 
Bramhall, Hobbes demonstrates a keen grasp of some of the 
theological difficulties produced by the uncritical use of 
Aristotelian concepts. However, and this step is critical, 
Hobbes feels that he can solve these problems within the 
Aristotelian format-i.e., within the model of a single, all-
encompassing realm of 'nature' -once he has transformed the 
substantive image of what nature is. In other words, rather than 
rejecting the entire Aristotelian model of reality, he assumes that 
its framework is acceptable if its substance is changed in 
accordance with the inertial model of motion. 
The persistence of this Aristotelian cosmological matrix 
which designates human and political forms as one species of 
natural form provides Hobbes with the setting of his systematic 
political speculations. Like the exponents of the Aristotelian 
tradition, Hobbes derives significant political implications from 
the character of the 'natural' world of which politics is one part. 
These implications are important and, by contrast with the 
tradition against which Hobbes is reacting, quite novel. 
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Because Hobbes views motion as something very different from 
the Aristotelian actualization of potential, he sees nature as 
something very different from the Aristotelian ordered whole; 
therefore his theories must logically presume a radically altered 
environment for political phenomena. The new face of nature 
is not that of something which possesses an inherent tendency 
toward growth and fulfillment, but rather of something which 
merely persists in its motion without end. The new world of 
nature is not a cause of order but rather the absence of order. 
The whole is not prior to the parts, but the parts are the 
realities and the wholes merely works of artifice. The impact of 
this deep transformation of politics' setting, nature, is manifest 
in Hobbes's political analyses. 
The novelty of the Hobbesian understanding of nature and 
its political import are first evidenced in his construct of the 
state of nature. The natural condition of man, as depicted by 
Hobbes, provides a stark contrast to the Aristotelian picture of 
man as a political animal by nature. The Greek belief that 
man is a creature 'born fit for society' is, Hobbes says, 'certainly 
false, and an error proceeding from our too slight contemplation 
of human nature.' 16 Men do desire to come together; but 
merely coming together does not constitute a society, for 
'civil societies are not mere meetings, but bonds.' 16 Men seek 
the company and services of other men, but for their own 
advantage. Specifically, men seek congress with their fellows 
'either for gain or for glory'; and these could actually be better 
attained by dominion than by belonging to society as one 
member among others. 'But though the benefits of this life 
may be much furthered by mutual help; since yet those may be 
better attained to by dominion than by the society of others, I 
hope no body will doubt, but that men would much more 
greedily be carried by nature, if all fear were removed, to 
obtain dominion, than to gain society.' 17 
Man's natural condition, then, far from being that of an 
organized society, is a state of mutual enmity. In fact, 'without 
a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that 
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condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of 
every man, against every man.' 18 In a famous passage, Hobbes 
itemizes some of the ways in which this natural situation is 
truly an 'ill condition': 'In such condition, there is no place 
for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and 
consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor use 
of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no com-
modious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing 
such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of 
the Earth; no amount of Time; no Arts; no letters; no Society; 
and what is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent 
death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, 
and short.' 19 
The causes of such a sorry state may be found in the relative 
equality of human endowments and the nature of human 
desires. Men differ to a certain extent in their natural aptitudes 
and abilities, of course; but on the whole, says Hobbes, they 
are sufficiently equal both in physical and mental faculties 
that no 'one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, 
to which another may not pretend, as well as he.' 2° From this 
rough equality of ability arises a basic equality of 'hope in the 
attaining of our ends.' This pattern quickly leads to conflict, 
however, since 'many men at the same time have an appetite to 
the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy it in 
common nor yet divide it.' 21 Especially is this inability for all 
to be satisfied in their aims manifest in the quest for glory, 
which Hobbes feels to be a very important human motivation. 
For vainglory can be satisfied only by a relative pre-eminence; 
'if all men have it no man hath it, for they consist in comparison 
and precellence.' 22 Therefore, one man's attainment ofhis goal 
is intrinsically dependent upon the thwarting of his fellows' 
similar desires. 
This stark analysis of the human condition which Hobbes 
presents grows from several sources. In part, it simply reflects a 
very different substantive assessment of human desires and 
motivation from that of the Aristotelian tradition. Hobbes sees 
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a rather large degree of ruthless egocentricity as a general 
human trait, and he is therefore not predisposed to see the 
construction of a viable civil society as a painless feat. The 
political turbulence and consequent social disorder during his 
own lifetime lent credence to his vision. For example, Hobbes 
suggests that• the upheavals of civil war, which he experienced, 
offer a good approximation of the state of nature. 23 
While this substantively bleak view of the human psyche is a 
departure from the Aristotelian outlook, it is not wholly novel. 
Hobbes shares much in common with the Augustinian tradition, 
for example, with its sober assessment of political possibilities 
based on its analysis of the profound and pervasive sinfulness of 
the human spirit. The vainglory of Hobbesian man resembles 
the amor sui of the Augustinian sinner. And the warlike societies 
of Hobbes bear a noteworthy semblance to Augustine's 
'robber bands.' The analogies should not be overdrawn, for the 
Hobbesian system is without the Platonic philosophical and 
theological context of the Augustinian world view, and this 
difference is significant. Nevertheless, the resemblances are 
real, and they serve to remind us that Hobbes's divergence 
from Aristotle in his account of human nature is not sub-
stantively without precedent. 
This source of Hobbes's departure from the Aristotelian 
tradition, that is, his basically different account of human 
nature is an important one. Hobbes's account of the state of 
nature is more than this, however. It also possesses a methodo-
logical and substantive significance which develops out of the 
new natural philosophy which Hobbes affirms. This significance 
needs to be recognized if it is to be appreciated that Hobbes's 
political concepts are to some extent a function of his new 
cosmological paradigm and are not purely the outcome of his 
observations of men and manners. 
In Aristotle and in Aquinas the idea of nature as a teleo-
logical system of order undergirded their statements about 
human nature. Since nature was composed of substances 
directed toward their completion, statements about the 'nature' 
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of anything, including man, had to take into account not only 
origins, but the end as well. The process of assigning a 'nature' 
to something was a matter of defining its essential 'whatness,' 
and the goal toward which it moved was actually the determina-
tive influence in this definition. This intellectual method was in 
accord with the ontology which sustained it, and both the 
method and the ontology could be seen in Aristotle's contention 
that 'it is the goal rather than the starting point of motion 
that gives its name to a particular process of change.' 24 The 
depiction of the 'nature' of something, then, inevitably in-
volved the consideration of the entire pattern of its movement, 
not only including but emphasizing its telos or perfection. When 
Aristotle said that man is by nature a social animal, then, he 
did not necessarily mean that man was instinctively or by 
origin a social creature, but rather that his faculties were such 
that they could be fully realized only in society. 
If, methodologically, the Aristotelian tradition looked to the 
end of something to ascertain its nature, Hobbes in contrast 
looks to its simplest component elements. This change con-
stitutes a striking methodological reversal, pregnant with 
substantive implications. In making this change, Hobbes was 
participating in one of the key facets of the seventeenth-century 
revolution, namely, the espousal of a new method whose 
principal exponent was Descartes. 'The whole of human 
knowledge,' according to Descartes, 'consists in a distinct 
perception of the way in which simple natures combine in 
order to build up other objects.' 25 The right method of dis-
covering the first principles of something, then, is on this 
view to separate it into its components. This process is termed 
'resolution' by Hobbes, and at times he even equates it with 
reason. 26 In any case, it is resolution which brings us to 
'universal knowledge.' 'And in this manner, by resolving 
continually, we may come to know what those things are, 
whose causes being first known severally, and afterwards 
compounded, bring us to the knowledge of singular things. I 
conclude, therefore, that the method of attaining to the 
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universal knowledge of things, is purely analytical.' 27 Once 
this process of resolution is completed, Hobbes feels, further 
inquiry can be conducted simply by using the principles of 
motion, for all things have 'but one universal cause, which is 
motion.' 
Hobbes's state of nature, then, is a theoretical construct 
produced through an analytical procedure of this kind. 
It is a picture of civil society as Hobbes sees it, with all the 
civil bonds dissolved by a process of abstraction. The human 
animal which inhabits Hobbes's mythical state of nature is 
not the Aristotelian animal who exists in tension between 
his origin and his fulfillment, nor is he simply 'instinctive' 
man antecedent to all society (a creature that would be pure 
fiction); but he is rather the typical seventeenth-century 
man as Hobbes sees him, released from the network of in-
stitutions and obligations which constitute society. C. B. 
MacPherson, who emphasizes the connection of Hobbes to a 
possessive market society, has recognized this function of 
Hobbes's state of nature quite clearly, characterizing it as 
'the hypothetical condition in which men as they now are, 
with natures formed by living in civilized society, would 
necessarily find themselves if there were no common power 
able to overawe them all.' 28 MacPherson's attempt to attribute 
Hobbes's psychology to a peculiar social origin is perhaps 
overdrawn; the quest for gain and glory which Hobbes so 
vividly depicts is not confined to capitalism, but seems to find 
expression in traditional and modern totalitarian societies as 
well. However, his perception of Hobbes's state of nature as 
'reached by successive degrees of abstraction from civilized 
society' 29 is not dependent upon his sociological explanation 
of its content. 
The method for discovering what is 'natural' about anything, 
including men and political society, then, is for Hobbes this 
process of analytical dissolution which he calls 'resolution.' 
As Rousseau acutely was to observe in the next century, he 
actually failed to complete his appointed analytical task. What 
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he depicted as man in the state of nature was still a political 
animal, one who was released from the bonds of obligation 
and authority but who was still clearly a social product. 30 
Nevertheless, whatever failings Hobbes had in carrying out his 
analysis, the nature of the intellectual project he had in mind is 
quite clear: to reach the 'real' components of any 'complex 
whole' such as political society, one must intellectually 'resolve' 
it into its constituent elements. 
This norm for intellectual analysis, it is important to 
recognize, does not arise from a vacuum. Instead, it is the 
methodological imperative which follows from the new view of 
nature which Hobbes shared with his distinguished con-
temporaries. The new method, the new epistemology, which 
produces the new motif of the 'state of nature' rests firmly on an 
ontological foundation. The analyst must resolve to find what 
is real not because of some intellectual whim, but because 
nature is itself a state of dissolution and dissociation. In the 
context of political analysis, Hobbes denies the ontological 
priority, the natural order, of society, not simply because man 
is seen as power-hungry, but because the ontological priority 
of all complex wholes disappears in the seventeenth century. 
The new understanding of nature as a state where order is 
lacking is most strikingly captured in Hobbes's references to 
'meer nature.' 31 This characterization would have been 
nonsensical to Aristotle and the Scholastics. For them, after 
all, nature was everywhere the cause of order, the fundamental 
force in the world acting for coherence and organization. 
But Hobbes's 'meer nature' is no organic purposeful whole; 
it is an atomistic agglomeration of entities not related by 
nature. A corollary of the 'simplicity' of nature which seemed 
so admirable and intelligible to the seventeenth-century 
mind was its disorganization. In a certain sense, the new 
nature is exquisitely ordered- but the criteria of this order are 
purely and exhaustively geometric; any other form of order, 
such as political or moral order, is artificial. 
Hobbes goes even further. Nature is not only characterized 
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by a lack of human or political order; it is even a force working 
against order in some ways. 'Nature dissociates,' he says, 'and 
renders men apt to invade and destroy one another.' 32 The 
'natural lusts of men,' he says elsewhere, 'do daily threaten 
each other.' 33 The political task which faces men, therefore, 
is not to attain that order which nature has provided for them, 
but rather to escape the intrinsically ill condition of meer 
nature. 
The disorder of meer nature, standing as it does in such stark 
contrast to the orderliness of Aristotelian nature, helps to 
explain the radically creative force which Hobbes attributes 
to the word of the sovereign. Given the anarchy of meer 
nature, the voice of the sovereign must serve as the logos-
the origin of order. For nature herself is now bereft of its 
logos; it has been stripped altogether of its ordering force. 
Man must therefore create and invest such a force on his own 
as a work of artifice. He must build 'an Artificiall Man ... 
of greater stature and strength than the Naturall for whose 
protection and defense it was intended,' namely, 'that great 
Leviathan.' 34 Only through such a creation can man save 
himself from the suicidal consequences of remaining in a 
state of nature. 
The dissolution of the teleological orderliness of nature carries 
with it some further important consequences for Hobbes's 
social thought, as well. In the first place, all moral judgments 
are deprived of any objective foundation and therefore must be 
seen as purely expressions of subjective appetite. In parallel 
fashion, any standards external to the vagaries of human will 
disappear from consideration of economics. And finally, the 
meaning and content of 'natural law' undergoes a striking 
substantive deflation. Each of these developments will be 
considered in its turn. 
In the classical tradition, ethics was a branch of ontology. 
Moral judgments were extrapolations from the 'nature of 
things' for human action. The logical form of an ethical 
imperative was something like this: 'If the order of the universe 
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is such-and-such, then one should act in such-and-such a way 
for his actions to be consonant with that order.' Specific 
injunctions to behave in a particular way were, then, basically 
hypothetical imperatives, based upon the reality principle. 
That is, man did not create the order of the world, and he 
cannot abolish it. Therefore, he must reconcile his own actions 
to the givens of the order within which he lives. The alternative 
is to be irrational in a very profound sense, or insane. 
This understanding of ethical discourse is obviously contin-
gent upon certain prior ontological assumptions for its validity. 
Specifically, unless one presumes some form of teleological 
order in the world, the reality principle loses any real force as 
the source of imperatives for action. Only an ordered nature of 
this kind can provide ethical statements or moral judgments 
with any real substance. The ethical tension between 'ought' 
and 'is' is grounded in the ontological tension between essence 
and existence; and if the latter is dissolved, then the former 
falls apart as well. Precisely this kind of ontological trans-
formation occurs in Hobbes's cosmology, so appropriately 
enough the whole nature and status of ethical discourse is 
altered as well, as Hobbes himself clearly recognizes and 
forthrightly affirms. 
With the disappearance of a logos from nature, the only 
order left is that of natural lust. That is, the mandates of 
natural reason are deprived of any ontological basis and their 
role must henceforth be performed by the only compelling 
natural quality left, namely, the will, which is the aggregate of 
the natural motions, appetite and aversion. Ethical statements, 
therefore, must be expressions of will, or to use the more 
contemporary term, expressions of preference. There is nothing 
else in nature for them to express. Hobbes's theory of ethical 
propositions, then, is a perfect prototype for what has more 
recently become known as the emotive theory of ethics. 
'But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire; 
that is it, which he for his part calleth good; and the object of 
his hate, and aversion, Evill; and of his contempt, Vile and 
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Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, Evill, and Con-
temptible, are ever used with relation to the person that 
useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; 
nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the 
nature of the objects themselves.' 35 
The ramifications of this position extends into Hobbes's 
doctrines in the area of political economy and economic 
justice. Viewing economic activity as only one aspect of a 
broader human order, the Aristotelian tradition placed certain 
limitations upon it which followed from the larger order. The 
demands of economic justice were expressions of the belief that 
commerce must be integrated into a wider framework of human 
nature, and these demands had been elaborated in theories of 
just price, commutative justice, and distributive justice. 
Here, as elsewhere, however, the concept of justice is an 
ontological one, and Hobbes's destruction of the classical 
ontology leaves him no basis for these traditional theories of 
economic justice. Hobbes therefore concludes, again quite 
logically from his premises, that the only criterion of value 
is 'appetite,' and hence there is no distinction between value 
and market price. Just (from 'justice') price gives way to just 
(merely) price. 'Justice of Actions, is by writers divided into 
commutative, Distributive; ... Commutative they place in 
the equality of value of the things contracted for; and dis-
tributive, in the distribution of equall benefit, to men of 
equall merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer than we 
buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all 
things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the 
Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they 
be contented to give.' as 
Just compensation for the use of other human beings, Hobbes 
continues, as in the case of raw materials and finished goods, is 
properly to be determined by the will of the employer. 'The 
value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; 
that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his 
Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependent 
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on the need and judgment of another.' 37 Considered as 
simply an empirical theory about the mechanisms of price 
determination in a market economy, of course, this account is 
unexceptionable. Considered as a theory of economic justice, 
however, Hobbes's pronouncements represent a complete 
relinquishing of moral control over the market. Rather than 
being a contingent facet of human social life, economic 
relations become the autonomous standard to which all other 
facets of political order must conform. 
This theory provided a very useful tenet for emergent 
capitalism. The laissez faire economists of classical liberalism 
were soon to turn the unfettered operation of the market 
mechanism into an immutable law of nature, ostensibly 
beyond the scope of human control. This notion presumably 
salved the consciences of the new entrepreneurial class; 
however, capitalism's tendency to carry the Hobbesian theory 
of a man's value to its logical conclusion eventually elicited 
anguished responses. Marxian economics, for example, which 
begins with a labor theory of value and thence derives 
concepts such as 'exploitation' and 'alienation,' is actually a 
systematic restitution of economics to a contingent place 
within the entire human economy and has a root affinity with 
the classical concepts of just price and distributive justice. 
Contemporary economists who think that Marx's use of the 
labor theory of value was simply a bad misconception of 
the functioning of a market system miss the point entirely; for 
the Marxian system was normative in the classical sense, 
that is, anchored in a humanized ontology. A market economy 
wholly unchastened by such anthropocentric concepts must 
ultimately prove intolerable; and Western capitalism has, in 
fact, averted a Marxian cataclysm only by implicitly repudiating 
the unfettered Hobbesian theory through new channels of 
distributive justice such as the progressive income tax. 
A final political ramification of the radical alteration in the 
understanding of 'nature' effected by Hobbes appears in his 
consideration of the laws of nature. The question of the 
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meaning, status, and content of natural laws is a critical one in 
the interpretation of Hobbes. The importance of this question 
arises both historically and logically. Historically, it is an 
important issue because of the central position which natural 
law held in the political theory of the Aristotelian-Scholastic 
tradition against which Hobbes reacted. Logically, the question 
of natural law is also important because of its intimate connec-
tion with the whole problem of the grounds of political obliga-
tion; and the designation of the source and extent of political 
obligation is a central issue, if not the central issue, in any 
systematic political theory. 
Unfortunately, as is often the case, this absolutely central 
question is also an extremely vexing one which has, accordingly, 
given rise to several divergent theories about Hobbes's real 
meaning and intent. There are two principal reasons for the 
peculiar difficulties which surround the whole problem of 
Hobbes's views on natural law. First, there are some very deep 
semantic problems which systematically complicate the entire 
question. Second, Hobbes's statements about natural law 
often do not appear wholly reconcilable with each other for 
varied reasons. 
The semantic problems involved, in turn, derive from at 
least two sources: first, the inherent multiplicity of linguistic 
functions performed by the key terms, and, second, the sub-
stantive transformation effected in some of these terms by 
implication from the basic paradigm transformation we have 
been examining. Both of these sources of semantic difficulty 
can be appreciated by considering the three central terms 
themselves, namely 'natural,' 'law,' and 'obligation.' 
The term natural is used in a variety of ways in common 
discourse. In a general sense, we often refer to the 'nature' of 
something, meaning its irreducible defining properties, 
attributes, and functions. This usage is a kind of colloquial 
remnant of the more systematic identification of nature with 
essence in the Aristotelian tradition. 'Nature' also may be used 
to designate a particular class of things, which may be dis-
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tinguished from other classes such as supernatural, human, 
historical, or artificial. And finally, 'natural' may refer to a 
specific mode of action, as when we say that such-and-such 
happened quite 'naturally.' This family of meanings only 
begins the semantic tangle, however, for ambiguity may attend 
each of these general significations. For example, to say that 
something naturally occurred may refer to economic rationality, 
psychological compulsion, or biological and physical 
in variance. 38 
These semantic problems are compounded by the various 
substantive interpretations which each of the usages may 
represent, depending upon the implicit cosmology involved. 
As R. G. Collingwood has lucidly demonstrated, the sub-
stantive reference of nature in terms of both what is included 
within it and what is seen as its characteristic mode of action 
has varied significantly within the Western philosophical 
tradition. 39 These transformations in what, substantively, is 
perceived as natural, of course, can cause great confusion in 
assessing the meaning of the term in another era. For example, 
what appears as a logical faux pas, the 'naturalistic fallacy,' 
may not be that, given a different understanding of nature. It 
is important, therefore, in approaching a topic such as Hobbes's 
views on natural law, not to begin by facilely setting up logical 
categories which are dependent upon our own substantive 
philosophical premises. 
'Law' can also suffer from ambiguity. For example, we may 
use the term law to refer to such varied phenomena as statistical 
regularity (Boyle's law), natural compulsion (the law of 
gravity), political promulgations (the Taft-Hartley law), and 
moral dictates (the law of the prophets). It is partly for this 
reason that Hobbes tries to specify a narrow signification of the 
term to refer solely to the 'command of him or them that have 
coercive power.' 40 This semantic recommendation, however, as 
is often the case in such questions, has both ontological roots 
and political ramifications. Ontologically, this limitation oflaw 
to a species of command reflects Hobbes's radical nominalism. 
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For Aristotle, for the Stoics, for Scholastic theorists such as 
Aquinas or Hooker, law was a manifestation of the universal 
logos, a product of the reason which pervaded the created 
order. Positive laws, products of the human will, were recog-
nized by this tradition, but they were always viewed in the 
context of the natural and divine laws which transcended 
human volition. For Hobbes, however, nature is governed by 
no rational, purposeful logos of this sort. Given this premise, 
it makes very good sense to clarify the concept of law by con-
fining it to the realm of will, of command, and removing the 
ambiguity that occurred when the component of rationality 
was insisted upon as a defining feature. Furthermore, this 
semantic clarification has the added implication that only the 
sovereign can say what is lawful; for many can claim to be 
rational, but only the sovereign possesses coercive power of an 
overriding degree. Hobbes was hardly unaware of or displeased 
by this implication of his definition oflaw. 
Finally, the semantic problems attending the intimately 
related concept of obligation are at least as thick as those 
surrounding nature and law. Therefore the attempt to ascertain 
whether the laws of nature are obligatory in Hobbes is com-
plicated by a geometric progression of definitional difficulties. 
To be obliged in its most general sense means to be bound, and 
Hobbes asserts his faithfulness to this basic meaning. But there 
are many kinds of bondage, and hence many kinds of obliga-
tion as well. Michael Oakeshott distinguishes four kinds of 
obligation, for example, which he calls physical, rational, 
moral and political. 41 Thus, one may be 'obliged' to slow down 
when driving his Volkswagen up a steep hill, he may be 'obliged' 
to give assent to a proposition of Euclidean geometry, he may 
be 'obliged' to care for his ageing parents, and he may be 
'obliged' to pay his taxes. 
The meaning of obligation is further complicated, as in the 
case of 'nature' and 'law,' by substantive philosophical con-
siderations. These considerations lead to some varied con-
ceptions of what must be involved in a genuine theory of 
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obligation. It is generally understood that a theory of political 
obligation should derive political obligation from some source 
outside of politics narrowly defined; otherwise, the question of 
legitimacy is begged and the question of obligation becomes a 
redundancy for the purely empirical problem of 'who governs?' 
However, what these possible outside sources are from which 
political obligation may be properly derived may vary with 
philosophical persuasion. For example, since Hume it has 
generally been held that no 'ought' can legitimately be derived 
from an 'is.' This ground rule places certain clear limitations 
upon a theory of political obligation. However, this limitation 
derives its force from an ontology which denies the presence of 
tension between potentiality and actuality within the realm of 
'is.' It was for this reason that Hume's 'logical' rule was not 
'discovered' until his time. 
Besides these deep and pervasive semantic problems, the 
status of laws of nature in Hobbes's system is complicated by 
at least two idiosyncrasies of Hobbes's thought on this question. 
In the first place, Hobbes at times simply seems to be inconsis-
tent, sometimes attributing features to the natural law quite 
offhandedly which are never reconciled with other accounts 
which would seem to exclude them. For example, at one point 
Hobbes implies a very broad and inclusive scope to laws of 
nature in a simple appositive phrase: 'The first are the same 
Lawes of Nature, of which I have spoken already in the 14th 
and 15th chapters of this Treatise; namely, Equity, Justice, 
Mercy, Humility, and the rest of the Morall Vertues.' 42 
Referring back to chapters fourteen and fifteen, however, the 
reader will be hard pressed indeed to find anything resembling 
this catalog of virtues allegedly encompassed by the laws of 
nature; and the rationale of their inclusion in the laws of nature 
as Hobbes systematically defines them elsewhere remains 
highly problematic. Second, as I will argue shortly, Hobbes is 
willing to attribute a dual status to the laws of nature, which in 
turn implies the possibility of deriving political obligation from 
more than one source. There is nothing illicit in giving a dual 
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status to the laws of nature, of course; but this feature, together 
with Hobbes's occasional vagueness and inconsistency, adds 
one more complication to the overall picture. 
With these warnings as to the numerous potential pitfalls 
surrounding this problem, we can turn to consider the laws of 
nature in Hobbes, their meaning, their significance, and in 
what way or ways they are obliging. Considerable clarity, I 
hope, can be given to this question by understanding Hobbes's 
laws of nature as one more embodiment of the basic pattern of 
paradigm transformation which we have perceived throughout 
his system of ideas. That is, once again Hobbes's concepts 
retain the framework of the Aristotelian and Scholastic formula-
tion but reach a different set of conclusions because of the 
transformation of key substantive models. 
There are essentially two standard accounts of the nature and 
status of Hobbes's laws of nature. The first interpretation sees 
them as prudential maxims which will recommend themselves 
by their logical force to any man desirous of avoiding violent 
death. The second interpretation, generally associated with 
A. E. Taylor and Howard Warrender, takes a different tack. 
According to this argument, the first interpretation is un-
satisfactory because laws of nature so conceived would not be 
genuinely obligatory. If they are not genuinely obligatory, 
moreover, the argument runs, then Hobbes cannot claim to 
have established any binding duty to obey the civil law, for a 
duty to obey the civil law 'cannot be prescribed by civil law 
itself.' 43 Hobbes clearly feels that he has established the obliga-
tion to obey civil authority, though, and he therefore must 
feel the laws of nature, from which the civil authority is derived, 
to be obligatory also. This conclusion is buttressed, moreover, 
by the fact that he continues to speak of natural laws after he 
has clearly defined laws as commands and equally clearly 
distinguished command from counsel. 44 If the laws of nature 
are but prudential maxims, the argument goes, they could not 
be genuinely obligatory, for a man 'cannot be obliged to do as 
he is Counselled, because the hurt of not following it, is his 
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own.' 45 These difficulties disappear, however, if the laws of 
nature are regarded not as prudential maxims but as commands 
of one who has the right to do so, namely, God. As Taylor 
concludes, then, 'I can only make Hobbes's statements con-
sistent with each other by supposing that he meant quite 
seriously what he so often says, that the "natural law" is the 
command of God, and to be obeyed because it is God's 
command.' 46 
Actually, both of these interpretations are correct, at least in 
what they affirm about Hobbes's laws of nature, even if they 
are not correct in what they deny. Hobbes provides two lines of 
argument for the grounding of political obligation, both of 
which he is perfectly willing to affirm, and each of which is 
quite compatible with the other. The laws of nature play a 
central role in both lines of argument; and in fact their content 
is identical in each case, although their status differs. Hobbes 
is himself indifferent as to which argument is accepted, for 
either way he has reached the same conclusions. 
The dual status which Hobbes accords to the laws of nature 
is clearly reflected in the passage where he says of them: 'These 
dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; 
but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes 
concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defense of 
themselves; whereas Law, properly is the word ofhim, that by 
right hath command over others. But yet if we consider the 
same Theorems, as delivered, in the word of God, that by right 
commandeth all things; then they are properly called Lawes.' 47 
Having said this, Hobbes can quite legitimately refer to natural 
laws as both counsels and commands. They are both dictates of 
prudence derived from an understanding of the nature of things 
and dictates of God, who is the author of nature. Viewing 
them in the guise of divine commands neither adds nor sub-
tracts anything in the way of substance from the laws of nature; 
it simply accords to them a status of moral obligatoriness which 
they do not possess merely as counsels of prudence. 
There is nothing especially novel about this attribution of a 
118 THE POLITICS OF MOTION 
double status to laws of nature, actually. It was a commonplace 
of the Christian natural law theorists, whether the Catholic 
Thomas or the Anglican Hooker, that the laws of nature could 
be grounded autonomously in the structure of the created 
order or grounded in the will of God who had created that 
order. The epistemological situation was seen, moreover, as 
paralleling the ontological pattern of dual status. One could 
know the laws of nature by the exercise of his natural reason, 
but they could also be found in the scriptural and prophetic 
revelation of God's imperatives. Hobbes's theoretical radicalism 
in relation to natural laws consists not in the status he accords 
them but in the substance he ascribes to them. 
Some commentators, Warrender and Taylor among the 
foremost of these, have argued that only considering the laws 
of nature in their status of divine commands leads to finding 
an acceptable theory of obligation in Hobbes. It is important 
to recognize, however, that this view is the function of some 
important premises about what may legitimately constitute 
obligation. It is highly doubtful that Hobbes shared these 
premises, though, and it is equally questionable whether these 
premises are as incontrovertible as proponents of the Taylor-
Warrender position tend to assume. Specifically, this position 
rests upon the premise that political obligation must be 
grounded in moral obligation and in that alone. This must be 
the case, the argument runs, since political obligation cannot 
be grounded upon itself; but it cannot be grounded upon the 
nature of things either, since this would be a derivation of an 
'ought' from an 'is.' Therefore, for Taylor and Warrender, the 
grounds of political obligation must be found in an antecedent 
moral obligation and in that alone if it is to pass muster as a 
genuine theory of obligation. These requirements for an accept-
able theory of obligation are reflected, for example, where 
Warrender says: 'If the laws of nature in the State of Nature 
are not regarded as the commands of God, they may be taken 
to be merely rational principles of prudence. The atheist, 
presumably, would have some use for these maxims as they 
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would be a guide to his preservation, but he could not con-
sider them as laws, and, as we have seen, could not be obliged 
by them.' 48 
If one accepts the premises of this argument, the conclusions 
follow; and, as stated earlier, Hobbes would have been per-
fectly pleased for anyone to feel bound to obey the laws of 
nature because they were divine dictates. It is not necessary, 
however, to construe the nature of obligation so narrowly. 
There is no reason that political obligation cannot be grounded 
in natural obligation as well as in moral obligation, unless one 
insists a priori that this is illicit. Such an insistence may reflect a 
personal refusal to be obliged by anything other than what one 
is willing to consider a moral imperative. This is anyone's 
privilege. However, it is conceivable that there are such things 
as natural imperatives, as well, and it is perfectly legitimate to 
base political imperatives upon these. Warrender's line of 
argument tends to obscure Hobbes's belief in the reality of such 
natural imperatives and the significant political imperatives 
which he believed largely to follow from them. 
Because of this narrowing of what constitutes a genuine 
theory of obligation, Warrender's depiction of Hobbes is 
disturbingly eccentric in the literal sense of that word. In the 
first place, the vast energies which Hobbes devoted to demon-
strating the appropriate political implications of an intelligent 
self-interest become virtually irrelevant. The essential Hobbes, 
in relation to natural law and political obligation, becomes a 
fideist, who believed rational theological propositions impossible 
but nevertheless grounded a political theory on divine will; all 
the psychological propositions become logically unnecessary 
enterprises. If these propositions had any relevance to Hobbes's 
political theory, by Warrender's standards it was purely to 
sustain the possibility of compliance with natural law, pos-
sibility being a necessary validating condition of any obliga-
tion. 49 It quickly becomes apparent, however, that almost 
everything of interest in Hobbes's theory comes under the 
heading of validating condition. Included, for example, are 
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the mandate of the sovereign and what Hobbes holds to be 
man's overriding instinct for self-preservation. What is left as 
the grounds of obligation are peculiarly empty and almost 
purely formal. Finally, under this view, the parallel of natural 
and political obligation in Hobbes becomes 'coincidental'; 
Warrender's logical categories require that the two remain 
chastely separate, and hence one cannot be seen as connected 
with the other. 50 This interpretation renders purely accidental 
what Hobbes would certainly have considered his distinctive 
achievement, namely, the demonstration that duty is not only 
not incompatible with self-interest, but follows from it. 
In some ways, contrary to the assumptions behind the War-
render approach, the derivation of political obligation from 
natural obligation is even more compelling than a derivation 
from moral obligation. Therefore, unless one insists a priori 
that only moral imperatives are genuinely obligatory, basing 
political obligation upon natural imperatives may provide a 
more satisfactory theory than basing it upon purely moral 
grounds. An argument which ends in purely moral grounds, for 
example, is subject to an infinite regress. If the response to the 
question 'why should I be politically obligated to do such-
and-such?' is 'because that is God's will,' one can then ask why 
he is obliged to obey God's will. This difficulty becomes 
apparent in the final, relatively sketchy section ofWarrender's 
book. If one asks why he should obey God, Warrender con-
cedes, the answer must be 'just because it is God's will' (not a 
very satisfactory ultimate basis for a theory of obligation) or 
else 'because you will be damned if you do not obey.' In the 
case of the latter answer, however, one has moved away from 
purely moral grounds to those of ultimate self-interest on a 
celestial plane. As Warrender himself observes, then, 'the goal 
of human endeavour throughout the whole of Hobbes's system, 
is self-'preservation and the avoidance of death, either in the 
immediate and biological sense, or in an ultimate dispensation 
by God in a second existence where a final ruling is given.' 51 
In effect, however, this final location of the grounds of obliga-
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tion in a second-world self-interest violates the criterion of an 
acceptable, purely moral, theory of obligation which Warrender 
earlier established; and if one can do so at the end, why not 
earlier? 
If Hobbes's natural laws are considered in their role as com-
pelling counsel in the service of self-preservation, it becomes 
apparent once again how Hobbes preserves the formal matrix of 
the earlier tradition while departing from it substantively. Both 
in the classical view of natural law and in Hobbes's view it is 
possible, and perhaps most enlightening, to see the laws of 
nature as peculiarly compelling hypothetical imperatives. The 
peculiar compulsion which they possess arises from the virtually 
unarguable status of the goal upon which they are contingent, 
namely, the end of being a man. That is, natural laws as hypo-
thetical imperatives can be expressed in the form, 'If you are to 
be a man, then you must do such-and-such.' Since the only 
apparent alternatives to being a man are being a god, a beast, 
or a nonentity, the obligations derived upon such a premise are 
hard to dispute. 
Hobbes, then, formally at least, sounds a lot like Cicero in 
proclaiming natural laws to be dictates of right reason incum-
bent upon all who wish to be men. 52 The novelty of Hobbes's 
position, however, which reduces the natural law to counsels 
of self-preservation, follows from the novelty ofhis view ofwhat 
is entailed in being a man. In the classical ontology, 'being' 
referred to existence in the tension between origin and com-
pletion. The dictates of natural law, therefore, were impera-
tives consequent upon the necessity of reaching fulfillment as a 
man. Man being 'naturally,' i.e., in his fruition, a social animal, 
he was naturally subject to political obligations. His natural 
tendency (horme) toward communal existence implied irre-
ducible political duties which logically could not be evaded if 
the end (telos) was to be reached. For Hobbes, however, as we 
have seen, being no longer contains this tension between poten-
tial and actual, between existence and essence. Hence, 'to be' 
means merely to persist, as in the model of inertia; and the 
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phrase 'if you are to be a man' means simply 'if you are to 
survive.' Imperatives for human action premised upon this 
virtually unarguable end, therefore, become counsels of self-
preservation. 
At first impression, it might appear that Hobbes, by eliminat-
ing the tension from 'being,' has left himself without the 
ontological basis for retaining any natural imperatives at all. 
In the classical cosmos natural laws were the imperatives of 
fulfilled being (actuality) upon aspirant being (potentiality). 
With the abandonment of the actual-potential, essence-
existence setting, there would seem to remain no obligations 
that could grow from the necessities of a teleological order of 
nature. If reality is tensionless, then it would seem to follow 
that a theory of obligation must, as Warrender argues, begin 
with the moral imperative of divine will or else be no theory of 
obligation at all, but simply an account of motivation. The 
alternatives, however, are not as simple as this. 
Although nature, in Hobbes's view, is not characterized as 
the Aristotelian cosmos was by the tension of potential and 
actual, it does have elements of tension within it. The tension 
which Hobbes perceives is not vertical, but horizontal; it occurs 
wholly within the single plane of appetites and aversions which 
comprise 'natural lust.' Nevertheless, it provides the necessary 
basis for continuing to perceive the presence of imperatives for 
human behavior grounded in the nature of things. 
This element of tension within Hobbes's nonteleological 
view of nature Michael Oakeshott tries to express by saying 
that, for Hobbes, 'there is a radical conflict between the nature 
of man and the natural condition of mankind.' 53 Specifically, 
two different components of man's complement of natural 
inclinations are at war with each other: his natural prideful-
ness, or vainglory, and his natural inclination to preserve his 
own life. Both of these drives are natural; both are self-oriented. 
Yet they are incapable of harmonious coexistence. As Oake-
shott observes, in Hobbes's view the human predicament is 
that 'nature itself is the author of his ruin.' 54 
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The phenomenon of natural obligation arises because, while 
both vainglory and the fear of violent death are natural pas-
sions, they are not of equal importance. Both logically and in 
fact, in Hobbes's view, the aversion to violent death takes 
precedence over all the other passions. Where it conflicts with 
them, it must prevail, since self-preservation is the sine qua non 
of satisfying any other natural inclination. 'There can be no 
contentment but in proceeding,' Hobbes reminds us. 55 Or, to 
put it in another way, the dead have no pleasures. Violent 
death is the summum malum, as Leo Strauss puts it, and the 
natural passion engendered by the apprehension of this fact has 
priority over the other natural passions. Therefore it is this 
master aversion, the fear of violent death, which is the 'purging' 
and 'civilizing' emotion 56 that 'brings man to reason' 57 and 
provides the basis for civil order. The dictates of the natural 
law are imperatives which follow logically from the overriding 
necessity to preserve one's life. 
Critics such as Warrender and Taylor contend that the laws 
of nature must be more than prudential maxims for self-
preservation of this sort. Hobbes would agree that they can be 
conceived as more than this, as divine dictates with intrinsic 
moral status, but they need not be more. Warrender argues 
that the formula required for the creation of a state is not 
'preserve yourself' but 'act so that all men can be preserved, 
except where this is inconsistent with your own preservation.' 
'This,' says Warrender, 'is, of course, an entirely different 
matter, and a prescriptive principle of this kind could never 
be derived from the ordinary self-interest of the individual 
alone.' 58 Hobbes's contention, however, is precisely that such a 
prescriptive principle can be derived from self-interest. The 
individual does not wish to accept the admonition to preserve 
the life of others per se, Hobbes agrees, but he is logically forced 
to do so in order to avoid self-destruction. Only by covenanting 
submission to a sovereign, who necessarily transcends his own 
particular interest, can the individual secure the indispensable 
core of self-interest, the reasonable hope of survival. And of 
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course this cannot be achieved without recognizing and con-
senting to the self-preservation of other men as well, since they 
would otherwise not join the pact. What Warrender argues 
must be an a priori transcendent principle of obligation, Hobbes 
sees as an intrinsically repugnant self-sacrifice necessitated by 
the absolute horror of the condition of 'meer nature.' 69 
Hobbes's attempt to reconcile self-interest and political 
obligation is not quite as radical and distinctive in form as it 
might appear. What is distinctive in Hobbes is the narrowness 
ofhis conception of self-interest, a substantive peculiarity which 
makes the attempted reconciliation so novel and stark. As long 
as man is conceived of as naturally a social animal, the concept 
of self-interest contains a barely submerged paradox: the 
human individual cannot act in his true self-interest if he, acting 
from motives of immediate advantage, breaks the social ties 
which permit him to be a man. Because this paradox dissolved 
in Hobbes, the problem of reconciling self-interest and political 
obligation becomes considerably more difficult. And this 
paradox is dissolved by the new conception of nature as a chaos 
of self-contained, atomistic entities which cohere only through 
artificial interference. The grounds of 'natural' community are 
lost; 'meer nature' cannot bind men; therefore, it falls to the 
sovereign power to do so. 
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A New Science and Political Deliverance 
'We learn either by induction or by demonstration.'- Aristotle 
'There is therefore no method by which we find out 
the causes of things, but is either compositive or 
resolutive, or partly compositive, and partly resolu-
tive.'- Hobbes 
The basic patterns which Hobbes perceives as characteristic of 
nature carry over into his philosophical anthropology. This 
permeation of Hobbes's vision of man by his fundamental 
cosmological vision is logically quite proper; for man is himself 
in Hobbes's view one part of the whole of nature, and he could 
therefore justifiably be considered as sharing the fundamental 
properties of the natural order. As Hobbes says in the Intro-
duction to the Leviathan, man is 'that Rationall and most 
excellent work ofNature.' 1 
The Cartesian solution to the problem of where to locate 
man in the world of res extensa was simply to extrude him from 
the natural world altogether. This solution, of course, brings 
with it some dilemmas of its own. Having banished the 'ghost' 
of thinking substance from the external world, one is hard put 
to explain their obvious and intimate interconnection. Such a 
radically dualistic formulation never appealed to Hobbes. For 
his thoroughly monistic mentality the only option was to 
retain the notion of the natural order as a single all-encompas-
sing whole. Anything that was not part of the bodily world 
simply did not exist for him. 'For the Universe, being the 
Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no reall part thereof that is not 
also Body; nor anything properly a Body, that is not also part of 
(that Aggregate of all Bodies) the U nivcrse.' 2 
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This monistic insistence upon the unity of the world, like 
much of the basic framework ofHobbes's thought, probably was 
partly due to the heavy component of tacit Aristotelianism 
which his mind contained. Anyone who reads the Aristotelian 
arguments against the Platonic conception of the Forms3 
should find a strong formal resemblance to Hobbes's anti-
dualistic contentions. Whatever exists, both for Aristotle and 
for Hobbes, is a part of the world; and the world is a universe, 
not a tenuous conjunction of radically different forms of being 
such as Ideas and 'sensible things' or extended substance and 
thinking substance. In the context of this monistic vision, then, 
a transformation in the fundamental conception of nature 
exercises a particularly compelling influence over the shape of 
the conception of human nature. Since man is a part of nature 
in the seamless web of the universe he must share some of 
its most basic properties and patterns of behavior. There is no 
escape hatch from the world of nature, no protected area or 
special status which man could have to exempt him from the 
forces and realities which govern the rest of the cosmos. Man 
might be the 'most excellent' of nature's works, to use Hobbes's 
phrase, but he is one of nature's works nevertheless. 
In the context of a nondualistic world view, then, the idea of 
nature which Hobbes develops has a clear logical bearing 
upon his image of man. Some of the ways in which this bearing 
is manifested will be examined in the following pages. Before 
doing so, however, it is worth noting that the conception of 
human nature which emerges will have an obvious and pro-
found impact upon the political prescriptions which Hobbes 
sees as the final fruit of his inquiry. For the political order is a 
product of which man is both the architect (the immediate, 
contingent architect, at least) and the inhabitant. Therefore, 
the shape of the polis must be determined by reference to both 
man's needs and his capabilities: it is determined by his needs 
as the inhabitant and by his capabilities as the architect. Any 
political program which does not rest firmly upon a realistic 
assessment of these key components of human nature, then, is 
A NEW SCIENCE AND POLITICAL DELIVERANCE I3I 
doomed to futility. It is for this reason that the classical pattern 
of political theorizing involves centrally the binding together of 
sociology and philosophical anthropology. To this pattern 
Hobbes is no exception, both because he was a realist who had 
no use for what he held to be futile or self-defeating exertions 
and because he was quite classical in his philosophical orienta-
tion, though not in his philosophical substance. 
Writers in the seventeenth century generated some rather 
strange and striking anthropological views. Perhaps the most 
striking and influential of these, and the most persistently 
problematic in the area of epistemology, is the Cartesian view 
of what Gilbert Ryle has termed the 'ghost in the machine.' 
Immersed, like Descartes, in the radical transformation of the 
classical conception of the cosmos, Hobbes also finds it necessary 
to produce a new model of human behavior to replace the one 
which had been predicated upon the earlier cosmology. In 
response to this need, Hobbes produces his own unique, and 
stunningly modern, conception of man. 
The two basic sides of man, and therefore the two basic 
components of any model of his basic nature, are his cognitive 
and intellectual processes and his affective behavior-his reason 
and his emotion. These two components, though closely 
interrelated, are nonetheless distinguishable aspects of the whole 
of human activity. The critical foundations of a model of man, 
then, arise in response to the questions 'what does it mean to be 
homo sapiens, the knowing animal?' and 'what are the basic 
motivations in human action?' To each of these critical 
questions, Hobbes provides his own distinctive answer. To 
know, he says, is to compute; and the fundamental motivating 
forces of human action are the vain desire for 'precellence' and 
the irreducible necessity for self-preservation. In the context of 
an open and insecure world, then, the composite view of man 
which emerges is that of a vain, power-hungry, and anxious 
'computer.' 
Each of these facets of human behavior which Hobbes com-
bines into his inimitable view of man grows in part from his 
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unflinching and often acidic observations of life around him. 
Like la Rochefoucauld, Hobbes seems ever attuned to 
perceive the admixture of egoism in virtually every human 
deed. He seems to take a perverse satisfaction in rooting even 
the most altruistic of human actions in the quest for power which 
he perceives to be universal. These autonomous interpretative 
observations of men and manners, in short, were obviously, as 
D. H. Robertson and others have observed, supremely im-
portant sources of the systematic conception of human nature 
which Hobbes ultimately articulated. Yet it is also true that 
this systematic view of human nature was very firmly rooted in 
his fundamental cosmological vision. The basic focal paradigm 
of inertial motion which shapes the Hobbesian conception of 
nature proceeds through this channel to shape his doctrine of 
man. The two basic sides of man, his reason and his passions, 
are designated by Hobbes as 'the principal parts of Nature.' 4 
The portrait of mankind which Hobbes paints for us, then, is 
not merely a composite of his ad hoc observations of human 
behavior, but is also an expression of those fundamental attri-
butes of the cosmos which man, the natural creature, shares 
with the rest of the natural world. For example, Hobbes's 
belief that men seek their own self-interest is not simply a 
statistical generalization-a 'general tendency' statement-
adduced purely from untheoretical observation. It instead has 
the status of a universal tendency ontologically grounded in the 
essential properties of nature. 6 
This systematic and ontologically grounded vision of human 
nature, needs, and capabilities which Hobbes develops once 
again replicates the basic pattern of a radically transformed 
Aristotelianism which characterizes his whole philosophy. The 
conception of human cognitive powers which Hobbes arrives at 
is essentially the Aristotelian model of demonstrative science 
set into the context of nominalist premises. The forms of 
Aristotelian inquiry are retained, even though the realist 
assumptions which Aristotle (with good cause) felt necessary to 
keep the enterprise viable are rejected. And the theoretical 
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conception of human affectivity and motivation which Hobbes 
develops adopts the Aristotelian model of natural tendency 
(horme), but transforms it radically by stripping away its setting 
in teleology. We shall look at each in turn- the cognitive 
in this chapter and the affective in the following chapter. 
First, let us consider the case of Hobbesian 'science.' In 
Aristotelian thought, 'not only art but knowledge imitates 
nature.' 6 The same is true in Hobbes, as we might expect, 
since he tacitly accepts most of the formal patterns of Aris-
totelian thought. Since, however, the substantive model of 
nature which he deems indicated by Galileo's discoveries is 
different from the substance of Aristotelian nature, Hobbes's 
model of human cognition undergoes a parallel change. In 
both Hobbes and Aristotle science is depicted as basically 
demonstrative, proceeding from clearly apprehended premises 
codified in definitions to demonstrated conclusion through 
syllogistic reason. The actual meaning of this pattern of 
scientific inquiry is quite different, however, in Hobbes's 
indefinite and nominalist world from what it is in the finite and 
realistic world of Aristotle. 
Aristotelian science is composed of the processes of demon-
stration and induction. The former proceeds from the universal 
to the particular, while the latter moves from the particular to 
the universal. These processes, of course, require bases from 
which to begin. These starting points for scientific discourse are 
accurate definitions, apprehensions of the essential nature of the 
genus or subject matter under consideration. Science, in fact, 
depends for Aristotle upon the possibility of univocal predica-
tion-upon things existing in such a way that they may be 
defined precisely and distinctively. The means by which man 
could reach this apprehension of essential nature was his nous, 
his intuitive capacity to grasp the basic structure of the entities 
which comprise the cosmos. And this capacity, in turn, is 
possible simply because the senses are capable, through time, 
of accurately distinguishing the universal patterns which are 
manifested in the recurrence of particulars. Upon this kind of 
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experience, then, man, the rational animal, could construct 
his edifice of scientific knowledge. When man reached this 
kind ofknowledge, moreover, 'knowledge of the reasoned fact,' 
he possessed knowledge of the fundamental causes at work, as 
well. 7 
Several observations need to be made about this epistemolo-
gical account of Aristotle. In the first place, this account of the 
process of knowing contains irreducible components of ration-
alism, empiricism, and intuitionism. Aristotle was neither a 
rationalist, nor an empiricist, nor an intuitionist in any simple 
and exclusive sense, then, but was a combination of all three. 
Each performed one function within his overall account of 
knowledge; none served him as an exclusive mode of knowing. 
It is the specific functions of the different components and their 
interrelationship that is essential to his method. This point is 
worth emphasizing in light of recurrent controversies as to 
whether Aristotle was an empiricist or a rationalist. Clearly he 
was both, in a sense, and neither in another sense. Simple modern 
labels serve more to distort than to illuminate his approach. 
Second, it is essential to realize how deeply embedded in and 
dependent upon his ontological beliefs Aristotle's epistemologi-
cal program was. As Marjorie Grene aptly observes: 'Aristotle's 
logic is not a pure logic, a system valid for "all possible worlds,'' 
like the formal systems envisaged by Leibniz. It is an analysis 
of the kind of discourse valid for expressing man's knowledge 
of this one, unique universe.' 8 
Aristotelian science is a closed system of discourse, applicable 
fully only to a universe which is itself closed-i.e., finite. The 
furniture of the universe must be subject to real definition if it 
is to be known, and it can be defined in univocal and real 
fashion only if it is itself finite. 9 
Hobbes's conception of the nature and powers of human 
reason are not always wholly clear and consistent.10 However, 
there is a discernible basic pattern to his account of what being 
a rational animal entails, and that pattern can be characterized 
as an adaptation of the fundamentals of Aristotelian method-
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ology to a nominalist universe. The key components of 
Aristotelian science are replicated in Hobbes's account of 
knowledge, but they become radically transformed by the new 
setting. The viability of this attempt on the part of Hobbes is 
open to serious question, of course; for Aristotelian method was 
structured from the outset to be uniquely applicable to the 
Aristotelian cosmos. Hobbes, nevertheless, inspired to a signifi-
cant extent by the Paduan school ofltalian Aristotelians, tries to 
accomplish the necessary adaptation; and, however unsuccess-
ful the attempt is ultimately, it has some notable consequences 
for the political uses of reason. 
Both Hobbes and Aristotle scatter their methodological 
formulations throughout their writings. However, Aristotle's 
explicit consideration of the functions and capabilities ofhuman 
reason appear most centrally in his Organon, the treatises on 
logic, reaching their apex in the Posterior Ana!Jitics. Hobbes's 
most systematic presentation of the same topic appears in Part 
One of De Corpore. If these two texts are examined carefully 
together, it becomes possible to perceive once again, this time 
in the treatment of human reason, the pattern we have indica-
ted throughout as characteristic of Hobbes's work, namely, the 
pattern of radical transformation of Aristotelian doctrine, with 
the content of the basic forms changed in the attempt to apply 
them to the conception of reality which informs the seventeenth 
century. 
To begin with, Hobbes asserts like Aristotle that the end of 
science is the certain knowledge of the causes and effects of 
things which are 'generated.' It is to be demonstrated know-
ledge, reached by a process of logical reasoning from first 
premises to demonstrated conclusion. Hobbes, who uses the 
terms philosophy and science interchangeably, puts it this way: 
'Philosophy is such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we 
acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have 
first of their causes or generation: And again, of such causes 
or generations as may be from knowing first their effects.' 11 For 
Aristotle, similarly, the end of scientific inquiry was the 
THE POLITICS OF MOTION 
acqmsttlon of certain knowledge of necessary causes; and 
demonstrative reason played a key part in reaching this end. 
We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific 
knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the 
accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think 
that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the 
cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the 
fact could not be other than it is .... 
. . . at all events we do know by demonstration. By 
demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific 
knowledge.12 
Hobbes likewise echoes the Aristotelian format as he asserts 
that scientific knowledge, demonstrative as it is, cannot be 
circular. That is, one cannot begin anywhere in the series of 
propositions that constitute a scientific argument as he could 
legitimately do if the pattern of scientific inquiry were logically 
circular. 'For we may not, as in a circle, begin the handling of 
a science from what point we please. There is a certain clue 
of reason, whose beginning is in the dark; but by the benefit of 
whose conduct, we are led as it were by the hand into the 
clearest light.' 13 The Aristotelian argument against the belief 
that 'demonstration may be circular and reciprocal' may be 
found in Book 1, Chapter g, of the Posterior Anarytics.14 
For both Hobbes and Aristotle, then, scientific knowledge is a 
linear progression to demonstrated conclusions about cause and 
effect. The next problem which logically must be confronted is: 
what are the starting points for this linear pattern of know-
ledge? Where does scientific knowing have the autonomous 
grounds which prevent it from being circular? Obviously, it is 
requisite for the scientist to begin with premises. Aristotle 
captures this clear logical necessity, saying, 'the required 
ground of our knowledge of a fact is the possession of such a 
syllogism as we call demonstration, and the ground of the 
syllogism is the facts constituting its premises.' 15 
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Here, with a consideration of the nature, source, warrant, and 
functions of these scientific premises we reach the real crux of 
the scientific methodology, of the conception of human reason, 
of both Hobbes and Aristotle. (Hobbes uses the terms 'prin-
ciples' or 'primary propositions' or 'universal' principles or 
propositions to signify these premises; but he is referring to 
precisely the same thing as far as their logical and methodologi-
cal function is concerned.) For these premises, or first principles, 
support the whole burden of scientific certainty. The process of 
syllogistic reason, of computation as Hobbes calls it, is only as 
good as its premises. Those who begin with faulty premises, as 
Hobbes so graphically puts it 'at last finding the error visible, 
and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to 
deere themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their 
books; as bird that entering by the chimney, and finding 
themselves inclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a 
glass window, for want of wit to consider which way they came 
in.' 16 Therefore, for science to exist, true premises must be 
obtainable. The necessity of possessing true premises for science 
-'the reckoning of consequences,' as Hobbes puts it-to 
begin is reflected in Aristotle's clear statement of the burden 
these first principles must carry: 'The premises of demonstrated 
knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better known 
than and prior to the conclusion, which is further related to 
them as effect to cause. Unless these conditions are satisfied, 
the basic truths will not be appropriate to the conclusion. 
Syllogism there may be without these conditions, but such 
syllogism, not being productive of scientific knowledge, will not 
be demonstration.' 17 
The apprehension of these necessary premises, or primary 
propositions, then, may be characterized as the foundations of 
scientific knowledge, both for Hobbes and for the Aristotelian 
account which he attempts to adapt and supersede. Upon their 
validity the whole superstructure of scientific conclusions 
depends. Given the lack of circularity of scientific knowledge 
in both the Hobbesian and Aristotelian framework, moreover, 
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these critical underpinnings of the whole enterprise must 
themselves be recognized as not subject to demonstration. 
Aristotle writes: 'Knowledge of the immediate premises is 
independent of demonstration. The necessity of this is obvious; 
for since we must know the prior premises from which the 
demonstration is drawn, and since the regress must end in 
immediate truths, those truths must be indemonstrable.' 18 
Hobbes follows this pattern quite closely, once again, saying 
that universal principles 'because they are principles cannot be 
demonstrated.' 19 
What, then, are these premises, these primary propositions, 
which are indemonstrable, but upon which all else depends? 
The answer, once more is the same for Hobbes as for Aristotle: 
the propositions which serve as the fundamental premises of 
scientific demonstration are definitions. The Aristotelian 
expression of this view runs as follows: 'Moreover, the basic 
premises of demonstrations are definitions, and it has already 
been shown that these will be found indemonstrable; either the 
basic premises will be demonstrable and will depend on prior 
premises, and the regress will be endless; or the primary truths 
will be indemonstrable definitions.' 20 The comparable passage 
in Hobbes states: 'Now primary propositions are nothing but 
definitions, or parts of definitions, and these only are the prin-
ciples of demonstration.' 21 And later Hobbes asserts that 
demonstration 'begins from primary or most universal proposi-
tions, which are manifest of themselves, and proceeds by a 
perpetual composition of propositions into syllogisms, till at 
last the learner understands the truth of the conclusion sought 
after .... such principles are nothing but definitions.' 22 In 
fact, Hobbes asserts, 'the only way to know is by definition.' 113 
Hobbes, then, continues to follow the Aristotelian tradition 
in which he had been instructed: from the insistence upon the 
demonstrative character of scientific knowledge, through the 
postulation of indemonstrable premises which are related in a 
cause-effect way to the conclusions, to the identification of these 
premises with definitions. The next question which logically 
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arises, however, is the problem 'what are these definitions?' 
And in his response to this substantive question, Hobbes departs 
from the traditional Aristotelian answer. Once again we find a 
radical transformation in content occurring at a crucial point 
within the context of persistent formal parallelism. And once 
again, this transformation is governed by the need to adapt the 
overall paradigm to the structural features of the new cosmos. 
Hobbes, pursuing the Aristotelian epistemological format, 
attributes critical significance to the act of definition, but defin-
ing something in a world of Body cannot be the same thing as 
defining something in a world of substances. 
In the Aristotelian world of finite, universal forms, the 
definition of an entity was the specification of the unique 
'this-ness' which made the entity what it was and which dis-
tinguished it from all other entities. The act of definition is 
possible, in Aristotle's view only a) because nature is the way 
it is-i.e., because the world is composed of 'definite things 
characterized by definite structures and definite life-histories, 
things which group themselves naturally according to these 
structures and processes, so that the world, in itself, displays the 
finitude essential to knowledge'; 24 and b) because the human 
mind, as itself a product of nature, possesses the capability of 
clearly perceiving these substantive patterns. The sublime 
confidence in the inherent capacity of the human mind was, 
as Grene astutely observes, more than likely the result of 
Aristotle's own experience as a biologist. That is, his biological 
investigations depended upon a prior identification of a particu-
lar species as being what it was and not another species. Aristotle 
experienced little difficulty in perceiving the pattern and 
properties of a species in recurrent individual specimens and in 
distinguishing one species from another; and it was therefore 
not surprising that he generalized this discriminative capacity 
of the practicing biologist into his systematic epistemology. 25 
It follows from the above account that Aristotle considered 
the act of definition to be a specification of the essence of a 
particular thing. 'Definition is of the essential nature or being of 
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something.' 26 Hobbes, however, must give a different account 
of what is involved in a definition, since the ontological context 
of his epistemology has no essences in it. Having conflated all 
heterogeneous substances into a single substance-i.e., Body-
Hobbes cannot view definition as an account of substantive 
boundary lines. He recognizes this quite clearly and affirms it 
explicitly: 
this is manifest, that genus, species, definition, etc. are 
names of words and names only; and therefore to put 
genus and species for things, and definition for the nature 
of any thing, as the writers of metaphysics have done, is 
not right, seeing they be only significations of what we 
think of the nature of things. 
Names have their constitution, not from the species of 
things, but from the will and consent of men. 
For definition is not the essence of any thing, but a 
speech signifying what we conceive of the essence thereof; 
and so also not whiteness itself, but the word whiteness, is 
a genus, or a universal name. 27 
If definitions, as conceived in the Aristotelian tradition, are 
not representations of the essence of any thing, what are they? 
Hobbes answers that they are explications of names. 28 These 
explications may take one of two forms, depending upon the 
type of name in question. If it is a compound name, that is, a 
name composed of more universal names (as the name 'man' 
may be said to be compounded of the names 'rational,' 'body,' 
'animated,' and so on), then the definition will consist of 
resolving that compound name into its simple and universal 
constituents. If the name is itself 'the most universal in its 
kind,' then the definition is a predication of different words 
which signify exactly the same thing. A definition, then, 
concludes Hobbes, is 'a proposition, whose predicate resolves 
the subject, when it may; and when it may not, it exemplifies 
the same.' 29 
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This account of definitions, of course, takes place in a 
resolutely nominalist context, where names are 'taken at 
pleasure'; and definitions therefore are 'truths constituted 
arbitrarily by the inventors of speech.' 30 Hobbes's account of 
naming and definitions is ultimately quite weak, especially 
considering the enormous burden which they carry. 31 It is not 
really clear what the formal requisites are of a definition which 
cannot resolve, because the name in question refers to a univer-
sal thing, but instead can only be 'such circumlocution as best 
explicateth the force of that name.' 32 Nor is it made clear what 
the standards of right definition are in a nominalist context. 33 
What is clear is that Hobbes's account of definition of compound 
names (and most definitions would be of this sort) is a direct 
reflection of his ontological departure from the Aristotelian 
tradition: namely, to ask for the nature of a thing means to 
ask for its component parts rather than for the formal whole it 
represents. This crucial difference receives systematic ex-
pression in Hobbes's characterization of the modes of scientific 
inquiry. It is also clear that, with all their deficiencies, 
Hobbesian definitions continue to perform absolutely critical 
functions in his account of human knowledge, just as essential 
definitions did in Aristotelian epistemology. These definitions are 
the source of all knowledge, the beginning of science, the first 
principles of reason, and the subject matter of philosophia prima. 34 
Moreover, it is also notable that Hobbes preserves largely 
formally intact, in his transformed ontological context, the 
Aristotelian account of the warrant for accreditation of defi-
nitional primary propositions and of the process of apprehending 
them. 
In both Hobbes's and Aristotle's accounts of the procedural 
means of reaching the universal definitive principles from which 
all scientific knowledge must be derived the same basic pattern 
is present. The inquiry into first principles begins with sensa-
tion. Next, recurrent images of the senses result in remem-
brance. The accumulation of memories become experience. 
Experience leads to the apprehension of first principles. And 
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finally, reasoning from these principles produces a kind of 
artificial experience which is science. The Aristotelian exposi-
tion of this process is most cogently expounded in the final 
chapter of the Posterior Ana{ytics; however, the basic sequence of 
sense-memory-experience-first principles-science may be seen 
in the following passage: 'So out of sense-perception comes to 
be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated 
memories of the same thing develops experience; for a number 
of memories constitute a single experience. From experience 
again-i.e., from the universal now stabilized in its entirety 
within the soul, the one beside the many which is a single 
identity within them all- originate the skill of the craftsman 
and the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the sphere of 
coming to be and science in the sphere of being.' 35 
Hobbes's account of the natural history of science, his genetic 
epistemology as it were, is virtually identical to Aristotle's, 
Like Aristotle, Hobbes sees the origins of all knowledge in 
sensation. 'The first beginnings, therefore, of knowledge, are the 
phantasms of sense and imagination.' 36 Later in the same 
volume, he elaborates and begins to link the original sense-
impressions to the phenomenon of memory, which itself plays a 
significant role in the rise of scientific knowledge: 'we must 
needs acknowledge sense to be the principle by which we know 
those principles, and that all the knowledge we have is derived 
from it. And as for the causes of sense, we cannot begin our 
search of them from any other phenomenon than that of sense 
itself. But you will say, by what sense shall we take notice of 
sense? I answer, by sense itself, namely, by the memory which 
for some time remains in us of things sensible, though they 
themselves pass away.' 37 The patterns of the senses, per-
petuated by memory to the point that the recurrence of 
general patterns may be recognized, turns into experience; and 
science itself is but one mode of knowing contingent upon this 
experience. This linkage of memory, experience, and science, 
the final part of the Aristotelian formal sequence of the genera-
tion of scientific knowing, is reflected in De Homine: 
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By this we may understand, there be two kinds of know-
ledge, whereof the one is nothing else but sense, or know-
ledge original, ... and remembrance of the same; the 
other is called science .... Both of these sorts are but 
experience; the former being the experience of the effects 
of things that work upon us from without; and the latter 
experience men have from the proper use of names in lan-
guage: and all experience being, as I have said, but remem-
brance, all knowledge is remembrance: and of the former, 
the register we keep in books, is called history; but the 
registers of the latter are called the sciences. 38 
The formal parallelism between Hobbes and the Aristotelian 
tradition extends from the process by which first principles are 
apprehended to the warrant for belief in them. Hobbes, like 
Aristotle, feels that it is the nature of first principles to command 
assent by the very power, immediacy, and indubitability with 
which they present themselves to the human mind. If scientific 
knowledge is to be certain, the originative principles of scien-
tific demonstration must be certain; but since the warrant of 
the principles of demonstration cannot be itself demonstrative 
(if circularity is to be avoided), the warrant must be the 
capacity of the principles to exhibit themselves as necessary, 
self-evident, and indubitable truths. 
For those who are accustomed to hearing Aristotle praised 
for his resolutely empirical methodology, the fact that he 
finally based his claim for scientific validity upon such an 
aprioristic argument may seem strange. It is nevertheless the 
case. For while Aristotle insisted upon careful empirical ob-
servation and equally careful logical demonstration as the 
principal components of his scientific procedure, the critical 
linchpin of the whole system was the presumption that the 
human mind could accurately perceive first principles by 
intuition (nous). Intuition, he said in the concluding remarks of 
the Posterior Ana[ytics, was 'the originative source of scientific 
knowledge.' 39 And the first principles grasped by intuition 
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must be self-evident: 'Things are true and primary which 
are believed on the strength not of anything else but of them-
selves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is im-
proper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; 
each of the first principles should command belief in and by 
itself.' 40 
Hobbes's conclusions about the self-evidencing nature of 
first principles as their warrant for our acceptance of them is 
essentially the same. A true definition, he asserts, will command 
assent through its undeniable clarity: 'the nature of a definition 
consists in this, that it exhibit a clear idea of the thing defined; 
and principles are either known by themselves, or else they are 
not principles.' 41 The reliance of Hobbes upon 'clear and 
distinct ideas' as the ultimate criterion for the acceptance of 
basic truths, of the fundamental premises of scientific demon-
stration, is not too surprising in historical context. The seven-
teenth century, in its predominant intellectual style, was 
almost uniquely convinced of the power and presence of self-
evident truths. But this calm confidence in the powers of 
intuitive reason was merely an accentuation of a pattern already 
there in the Greek conception of nous. 42 What is strikingly 
different from the Aristotelian characterization of intuitive 
perception of self-evident premises is the substance of what is 
seen to be self-evident. For Aristotle, intuitive perception was of 
universal gestalts, patterns of being such as biological species, 
that seemed to be perenially recurrent entities in a cosmos made 
up of entities. For Hobbes, as for most of the seventeenth 
century, intuition was of the universal components, the 
irreducible constituent parts of a substantively homogeneous 
umverse. 
It is on the basis of this crucial underlying substantive change, 
which is nevertheless placed within the persistent formal con-
text of Aristotelian epistemology, that Hobbes arrives at the 
heart of his conception of human reason and at his reflexive 
account of his own methodology. Apart from its intuitive 
powers, by which it is capable of apprehending self-evident 
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premises clearly presented, human reason consists of two basic 
intellectual operations: the first is resolution, the method of 
analytical reason, and the other is composition, the method of 
synthetical reason. Together, these two mental operations 
comprise the method of science, which consists of relating 
causes and effects. 'There is therefore no method, by which we 
find out the causes of things, but is either compositive or 
resolutive, or partly compositive, and partly resolutive. And the 
resolutive is commonly called analytical method, as the 
compositive is called synthetical.' 43 
The characterization of the two component operations of 
scientific method as composition and resolution are manifesta-
tions of Hobbes's mathematico-mechanical conception of 
reason. For Hobbes, to reason is to reckon and to reckon is to 
compute. 44 The sum and substance of science, then, is com-
putation, and science is conceived as a form of applied mathe-
matics which can be adapted to any subject matter which is 
'capable of composition and resolution.' 45 In arithmetic one 
adds and subtracts, multiplies and divides numbers. In geo-
metry, the same operations are performed on lines, figures, 
angles, and so on. In logic, one adds and subtracts the conse-
quences of words. And in law and politics, one reckons the 
empirical and logical consequences oflaws and the components 
of human action. 'In summe,' concludes Hobbes, 'in what 
matter soever there is place for addition and subtraction, there 
is also place for Reason; and where these have no place, there 
Reason has nothing at all to do.' 46 
It is clear that this is a model of human reason which could 
only be held by someone deeply infatuated with the power and 
accuracy of mathematical reason and heavily committed to a 
mechanistic conception of the world. For, on this model, 
knowledge comes about through a kind of intellectual tinkering: 
the mind takes things apart and puts them back together like a 
repairman working on a clock. In this way, it reaches an 
understanding of the subject-matter. The Aristotelian mind, 
living in a biological cosmos of intelligible species, gestalts, 
K 
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would find such an account of scientific reason peculiar indeed. 
Nevertheless, here again Hobbes has fashioned his own 
philosophical paradigm, this time in the interpretation of 
cognition, by adapting the traditional Aristotelian paradigm 
to the demands of his radically new and different ontology. It is 
fascinating to realize that composition and resolution are Aris-
totelian demonstration and induction placed in a nominalist 
setting, and thereby transfigured. 
Consider first the formally congruent pair of induction and 
resolution. As Aristotle said, and Hobbes repeats, some things 
are more known to us and others more known to nature. 47 
What is better known to us as men is what we can perceive 
with our senses, and that is the singular individual thing. What 
is better known to nature is the universal (for Hobbes, the 
universals) inherent in this singular whole. The function of 
resolution for Hobbes is the same as the function of induction 
for Aristotle, namely, to move from the sense-apprehended 
singular whole to that which is universal in it. Aristotle assigned 
this task to induction in the Posterior Ana[ytics: 'Thus it is clear 
that we must get to know the primary premises by induction; 
for the method by which even sense-perception implants the 
universal is inductive.' 48 
Since he remains an Aristotelian in his formal epistemological 
program, Hobbes must specify a type of intellectual operation 
to accomplish this same critical function of induction. That is, 
since he conceives of science as demonstrative, he must explain 
how the primary premises of scientific demonstration are 
discerned. For Hobbes, as for Aristotle, moreover, the only 
appropriate premises for a demonstrative science are universal 
principles. Therefore, some means must be provided for the 
apprehension of universals, such as Aristotle provided in his 
account of induction. 
Aristotelian induction and Hobbesian resolution, then, are 
formally and functionally congruent. They accomplish the 
same thing for science- the apprehension of premises of 
demonstration-and they accomplish this in the same way, 
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i.e., by moving from the sense-perceived particular to that 
which is universal in it. The transformation of induction into 
resolution, or analysis, is necessitated in Hobbes by the radically 
different substantive subject-matter upon which it must work. 
Or, to put it another way, induction becomes resolution because 
the underlying conception of what it is that is universal has 
been so radically altered. Both induction and resolution have 
the purpose of knowing universals, but in the heterogeneous and 
finite cosmos of Aristotle such knowledge is of the essence 
while in the homogeneous and open universe of Hobbes such 
knowledge is of the universal parts or components. The appre-
hension of the universal essence which is 'in' the sense-per-
ceived particular is, in Aristotelian epistemology, a kind of 
consolidation of a gestalt. The apprehension of the universal 
parts which are 'in' the sense-perceived singular whole be-
comes, in Hobbes's epistemology, a kind of intellectual dis-
mantling of the complex whole into its simple and universal 
components. 
In the chapter 'Of Method' in De Corpore, Hobbes elaborates 
his conception of the purposes and process of resolution in a 
passage worth citing in some detail, since it illustrates rather 
clearly the principal features pointed out above. 
But to those that search after science indefinitely, which 
consists in the knowledge of the causes of all things, as 
far forth as it may be attained, (and the causes of singular 
things are compounded of the causes of universal or 
simple things) it is necessary that they know the causes 
of universal things, or of such accidents as are common to 
all bodies, that is, to all matter, before they can know 
the causes of singular things, that is, of those accidents 
by which one thing is distinguished from another. And, 
again, they must know what those universal things are, 
before they can know their causes. Moreover, seeing 
universal things are contained in the nature of singular 
things, the knowledge of them is to be acquired by reason, 
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that is, by resolution. For example, if there be propounded 
a conception or idea of some singular thing, as of a square, 
this square is to be resolved into a plain, terminated with a 
certain number of equal and straight lines and right angles. 
For by this resolution we have these things universal or 
agreeable to all matter, namely, line, plain (which contains 
superficies), terminated, angle, straightness, rectitude, 
and equality; and if we can find out the causes of these, 
we may compound them altogether into the cause of a 
square. Again, if any man propound to himself the 
conception of gold, he may, by resolving, come to tht ideas 
of solid, visible, heavy, ... and many other more universal 
than gold itself; and these he may resolve again, till he 
come to such things as are most universal. And in this 
manner, by resolving continually, we may come to know 
what those things are, whose causes being first known 
severally, and afterwards compounded, bring us to the 
knowledge of singular things. I conclude, therefore, that 
the method of attaining to the universal knowledge of 
things, is purely analytical. 49 
The second congruent pair is that of Aristotelian demon-
stration and Hobbesian composition. Both of these intellectual 
operations begin with the necessary and universal principles 
provided by induction/resolution. Moreover, Hobbes follows 
in the Aristotelian formal pattern by postulating that the 
universal principles contain within them an indication of the 
definitive causal forces at work. 60 Therefore, demonstration/ 
composition is a process of drawing out the logical consequences 
of the universal premises; and, because these premises contain 
the cause, this process is seen as drawing out the causal con-
sequences at the same time. In both Aristotle and Hobbes, 
then, the method of demonstration consists of moving from 
the universal cause to the particular effect. 'Demonstration,' 
Aristotle wrote, 'develops from universals' and 'is syllogism 
which proves the cause,' 51 Hobbes concurs: 'The end of 
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science is the demonstration of the causes and generations of 
things; which if they be not in the definitions, they cannot be 
found in the conclusion of the first syllogism, that is made 
from those definitions; and if they be not in the first conclusion, 
they will not be found in any further conclusion deduced from 
that; and, therefore, by proceeding in this manner, we shall 
never come to science; which is against the scope and intention 
of demonstration.' 52 
Hobbes's formal characterization of compositive, synthetical 
reason, then, exhibits the same formal pattern and performs the 
same methodological functions as Aristotelian demonstration. 
It 'begins from primary or most universal propositions, which 
are manifest of themselves, and proceeds by a perpetual 
composition of propositions into syllogisms, till at last the 
learner understand the truth of the conclusion sought after.' 53 
The novelty of the Hobbesian account of demonstration as a 
process of composition stems, once more, from the adaptation of 
this basic process to the setting of his novel ontology. In the first 
place, the transformation of the notion of universals into 
'accidents common to all bodies' turns the causal force of the 
universals into purely efficient causality. And second, since the 
universals are envisaged as component elements rather than 
essences, the demonstrative movement from the universal to the 
particular involves a kind of putting back together of the 
particular complex whole out of the universal parts which were 
uncovered by analytical reason. 
Before considering the specifically political applications and 
implications ofHobbes's conception of the nature and powers of 
human reason, a summary recapitulation of the argument 
might be in order. Aristotle's and Hobbes's epistemological 
reflections are not easily digestible and the coherence of the 
course we have followed to this point may not be easily per-
ceived. The following chart, therefore, may be helpful as a 
sketchy overview of the structure of Hobbes's scientific 
methodology and its relationship to the Aristotelian tradition 
from which he begins. 
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This chart reflects the basic pattern which I have been seeking 
to establish: that Hobbes's model of human reason is structurally 
analogous to Aristotle's epistemological model, with trans-
formations effected as necessary to adapt the model to the 
infinite, mathematicized universe of the seventeenth century. 
Hobbes's account of human reason has a direct bearing 
upon his political theory in a number of ways. For example, 
this model of scientific method serves as reflexive elucidation 
of his own political analysis as he conceives it. That is, his 
own civil philosophy is depicted as a highly significant fruit of 
the pattern of inquiry he describes. In his examination of 
'politique bodies,' Hobbes feels, he has pursued the proper 
course of a demonstrative science, from the particular pre-
sented to the senses back by 'resolving continually' to the 
universal principles behind them and from there by composition 
to the finished construct of the Leviathan. In the preface to 
De Give, Hobbes outlines how his approach to civil philosophy 
embodies the resolutive-compositive method. 
Concerning my method, ... I took my beginning from the 
very matter of civil government, and thence proceeded to 
its generation and form, and the first beginning of justice. 
For everything is best understood by its constitutive 
causes. For as in a watch, or some such small engine, the 
matter, figure, and motion of the wheels cannot be well 
known, except it be taken ins under and viewed in parts; so 
to make a more curious search into the rights of states and 
duties of subjects, it is necessary, I say, not to take them 
insunder, but yet that they be so considered as if they were 
dissolved. 54 
Beginning from perception of the particular as it presents 
itself to the senses-in the context of civil philosophy, the 
particular being society as it presently is, the empirical political 
world- the civil philosopher must resolve it into its universal 
components. Having discovered these universal components-
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in the context of civil philosophy, these components are the 
natural passions and capabilities ofman-the civil philosopher 
has found the nature, the unvarnished natural universal parts, 
of social existence. In other words, through the process of 
resolution, analytical reason, one finds the state of nature. 
And on the basis of the universal principles which Hobbes 
feels he uncovers about natural passion, the human mode of 
that universal cause, motion, he depicts that state of nature as a 
state of war. 'The foundation therefore which I have laid, 
standing firm, I demonstrate, in the first place, that the state 
of men without civil society, which state we may properly call 
the state of nature, is nothing else but a mere war of all against 
all.' 55 
The final step of the method in the setting of civil philosophy, 
then, becomes to recompose the society out of these natural 
parts- to demonstrate the consequences of the causal com-
ponent principles for the effect, the complex whole, the state. 
'These grounds thus laid, I show further what civil government, 
and the supreme power in it, and the divers kinds of it are; by 
what rights particular men, who intend to constitute this civil 
government, must so necessarily transfer from themselves on the 
supreme power, whether it be one man or an assembly of 
men, that, except they do so, it will evidently appear to be no 
civil government, but the rights which all men have to all 
things, that is, the rights of war still remain.' 56 This process of 
social reconstruction Hobbes delineates in the section on 
'Dominion' in De Give, and Part 2 of the Leviathan. 
Hobbes's claim that he has produced his civil philosophy by 
a process of analytical resolution to the natural and universal 
principles followed by a recomposition to the reconstructed 
whole, the Leviathan, raises an immediate problem: namely, how 
can he arrive at a conclusion which differs from his starting 
point? That is, how can the method of resolution-composition 
be creative? If you take something apart and put it back 
together again, must you not arrive back where you started, 
perhaps with a greater understanding of your subject-matter 
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but nevertheless at the same place? This objection raises an 
important issue, for what is ultimately at stake here is the 
whole problem of the relationship between description and 
prescription in Hobbes's thought. Upon the success of his 
method in coming up with a political whole at the end of his 
inquiry which is something different from and better than the 
political situation from which he started rests Hobbes's claim 
for his fundamental accomplishment, i.e., to produce prescrip-
tions for political action which will command assent from all 
who understand the natural principles he uncovers. 57 
Hobbes, it must be said, never gives this problem the explicit 
attention it deserves or even requires. Any attempt to character-
ize his implicit conception of how the method of resolution-
composition could be creative, could end with a different 
'whole' from that which one began by 'resolving,' must 
necessarily be somewhat speculative. With that caveat, I 
think we could suppose that Hobbes had in mind something 
like the following argument. The present political situation 
from which I begin my analysis, he might say, is rather like the 
situation of a broken watch. The watch repairman, when he 
comes to fix it, must take it apart and put it back together 
properly, with the parts arranged this time in accordance with 
their nature. In the same way, Hobbes would argue, I have 
come upon a society broken and disordered by civil strife, 
taken it apart into its fundamental constituent parts, and 
imaginatively recomposed it into the ordered whole which is 
consonant with the nature of those parts. This analogy, of 
course, presumes the validity of designating the situation 
from which Hobbes begins as somehow 'broken,' but Hobbes 
feels this is no problem; the natural passions of all men would 
affirm the unsatisfactoriness of the condition of civil war. 
Men have not arrived in this sad state because they wanted to 
be in it, even though they might have gotten there 'naturally.' 
They got there because of a defect in their understanding. 
'The cause of war,' Hobbes asserts, 'is not that men are willing 
to have it; for the will has nothing for object but good' but 
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rather 'that men know not the causes neither of war nor peace.' 68 
Perhaps a better analogy even than that of the broken clock 
and the repairman- an image to which Hobbes is strongly 
attuned- is the analogy of the chess game played by a novice 
and criticized by a master, suggested by J. W. N. Watkins. 09 
In this analogy the novice is mankind in general, the master is 
Hobbes, and the game itself represents the world of political 
action. Man, in this analogy, is like a chess novice who, 
making each move on the basis of what seemed natural at the 
time, eventually finds himself in a deteriorating strategic 
situation that ends in his checkmate. Each individual move 
may have seemed like a good idea at the time, to take the 
opponent's bishop, to put his king in the corner for protection, 
and so on. But the composite of the individual moves which 
seemed right at the time turns out to be disaster. How could 
this happen? He thought he knew everything he needed to 
know-how each piece moved, the object of the game, and so 
on- but he reached a conclusion he did not intend even though 
he intended each individual step in the overall debacle. How 
could he be helped? 
The likely tack of the chess-master, seeking to instruct the 
novice in order to save him from such failures, would very 
likely be to 'resolve' the game as it had been played into its 
component moves. In this way, the novice may reach an 
understanding of the contextual circumstances that led him 
astray through the unintended consequences of his original 
moves. By understanding these consequences, which he had not 
perceived at the time although he theoretically and potentially 
was capable of doing so, he realizes where he went wrong and, 
with the master's help, can imaginatively recompose a game 
plan which would avoid a repetition of the original disaster. 
The recomposed game, then, would not be the same as the 
game which was the original subject for instructive analysis. 
This image of the chess-master captures very nicely Hobbes's 
conception of his peculiar role in relation to those he wishes to 
instruct in the precepts of civil philosophy. Men are like 
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chess novices, who blunder into political disaster because 
they 'know not the causes neither of war nor peace.' And the 
reason for this deficiency is that 'none hitherto have taught 
them in a clear and exact method.' 60 It is this method, of 
course, which Hobbes feels that he can supply and, moreover, 
has put to use. The method of reckoning causes and conse-
quences through a process of resolution and composition-
Aristotelian demonstrative science brought to practical fruition 
by its adaptation to the realities of an open universe of bodies in 
motion-can, in Hobbes's view, provide man with a key tool 
previously unavailable in his desperate quest to solve his 
political predicament. And Hobbes perceives himself as the 
chief purveyor of this epistemological epiphany, a master of 
the method which can save men from the horror of political 
chaos. 
Methodology, in other words, plays a central function in 
Hobbes's political soteriology. Nature places man into a 
predicament from which he must be saved- a disordered 
state of nature whose perpetuation leads to mutual destruction. 
To escape the likelihood of meeting a violent death, then, to 
escape a 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short' existence, 
man must extricate himself from the chaos of 'meer nature' 
by his own effort. He may succeed in this endeavor, for he has 
the capability to create social artifices, works of human craft to 
make good the vacuum of order in nature. To be successful, 
however, he must know his material: the natural passions, the 
causes, the consequences out of which his social construct 
must be created. This knowledge crucial to salvation is what 
Hobbes feels he has supplied. His science of 'bodies politique' 
is a redemptive tool. 
On the sure foundation of the principles which Hobbes has 
laid down, mankind, as the artificer by default of his own 
political salvation, may build a 'constitution everlasting.' 
And as the art of well building, is derived from Principles 
of Reason, observed by industrious men, that had long 
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studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of 
figure, and proportion, long after mankind began (though 
poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun to 
constitute Common-wealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse 
into disorder, there may, Principles of Reason be found 
out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution 
(excepting by externall violence) everlasting. And such are 
those which I have in this discourse set forth. 61 
When he considers how far removed is the general practice of 
men from the precepts he has discovered, Hobbes confesses, 
he despairs that 'this my labour' is 'uselesse.' But as he con-
siders again that he is the first philosopher ever to 'sufficiently 
or probably prove all the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, 
that man may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to 
obey,' his hopes revive. 'I recover some hope, that one time or 
other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a 
Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe (for it is short, and I 
think clear,) without the help of any interessed [sic], or 
envious Interpreter; and by the exercise of entire Soveraignty, 
in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of 
Speculation, into the Utility of Practice.' 62 
Hobbes's confidence in the efficacy of his civil philosophy as a 
remedy for political disorder reflects the new status he accords 
to the scientific study of politics. That is, for Hobbes, unlike for 
Aristotle, political science is a theoretical science- a form of 
knowledge which can be precise because it deals with necessary 
truths. Hobbes, in fact, has no category of practical science; 
there is only science, which is all theoretical, and untheoretized 
experience. However, theoretical science, as Hobbes describes 
it, takes on one very important feature of Aristotelian practical 
science, namely, its orientation toward action. For Hobbes, if 
the satisfactions of theoretical science were purely intrinsic 
and contemplative, the game would not be worth the effort. 
'For the inward glory and triumph of mind that a man may 
have for the mastering of some difficult and doubtful matter, or 
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for the discovery of some hidden truth, is not worth so much 
pains as the study of Philosophy requires.' 63 Instead, knowledge 
must have a payoff, a concrete use or impact in our daily 
lives. 'The end of knowledge,' says Hobbes, echoing Bacon, 'is 
power'; and 'the end or scope of philosophy is, that we may 
make use to our benefit of effects formerly seen,'64 
Political science, civil philosophy, is, in fact, the preeminent 
example of the potential practical benefits of theoretical 
understanding. The benefit it offers to mankind, if they will only 
pay heed, is nothing less than political salvation, escape from 
the political predicament produced by 'meer nature.' In this 
sense, the newly theoretical science of politics is envisaged by 
Hobbes as the gnosis of his secular and this-worldly soteriology. 
With this knowledge, man can save himself from political 
disaster. Indeed, he will inevitably save himself; for once in 
possession of this saving knowledge, his own nature will compel 
him to pursue the course of action which Hobbes prescribes. 
'All men,' Hobbes asserts, 'as soon as they arrive to under-
standing of this hateful condition, do desire, even nature itself 
compelling them, to be freed from this misery.' 65 Without the 
saving knowledge offered by the theoretical study of politic 
bodies, however, man cannot reckon the consequences to 
himself of his actions and therefore will be doomed perpetually 
to repeat the errors which lead to civil strife, turmoil, and 
warfare. 
If the method which Hobbes describes and the knowledge it 
produces are a redemptive tool, however, they are only that. 
They are a necessary component of the solution to man's 
political predicament, but they are not by themselves sufficient 
for redemption. They are a tool, that is, but not a force: a 
vehicle, but not an impetus. They provide the necessary means 
which have hitherto been lacking, but in themselves they do 
not provide the equally necessary motivation to appropriate 
those means. Knowledge may be power, but it is a power 
contingent upon man's desire to use it. In order to discover 
what this force is that will, in Hobbes's view, galvanize mankind 
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to use his doctrine if they only can understand it, we must 
turn to the passions of man- the other half of his nature. It is 
here that we must seek answers to the questions: why does 
man, the political (chess) novice, blunder so badly in the first 
place? and why will he succeed in salvaging himself once he 
is properly instructed in the causes and consequences of his 
actsion? 
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6 
Passion and the Politics of Containment 
'It is evident that the polis belongs to the class of 
things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature 
an animal intended to live in a polis.'- Aristotle. 
'And thus much for the ill condition, which man by 
meer nature is actually placed in, though with a 
possibility to come out of it.'-Hobbes. 
The two principal components of man's nature are his cognitive 
capacities and his affective inclinations. In the previous chapter 
the nature and significance of Hobbes's conception of human 
reason, its powers and processes, were discussed. His basic view 
of man's rationality, it was argued, is an adaptation of the 
Aristotelian epistemological format to the exigencies of the 
seventeenth-century's new view of reality. Moreover, it was 
noted, Hobbes is convinced that reason, so conceived, has a 
critical role in the deliverance of man from his political plight. 
To complete the sketch of Hobbes's view of human nature, it 
is necessary now to consider his treatment of human passion 
and its political consequences. 
It is here, in the realm of human passion, that Hobbes finds 
the dynamic forces behind the political struggle. The drama of 
political life for him is the product of the interplay between 
contending fundamental motivations which govern the actions 
of all men. These motivations are universal, natural drives, in 
his view, as much an essential part of man as the natural facts 
of his corporeality and mortality. 
The political impact of the natural framework of human pas-
sions is, for Hobbes, profoundly paradoxical. Man's emotional 
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necessities are both his blessing and his curse, the source of his 
immediate quandary and his potential deliverance. For on the 
one hand, man's natural egoism propels him into a primal 
political imbroglio of zero-sum game competition with his 
fellow human beings. The satisfaction of his egoistic desires 
logically requires the frustration of other men's desires. It is for 
this reason that the natural condition of mankind is seen as a 
state of war. On the other hand, man's natural desire to avoid 
violent death constitutes a great pacifier. Man is never really 
socialized, for Hobbes, in the sense of deriving great reciprocal 
satisfaction from social interaction, but he may be socialized 
to the limited extent of providing for the containment of his 
destructive egoism. And the motivating force behind this 
politics of containment is part of man's natural passion as 
surely as are the forces which create his political dilemma in the 
first place. 
The bearing of Hobbes's basic cosmology, his view of motion, 
body, and nature, upon his psychology and politics is a con-
troversial issue. Some writers have accepted Hobbes's belief 
that his political and psychological ideas were firmly based 
upon his natural philosophy. Hobbes's contemporaries, es-
pecially, were inclined to see his materialism, his alleged 
atheism, and his politics as all part of one detestable whole. 
Since G. C. Robertson argued that Hobbes's political ideas 
were largely formulated when he was still simply an observer 
of men and manners rather than a natural philosopher, how-
ever, there has been a strong tendency to separate his social 
thought from his cosmological ideas. Robertson found the key 
sources of Hobbes's political theory in 'his personal circum-
stances and the events of his time'; Strauss found these sources 
in Hobbes's conception of natural right; and Taylor and 
Warrender found these sources in Hobbes's allegedly autono-
mous belief in the existence of natural or divine obligations.1 
Despite the differences among themselves, these writers share 
the view that the basic source of Hobbes's political thought is 
not to be found in his natural philosophy. 
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The logic behind Strauss's dismissal of Hobbes's natural 
philosophy as a genuine basis of his political philosophy is 
significant. Earlier metaphysics were, he says, 'anthropomor-
phistic' and 'therefore a proper basis for the philosophy of 
things human.' On the other hand, modern science 'which 
tried to interpret nature by renouncing all anthropomorphisms, 
all conceptions of purpose and perfection, could, therefore, to 
say the least, contribute nothing to the understanding of things 
human, to the foundation of morals and politics.' 2 Hobbes's 
'original view,' Strauss concludes, 'is independent both of 
tradition and modern science.' 3 
J. W. N. Watkins aptly summarizes the Strauss-Warrender-
Taylor-Robertson position this way: 'Psychological conclusions 
about thoughts, feelings, and wants cannot be deduced from 
materialistic premises about body movements; therefore 
Hobbes must have made a fresh start when he turned from 
nature to psychology and politics.' 4 The major premise of this 
argument is, I think, beyond serious disputation. Structural 
features of one realm of reality cannot be derived by deducing 
them from the characteristic features of another realm. Psycho-
logical and political principles cannot be deduced from 
physiological principles. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the 
argument- 'therefore Hobbes must have made a fresh start'-
is not easily reconcilable with Hobbes's own conception of 
what he was doing, nor does it necessarily follow from the 
major premise. The problem is that there is a hidden minor 
premise in the 'fresh start' argument, namely, that the only 
form of influence of natural philosophy on political philosophy 
is by direct substantive, deductive, influence. This premise, 
however, is based upon an overly narrow conception of the 
operations of the human mind. And if this minor premise is 
denied, then the conclusion that Hobbes must have made a 
fresh start when he turned to politics and psychology can also 
be denied. 
Contrary to the hidden minor premise in the 'fresh start' 
theory, there is more than one way in which a theoretical 
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formulation in one area may exert some influence over theoreti-
cal formulations in another area. Or, to express it in the 
concrete terms of the immediate problem, there is more than 
one way in which the transformation of the idea of nature in the 
seventeenth century, which Hobbes embraces, could have had a 
positive impact upon his political theory. In certain cases one 
area of theory may conceivably have direct, substantive im-
plications for another area of theory. If political life is a part of 
the larger whole of natural life, then a change in the substantive 
understanding of nature will obviously have a direct, deductive 
bearing upon the understanding of politics. The substantive 
properties of the part are transformed with the substantive 
properties of the whole. In the case of Hobbes, however, this 
mode of influence is not really a logical possibility, since as 
Strauss has pointed out, his conception of nature has no 
human substantive properties at all. 
Hobbes, considering man to be part of nature, may have 
entertained the idea that his political theory could be derived 
deductively from his natural philosophy. If he did entertain 
this view, he was mistaken for the reasons Strauss puts forward. 
However, his conviction that his natural philosophy had a 
profound impact upon his political outlook was not mistaken, 
even if he misconstrued how the impact came about. 
Even where one theoretical model cannot properly produce a 
theoretical model appropriate to another realm of reality by a 
process of logical deduction, it may have a profound influence 
upon the other area of theory by means of analogy. Theory 
developed to explain one area of reality- the motion of physical 
bodies, for example-may have a persuasive structuring impact 
upon a second theoretical model directed toward under-
standing another area of reality- the emotions of human beings, 
for example. The formulations of one theory do not govern the 
other theory in a direct, deductive way; they have their 
impact by analogically shaping the perceptual patterns used to 
relate and tie together the raw data of the area in question. 
Models and metaphors which were developed to conceptualize 
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one set of data, especially if they are seen as properly relevant 
to another set of data, may serve to establish the conceptual 
patterns which are used to understand that other set of data. 
While it is true that Hobbes's natural philosophy cannot 
provide the content of his political theory, then, it serves as a 
source of heuristic models which shape and limit his political 
theory analogically. 'Nature' for Hobbes is devoid not only of 
human substance but of any substance other than that homo-
geneous substance which he calls 'body.' Nature, however, 
does have a characteristic pattern of action. It moves in a 
specific, definable fashion, the apprehension of which is 'the 
gateway of natural philosophy universal.' And it is this model 
of behavior which Hobbes carries over by analogy into his 
explication of human political and psychological behavior. 
The extension of this model of behavior from the realm of 
natural philosophy to the realm of political philosophy was not 
merely a possible theoretical assumption which Hobbes hap-
pened to make. He was instead positively led to take this step 
by the framework of the Aristotelian cosmology which he 
tacitly accepted as the proper matrix of his own world view. 
For although the Aristotelian-Scholastic cosmos was composed 
of heterogeneous substances, it was depicted as quite homo-
geneous in its basic pattern of action. Specifically, the Aris-
totelian model depicted all natural motion as manifesting the 
same basic pattern of the actualization of potentiality. Men, 
plants, animals, and falling bodies all allegedly exhibited the 
universal properties of natural motion- they all were striving 
to reach their natural telos. 
In other words, it was one of the implicit propositions of the 
Aristotelian cosmology that everything that moved naturally 
moved in the same way. There were no discontinuities among 
varied types of natural motion, no lines of differentiation among 
different characteristic modes of behaving in different forms of 
life. Therefore, it was a natural assumption for Hobbes to make 
that the transformed conception of motion possessed universal 
applicability. Against the background of the intellectual 
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tradition in which he had been trained, it would have been a 
revolutionary step for him to have thought otherwise. Since 
his philosophic radicalism extended only to a drastic metamor-
phosis of the Aristotelian cosmology, and not to its outright 
abandonment, it was easy for him to presume that human 
behavior should be perceived and interpreted in fundamentally 
the same manner as the behavior of other constituents of 
nature. Aristotle in effect invited this presumption, and Hobbes 
acquiesced. Substantively radical, he remains formally conser-
vative. 
Paradoxica1ly, in fact, Hobbes's retention of the matrix of 
the Aristotelian cosmology contributes importantly to the 
totality of his substantive rejection of Aristotelian doctrines. 
Since the formal pattern of the Aristotelian cosmology estab-
lished the profound interconnectedness of all the substances of 
nature by using a single theoretical conception of motion as 
their common foundation, it invited its own wholesale destruc-
tion. By resting his entire cosmology upon the foundation of a 
single theoretical model, Aristotle constructed a world view that 
was as fragile as it was extensive. In effect, anyone who could 
legitimately transform the theoretical foundation of his cos-
mology-his idea of motion-could transform the entire edifice. 
Hobbes, in effect, did precisely that. 
The relationship of Hobbes's new model of motion and the 
natural philosophy which develops from it to his political and 
psychological theories is not a simple one. Past discussions of the 
problem have tended to miscarry by assuming that Hobbes's 
natural philosophy either produces his political theory in its 
entirety or else it is irrelevant. The choices, however, need not 
be constrained by this dichotomy. In fact, Hobbes's natural 
philosophy is neither the sufficient basis of his political theory 
nor irrelevant. It has profound bearing without constituting 
sufficient cause. 
Since, as Strauss observed, there is no human content in the 
new cosmology it simply cannot be the source of a substantive 
political theory. No amount of intellectual contortioning can 
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remedy that fundamental incapacity. The new philosophy of 
nature, however, did inculcate in its adherents, Hobbes 
among them, a faith in the efficacy of certain organizational 
paradigms as interpreters of reality. If these perceptual 
patterns, or paradigms, could be made legitimately applicable 
to human phenomena- and the Aristotelian cosmology sug-
gested the legitimacy of such a carry-over-then they might 
become profoundly significant in shaping and ordering this 
set of data as well. Considerable evidence suggests that this 
potential form of influence of natural philosophy upon social 
philosophy is in fact operative in Hobbes. 
In order for perceptual models of natural philosophy to 
become influential in shaping perceptions of political order, it is 
necessary for them to achieve what might be called resonance 
with some patterns found in the realm of politics. That is, the 
theorist must perceive, or believe he perceives, political 
realities which are relatively isomorphic with the model which 
has developed from a consideration of natural realities. Apart 
from a situation of this sort, paradigms derived from the 
interpretation of the natural world will have little or no bearing 
upon the interpretation of politics. If there is a predisposition 
to see paradigms of nature as relevant to politics, and if in 
addition these paradigms can achieve some resonance with 
significant political phenomena, then a philosophy of nature 
may have a real impact on a theory of politics. 
In the case of Hobbes, as I shall argue, the determinative 
models in his interpretation of nature do have resonance in 
some fundamental components of politics- especially in the 
area of human passion and motivation. In human vanity, 
egocentricity, appetiveness, desire for power, and self-preserva-
tion, Hobbes found aspects of human behavior which lent 
themselves readily in his view to conceptualization by the same 
basic models that had proved so fruitful in the understanding 
of natural phenomena. Moreover, he was conditioned by 
Aristotelianism to view these parallelisms as more than in-
teresting analogies, to see them instead as manifestations of 
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the fundamental homogeneity of all 'natural action,' human 
behavior included. 
Since paradigms originating in extrapolitical, nonhuman 
areas of investigation must achieve resonance in political 
reality, it could be argued that they are not especially potent in 
political theory. Perhaps they serve as merely illustrative 
analogies which are used for purposes of communication or 
elaboration. Perhaps they are largely rhetorical window 
dressing that could be jettisoned without altering the theory 
notably. 
It is possible to construct a plausible argument along these 
lines. And such an argument can never be definitively adjudi-
cated, since it rests upon conjecture as to 'what would other-
wise have been the case.' Any answer given, therefore, is 
subject to the same kinds of reservations as answers to con-
jectural historical puzzles, such as 'what would have happened 
had the South won the Civil War?' and 'what would Europe 
be like now if the Bolshevik Revolution had been a failure?' 
The contribution of natural science paradigms to political 
theories, therefore, can never be precisely measured. However, 
it is necessary and important to observe that these paradigms 
can perform several functions in the context of political theory 
which go considerably beyond a merely decorative or rhetorical 
role. When these functions are noted, it becomes a persuasive 
supposition that the political theories in question would not be 
the same in the absence of the suggestive paradigms, nor would 
they be as strongly held and widely applied. At the very least, 
the presence of these positive functions of the extrapolitically 
originated paradigms in the context of political theory shifts 
the burden of proof to those who would argue that they are not 
significantly influential even where clearly present. 
In the first place, paradigms which originate from the inter-
pretation of nonpolitical phenomena may play a part in the 
actual process offormation of a political theory. By establishing 
a given pattern of order in the mind of the theorist, a non-
political model may suggest to him basic structures and forms 
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which he could use to understand politics. It may serve, in 
other words, as a kind of catalytic agent which helps to con-
solidate and integrate the political data into gestalts which 
have already proved persuasive in other contexts. The human 
mind is not divided into separate compartments. When a 
person turns from one set of data to another, from one type of 
intellectual problem to another, he cannot simultaneously 
purge his mind of all the patterns and concepts he has perceived 
and used. Even if he were to approach every new realm of 
reality only after undergoing a Cartesian mental purgative-
and Hobbes by no means felt this to be necessary or even 
appropriate methodologically- he could not escape the 
influence of his conceptual predispositions established by 
previous experience. Therefore, it is more than merely possible 
that a paradigm which is itself nonpolitical in origin may play 
a profound role in the formation of political concepts. And 
since Hobbes, beginning with the assumption of the homo-
geneity of 'natural motion' which he took over from the 
Aristotelian tradition, conceives this kind of conceptual carry-
over to be perfectly proper if not positively imperative, this 
possibility becomes a likelihood in his particular case. 
It is difficult if not impossible to demonstrate conclusively 
the formative influence of an established paradigm on the 
creation of another theoretical model. This difficulty arises 
because the operations of the human mind in the process of 
scientific discovery (as contrasted with the application and 
verification of theory) are extremely obscure. Ever since Plato 
posed the problem in the Meno, it has remained a mystery, 
both in philosophy and in science, precisely how the mind goes 
about looking for something which it does not know. 5 What 
we do know about these intellectual processes of discovery, 
however, based upon the reports of creative scientists who have 
made significant discoveries, suggests that paradigms, models, 
images, gestalts stemming from a wide variety of sources 
unrelated to the immediate subject-matter may play a pro-
found role in the germination of theories. The chemist who 
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discovered the circular structure of a particular hydrocarbon 
molecule, for example, reported that the catalyst to his dis-
covery was a dream in which he saw a snake holding its tail 
in its mouth. Surely, then, it is not too difficult to perceive that 
a dramatic new paradigm which had clearly possessed the 
mind of a given theorist, as the model of inertial motion had 
done in the case of Hobbes, might perform a similar function 
of creative inspiration through the medium of persuasive 
analogy. 
If the extrapolitical paradigm which is used in the inter-
pretation of politics has its origin in the very fundamental 
realm of nature, it serves a second positive function in relation 
to the political theory. It serves to give cosmological status to 
the political theory. It gives to the theory an alleged foundation 
that it does not possess in and of itself and therefore enhances 
its standing. An interpretation of politics carries an added 
claim to allegiance if it can be presented as but one manifesta-
tion of a much broader, indeed universal, force or tendency 
which is present in the very foundation of the universe. For 
example, the pattern of economic behavior captured by the law 
of supply and demand constitutes a significant analytical 
perception in its own right; but it achieves even more clout 
when it is presented as a law of nature that shares a common 
grounding with other natural patterns of orderliness. 
This function of providing a cosmological foundation for a 
social theory was especially significant in the period following 
the scientific revolution for at least two reasons. In the first 
place, such an alleged relationship between natural order and 
political order replicated the traditional pattern of finding 
nature to be a significant agent in the shaping of political 
realities. Although the substantive content of both the new 
view of nature and the new political theories of the seven-
teenth century and the Enlightenment were quite different 
from the content of the traditional view of nature and of 
politics, the ostensive functional relationship between the two 
was maintained by connecting them through a common 
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paradigm. And second, the age following the scientific revolu-
tion has been one in which the tools and models used to 
understand the world of nature have achieved a unique pre-
eminence. The surest path to legitimating virtually any form 
of inquiry has been to appropriate or approximate the methods 
of the mathematicizing sciences. 6 As a consequence, the claim 
that a particular social theory was firmly grounded scientifically 
-i.e., on the foundation of natural philosophy-improved its 
credibility not only to the theorist's audience but also to the 
theorist himself. 
In this context, then, Hobbes had considerable cause to shape 
his political perceptions and formulations so that they would 
conform fairly closely to the theoretical patterns of his natural 
philosophy. Significant benefits accrued to his system to the 
extent that he shaped and tailored one part of it to be sym-
metrical with the rest. The coherence of the whole constituted 
a powerful argument on behalf of each of its parts. Moreover, 
these compelling forces at work on behalf of integration and 
isomorphism among the varied parts of Hobbes's system of ideas 
should not be viewed as a purely external force. That is, he was 
not encouraged to dovetail his natural and political philosophies 
merely for the sake of persuading others; he was encouraged to 
do so to satisfy criteria of proper theoretical form profoundly 
operative within his own mind. He was himself sincerely 
convinced that the permeation of political concepts by the 
paradigms of natural philosophy was not only proper, but 
compulsory. He genuinely felt that civil philosophy 'can-
not be demonstrated, till [natural philosophy] be fully 
understood.' 7 
Once a paradigm growing from natural philosophy has 
become firmly established and then legitimated as appropri-
ately adaptable to political theorizing, moreover, it influences 
the resultant political theory in yet another way. Besides per-
forming a catalytic function in the formation of the theoretical 
model and serving to give it cosmological status, the reliance 
upon a paradigm serves to stabilize and to reinforce the theory 
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that has been generated and legitimated. This function of 
stabilization and reinforcement proceeds in both a positive and 
a negative fashion. 
Negatively, the model taken as a legitimate paradigm serves 
as a principle of conceptual limitation. The lines of the para-
digm, in other words, not only legitimate what lies within them 
but also exclude what falls beyond them. Phenomena which do 
not correspond to the established pattern, which transcend the 
boundaries of the paradigm, may easily remain unnoticed. 
These phenomena may be rendered virtually invisible, since 
the established perceptual gestalt refines them out rather like a 
polarized lens. Or, alternatively, their presence may be ex-
plicitly denied since they cannot conform with, cannot fit into, 
the accepted perceptual mold. Michael Polanyi has termed this 
limiting function of an accepted model the 'principle of sup-
pressed nucleation.' That is, the model functions to 'deny to 
any rival conception the ground in which it might take root. 
Experiences which support it could be adduced only one by 
one. But a new conception ... could be established only by a 
whole series of relevant instances, and such evidence cannot 
accumulate in the minds of people if each of them is disregarded 
in its turn for lack of the concept which would lend significance 
to it.' 8 The conception of nature which Hobbes brings with him 
to the study of politics exerts some of its most profound influence, 
I shall argue below, in this manner. On the basis of his pre-
established model of the world, some significant realities and 
possibilities are denied, jettisoned, or not seriously considered 
because their accreditation would break the boundaries of the 
model. 
Positively, i.e., beyond this negative function of limitation, 
the use of such an established conceptual model serves to 
reinforce and stabilize the theories it generates by a process of 
heuristic expansion. Once the model has been certified as the 
representation of a universal pattern of order, it tends to shape 
perceptions of other phenomena in such a way as to integrate 
them into its framework. A paradigm which has ostensive 
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universal status, which allegedly characterizes the universal 
nature of things, will possess this kind of expansibility almost 
by logical implication. If this is the very model of nature, the 
logic runs, then surely it is capable of expanding its explanatory 
scope to encompass any product of nature, including the state 
of nature. 
To summarize the argument to this point, then, it is quite 
possible for a philosophy of nature to exert a considerable 
impact on a philosophy of things human, even if that philosophy 
of nature is not anthropomorphic. By offering basic models 
which are held to be paradigmatic of the created world as a 
whole, even a nonanthropomorphic natural philosophy may 
work by analogy to shape, to suggest, to limit, to consolidate, to 
expand, to substantiate, to stabilize, and to reinforce formally 
parallel models of political life. In what follows I shall argue 
that in Hobbes's system of ideas this possible mode of influence 
is in fact operative and influential. 
It is not possible, of course, to demonstrate beyond question 
that Hobbes's political thought is influenced in the ways 
specified above by his natural philosophy. The only possible 
proof of this would be his own statements not only asserting that 
this is the case but explaining how it is the case. And even then 
one might argue, as in effect Leo Strauss did, that there is no 
real influence of this sort operative and that insofar as Hobbes 
thought there was he was simply mistaken. 9 What may be 
demonstrated, however, are the following: I) Hobbes thought 
that natural philosophy should be the foundation of political 
theory; 2) Hobbes thought that he had in fact succeeded in 
grounding his political theory on such a foundation; 3) some 
very striking parallels are present between the conceptual 
forms fundamental to Hobbes's view of nature and conceptual 
forms centrally operative in his depiction of political order; 
4) certain possibilities and realities which might be perceived 
in politics (some of which in fact played an important role in 
the traditional view of politics) are rejected by Hobbes, and 
such a rejection would be a logical consequence of accepting as 
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definitive of political behavior models of behavior originating 
in his natural philosophy. 
The first two of these propositions have been largely 
established by this time, and in any case they are not very con-
troversial. We shall turn then to an elaboration and substantia-
tion of the latter two propositions, examining the significant 
gestalts and exclusions in Hobbes's political theory which run 
parallel to similar patterns and limitations in his view of nature. 
Taken together these claims do not substantiate any belief that 
Hobbes's political theory is purely derivative of his natural 
philosophy; and such, indeed, is not in fact the case. What 
they do add up to is a warrant for belief that Hobbes's political 
ideas were significantly shaped and limited by the conjunction 
of his substantive natural philosophy and his methodological 
belief that natural and political philosophy were properly 
interrelated. 
The motif in Hobbes's view of nature which has the most 
profound and pervasive carry-over into his psychological and 
political models is his conception of motion. Tacitly standing 
within the formal matrix of his eviscerated Aristotelian cos-
mology, Hobbes assumes that the entire natural order including 
man, 'that most excellent work of Nature,' moves in funda-
mentally the same way. What Hobbes sees to be this basically 
homogeneous pattern of motion, however, has been radically 
recast. The universal phenomenon of motion is depicted by 
Hobbes as revealed by the startlingly new and fruitful theory of 
inertia. 
The Aristotelian mind had looked at all the hustle and bustle 
of the world, all the 'natural' motion constantly going on, and 
had seen it as the pursuit of finite ends by the phenomena of 
nature. The world's action was the interplay of purposeful 
strivings toward rest and fulfillment. Having incorporated the 
conceptual transformation manifested by the new understand-
ing of inertia, Hobbes looked upon the world and saw the 
interplay of motions with no natural end, no place of 'rest' 
whatsoever. 'Rest' was purely a relative situation, and it came 
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about in a moving body only through the imposition of an 
external force. This way of perceiving motion is not restricted 
by Hobbes to a single stratum of reality; it is seen as applicable 
to the motions of human and political bodies as well as to the 
motions of physical bodies. Therefore, Hobbes, early in 
Leviathan, establishes the model of inertia as a valid paradigm 
for the interpretation of moving bodies: 'That when a thing lies 
still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye still for ever, is a 
truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, 
it will eternally be in. motion, unless somewhat els stay it, 
though the reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can 
change itselfe,) is not so easily assented to.' 10 
The analogical carry-over into the interpretation of human, 
political phenomena of the new motion model leads Hobbes to a 
profoundly significant assumption from which his political 
theory must begin: men, too, move inertially. Not physical 
motions alone, but human e-motions as well move end-lessly, 
restlessly. Human motives are not specific finite desires which 
may be terminated by their fulfillment. Human life is not the 
quest of definite ends whose attainment brings the quest to a 
satisfied conclusion. Instead, as motivationally inertial creatures, 
like all the world, men move endlessly and insatiably. Therefore 
Hobbes postulates 'for a generall inclination of all mankind, 
a perpetuall and restless desire of Power after power, that 
ceaseth only in death.' 11 His fundamental psychological model, 
that is, is a human equivalent of the law of inertia. Elsewhere 
he elaborates: 'Seeing all delight is appetite, and presupposeth 
a further end, there can be no contentment but in proceeding: 
and therefore we are not to marvel, when we see, that as men 
attain to more riches, honour, or other power; so their appetite 
continually groweth more and more; and when they are come 
to the utmost degree of some kind of power, they pursue some 
other, as long as in any kind they think themselves behind 
any other.' 12 
In the Aristotelian cosmos, everything was characterized by a 
tendency to self-fulfillment. Movement was essentially a form 
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of growth or development. And man's movements, his 
e-motions, were one species of this universal pattern. His 
desire (orexis) and his natural tendency (horme) were directed 
toward finite ends which terminated the desire and the motion 
it engendered by fulfilling it. In Hobbes's world of inertial 
motion, this fundamental metaphysical postulate is trans-
formed from the perception of a universal tendency of all things 
natural to grow into a belief that all nature possesses a universal 
tendency to persist. All nature fundamentally desires its self-
preservation; it wishes, inertially, to persevere in its established 
path. Man, as a natural creature, is no different. He is possessed 
by an overriding natural tendency to seek his self-preservation. 
This desire, as a universal tendency of nature, is not properly 
subject to praise or blame, any more than one could be blamed 
for having two arms and a head. Not to have this desire would 
be perverse, unnatural. 'For every man is desirous of what is 
good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of 
natural evils, which is death; and this he doth by a certain 
impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves 
downward. It is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible, 
neither against the dictates of true reason, for a man to use all 
his endeavours to preserve and defend his body and the mem-
bers thereof from death and sorrows.' 13 
This fundamental, irreducible natural desire to persist in 
one's being, to preserve oneself, Hobbes continues, is the 
ontological foundation of natural right. 'Therefore, the first 
foundation of natural right is this, that every man as much as in 
him lies endeavour to protect his life and members.' 14 While it 
is true, therefore, as Strauss has insisted, that 'Hobbes's political 
philosophy starts from natural right,' 15 it must be recognized 
that natural right is for Hobbes simply the legitimation of the 
basic overwhelming motive force of the world. Natural right is 
not an a priori moral postulate which Hobbes promulgates as 
the central premise of his political theory. It is merely the 
realistic recognition and acceptance of the givenness in his 
own nature which man did not create and cannot abolish. 
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Hobb~s elaborates this connection of natural tendency and 
natural right in an important passage in the Elements of Law. 
That which is done by 'necessity of nature' constitutes a 
'blameless liberty,' he asserts, and that is what is meant by a 
'right.' 
And forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will 
and desire bonum sibi, that which is good for themselves, and 
to avoid that which is hurtful; but most of all, the terrible 
enemy of nature, death, from whom we expect both the 
loss of all power, and also the greatest of bodily pains in the 
losing; it is not against reason, that a man doth all he can 
to preserve his own body and limbs both from death and 
pain. And that which is not against reason, men call right, 
or jus, or blameless liberty of using our own natural power 
and ability. It is therefore a right of nature, that every man 
may preserve his own life and limbs, with all the power he 
hath. 16 
This nexus between natural right and the universal natural 
tendency of all created things to preserve themselves is the 
nexus between 'is' and 'ought' in Hobbes's political theory 
which has been alleged since Hume to be a logical impropriety. 
Hobbes's defense against this charge of impropriety would, I 
think, be essentially as follows. 'I did not confer the status of 
right upon natural tendency,' he might say. 'Nature herself 
did that. It is natural right that is in question, after all, not 
legal right or my personal preference. Only madmen moralize 
in a vacuum; and once nature instilled in all men a given 
inevitable desire, it was not in my power to declare the desire 
illegitimate any more than one could hurl imprecations against 
the rising of the tides or the falling of heavy bodies. Authority 
confers right, and nature is the author of man's innate drive for 
self-preservation. Hence nature (or God, as the author of 
nature, if you wish) has made this a natural right, and to begin 
political theory at this fixed point is only an act of acquiescence 
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in what nature has given us; it is an act of sanity and of science, 
not the promulgation of a moral dictate.' 
It helps to substantiate tlie claim that Hobbes took seriously 
what he felt to be the implications of his natural philosophy for 
the understanding of psychology and politics to observe similar 
thought patterns in the work of his noted contemporary, 
Spinoza. For Spinoza had also absorbed the philosophical 
implications of the new cosmology; and therefore, if Hobbes's 
social ideas are not based purely upon his observation of men 
and manners, but in significant part on his natural philosophy, 
then his thought might well exhibit some important conceptual 
parallelisms with Spinoza's. And indeed, Spinoza, in his 
Ethics, articulates a position which is strikingly similar to that 
of Hobbes, formally, substantively, and methodologically. 
The key formal and methodological parallelism between 
Hobbes and Spinoza consists in their belief that: I) man is a 
part of the whole of nature; 2) he therefore must be approached 
as one would approach a natural phenomenon, not to praise or 
blame it, but to understand it; 3) the method for understanding 
man's nature is the same as the method for understanding 
nature in general and therefore is a kind of quasigeometry. 
Hobbes's assent to these propositions has already been observed. 
Spinoza's commitment to them appears very clearly in the 
third part of his Ethics, 'On the Origin and Nature of the 
Affects.' Spinoza begins by complaining that most men 
approach human action as though it were a special case, 
altogether apart from the 'common laws of nature': 
Most persons who have written about the affects and man's 
conduct of life seem to discuss, not the natural things 
which follow the common laws of nature, but things which 
are outside her. They seem indeed to consider man in 
nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe 
that man disturbs rather than follows her order; that he 
has an absolute power over his own actions; and that he is 
altogether self-determined. They then proceed to attribute 
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the cause of human weakness and changeableness, not to 
the common power of nature, but to some vice of human 
nature, which they therefore bewail, laugh at, mock, or, as 
is more generally the case, detest. 17 
In contrast to this approach, Spinoza states, he will take 
quite a different tack; and this change of method is based upon 
an explicit affirmation of the homogeneity of nature and 
nature's product, man, just as Hobbes could have stated it: 
To such as these it will doubtless seem a marvellous thing 
for me to endeavour to treat by a geometrical method the 
vices and follies of men, and to desire by a sure method to 
demonstrate those things which these people cry out against 
as being vanities, absurdities, and monstrosities. The 
following is my reason for so doing. Nothing happens in 
nature which can be attributed to any vice of nature, for 
she is always the same and everywhere one. Her virtue is 
the same, and her power of acting; ... so that there must 
also be one and the same method of understanding the 
nature of all things whatsoever, that is to say, by the 
universal laws and rules of nature. The affects, therefore, 
of hatred, anger, envy, considered in themselves, follow 
from the same necessity and virtue of nature as other 
individual things .... I shall, therefore ... consider 
human actions and appetites just as if I were considering 
lines; planes, or bodies. 18 
The parallelism between Spinoza and Hobbes, moreover, is 
not purely formal and methodological; it extends also to the 
central substantive conception of the content of nature's 'power 
of acting' as manifested in human life. Having established the 
fundamental homogeneity of natural motion, and having found 
the concept of inertia to be the paradigm of this motion, 19 
Spinoza infers that the conatus sese conservandi, the desire for 
self-preservation, is the basic natural tendency of all life. This 
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principle is enunciated in Proposition Six of Part Three: 'Each 
thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persevere in its 
being.' 20 Hobbes, then, is not alone in deriving from the new 
cosmology the concept of an inertial drive for self-preservation 
as the fundamental natural tendency of human behavior. 
The natural necessity impelling all men to seek their self-
preservation generates the quest for power which is central to 
Hobbes's view of human motivation. In part, that is, the 
'rest-less' search for power which men exhibit is a practical 
consequence of their desire to avoid meeting a violent end. 
Trying to prevent others from endangering him, a man in the 
state of nature will naturally be driven to seek mastery over 
them. 'There is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so 
reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to 
master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no 
other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more 
than his own conservation requireth.' 21 
The libido dominandi, then, arises in the first place from the 
necessities of self-preservation. However, the matter is not 
quite as simple as that. There are at least two other sources 
of the restless desire for power which Hobbes sees as operative 
in men. The first of these is the love of glory, human vanity. 
Some men, Hobbes says, desire dominion over others not 
simply for the sake of security, but because they take delight 
in possessing the eminence manifested in their power. 'There 
be some,' he says, who pursue their acts of conquest 'further 
then their security requires' because they 'take pleasure in 
contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest.' 22 
The other source of man's quest for power might be expressed 
this way: power is necessary to liberty which is necessary to 
motion which is the source of human contentment. Power is a 
sine qua non of the continuing motion which is the essence of 
human happiness. 'Delight, contentment, or pleasure,' Hobbes 
tells us, 'is nothing really but motion about the heart ... and 
the objects that cause it are called pleasant or delightful.' 23 
'There can be no contentment,' he says elsewhere, 'but in 
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proceeding.' 24 For a man to be happy, therefore, he must be 
capable of moving as he pleases. That is, his motion must be 
unimpeded or else he will be frustrated and unhappy. Happiness, 
then, requires liberty, since liberty is unimpeded motion. 
'Liberty, or Freedome, signifieth (properly) the absence of 
Opposition: (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of 
motion).' 25 Because other men and their desires represent 
opposition to any man's natural desires, however, it becomes 
necessary to his liberty that he have power; for it is power 
alone that permits him to overcome the opposition and con-
tinue in his desired path. Therefore, it is a natural conjunction 
when Hobbes writes that men 'naturally love Liberty, and 
Dominion over others.' 26 The latter is a necessary means to the 
former. 
To summarize, then, the fundamental paradigm of inertia 
as the pattern of 'natural action' has a profound shaping 
influence upon the basic motivational psychology from which 
Hobbes begins his consideration of the nature and tasks of 
political order. In the first place, the conceptualization of the 
libido dominandi is isomorphic with the conceptual pattern of 
inertia: the search for power is 'perpetuall and restlesse,' 
having no end short of death. 27 And second, the inertial 
model of human motivation provides two of the three sources 
in Hobbes's genetic account of the centrality of the quest for 
power in human life : inertia in the form of the conatus sese 
conservandi, and inertia as 'delight in proceeding.' The third is 
delight in contemplating one's own preeminence, that is, 
glory. This third source of the power drive is not derived from 
models suggested by Hobbes's natural philosophy, but simply 
from his observations about human nature. He integrated it 
into his basic model of human behavior, but it is in origin 
philosophically autonomous, a product of, as G. C. Robertson 
put it, his 'observations of men and manners.' 28 
Moreover, the conception of a natural tendency to persevere 
in motion as a universal attribute of all natural beings, in-
cluding man, is the ontological basis of Hobbes's concept of 
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natural right. Therefore, the new view of motion, the critical 
fulcrum of Hobbes's 'natural philosophy universal' permeates 
his political thought in the roles of: I) the formal pattern of his 
political psychology, 2) a dynamic source of his derivation of 
the libido dominandi, and 3) the 'empirical' foundation of his 
formulation of natural right. Although his nonanthropomor-
phic natural philosophy could not provide the concrete human 
substance for his political and psychological theory, therefore 
(as the ambiguous role of glory in his thought illustrates), his 
political theory hardly represents a fresh start. Instead, it is 
permeated by profoundly operative conceptual models which 
Hobbes derives from his natural cosmology and which he 
considers legitimately, even imperatively, applicable to political 
theory. 
In consonance with his unidimensional cosmology, moreover, 
Hobbes conceives man's inertial passions as moving within a 
single emotional plane. Just as the heterogeneous panoply of 
substances found in the classical cosmos are conflated by 
Hobbes into the single substance of 'Body,' the varied forms of 
human emotion are conflated by him into a unidimensional 
continuum of 'appetite' and 'aversion.' 'All the passions,' 
says Hobbes, 'consist of appetite and aversion, except pure 
pleasure and pain, which are a certain function of good or 
evil.' 29 And appetite and aversion are not different types of 
motion, but simply poles of the same plane; they differ only as 
positive and negative, as attraction and repulsion. 
All the variations in human emotion are poured into a single 
stratum. For Hobbes, affection, passion, pleasure, and love 
are equivalents: 'So that pleasure, love, and appetite, which is 
also called desire, are divers names for divers considerations 
of the same thing.' 30 And elsewhere Hobbes asserts the identity 
oflove and lust: 'the name "lust" is used where it is condemned; 
otherwise it is called by the general word "love": for the passion 
is one and the same indefinite desire of different sex, as natural 
as hunger.' 31 
This conflation of all emotions into 'appetite' is a rather 
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radical and limiting conception ofhuman motivation. However, 
it does follow quite logically from the destruction of the 
teleological order and rationality in nature. Classical thinkers 
had conceptions of appetite, too, such as Plato's notion of the 
appetitive part of the soul and Augustine's notion of con-
cupiscence. But for Plato and Augustine the appetites were a 
distinct and limited class of human emotions. They were not 
to be confused with eros or amor Dei, which were the passionate, 
affective component of man's orientation toward the logos. 
With the obliteration of nature's logos, however, the ontological 
basis of the distinction in human psychology between love and 
lust, between rational and irrational emotions disappears. 
All motions of the human mind are left ontologically, and 
hence evaluatively, indifferent. Whether they be seen as good or 
bad becomes purely a question of subjective taste: 'Every 
man ... calleth that which pleaseth and is delightful to 
himself, good; and that evil which displeaseth him.' 32 
It is often stated that Hobbes founded the Leviathan upon 
will instead of reason. This characterization is quite accurate, 
for the mathematicization of reason left only the passions as the 
repository of human nature, which is the basis of any political 
philosophy. The real significance of this transposition, however, 
is not merely that it leaves the basis of the polity in the will, 
but what this will is. For in Hobbes's psychology, the will is 
merely a function of the inertially modeled appetite; specifically, 
the will is 'the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhering 
to the action or to the omission thereof.' 33 Ultimately, then, 
it is a more accurate characterization, and a more revealing 
one, to say that Hobbes bases the order of civil society upon 
'appetite.' He has completed the cycle from which Shakespeare 
had predicted disaster: 
Take but degree away, untie that string 
And hark, what discourd follows! Each thing meets 
In mere oppugnancy. The bounded waters 
Should lift their bosoms higher than the shores 
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And make a sop of all this solid globe. 
Strength should be lord of imbecility, 
And the rude son should strike his father dead. 
Force should be right; or rather right and wrong, 
Between whose endless jar justice resides, 
Should lose their names, and so should justice too. 
Then everything includes itself in power, 
Power into will, will into appetite; 
And appetite, an universal wolf, 
So doubly seconded with will and power, 
Must make perforce an universal prey, 
And last eat up himself. 34 
It is a measure of Hobbes's optimistic estimate of the potential 
efficacy of artificially contrived political institutions that he 
denies the last link in Shakespeare's chain of consequences. 
Rather than 'eat up himself,' man may instead create a 
sovereign power to check the naturally self-destructive con-
sequences of unbounded appetite. If this be man's hope and 
salvation, it is his only one, however; for human motivation 
can never transcend appetite for Hobbes, only contain it. 
The ultimate consequence and preeminent manifestation of 
Hobbes's radically transformed understanding of human 
emotion is his total rejection of any summum bonum. He declares: 
'But for an utmost end, in which the ancient philosophers 
have placed felicity, and disputed much concerning the 
way thereto, there is no such thing in this world, nor way to it, 
more than to Utopia.' 35 With this denial, Hobbes in effect 
pulls the linchpin from the classical cosmos; and this step, 
with its profound and far-ranging implications is the logical 
consequence of the radical transformation of the concepts of 
motion and nature. 
The significance of this rejection, for the interpretation of 
both physical motion and political action, is difficult to 
exaggerate. The summum bonum in Aristotelian and Scholastic 
thought represented the ultimate source of order in both the 
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physical and the political worlds. Moreover, it was the pre-
eminent expression of the isomorphism between human and 
natural behavior in the classical cosmos. The very same model, 
that of eternal, uncreated, simple, rotatory motion, represented 
in its physical modality the ultimate source of all natural 
movement and in its human modality the ultimate wellspring 
of human action. In both of these aspects, the summum bonum 
or unmoved mover, was the telos of the universe, and as such 
the cause of its order and life. 
This interpenetration of physics and psychology at the 
critical point of ultimate causation is reflected in the formal 
congruence between the patterns discerned by Aristotle in the 
final book of the Physics and in the first and last sections of the 
Ethics. In Book Eight of the Physics, Aristotle concluded that all 
motion in the universe must finally be contingent upon some 
primary movent, a primum mobile which is itself unmoved. 
And this unmoved mover, he argued, is properly understood 
as a pattern of self-sufficient, continuous, regular, eternal, 
rotatory motion. 3 6 
Precisely the same model reappears in Aristotle's discussion 
of the good in the Ethics. The summum bonum or highest good 
is depicted as the primum mobile or unmoved mover of human 
action. The good is 'that at which all things aim'; and the 
chief good is that 'which we desire for its own sake.' 37 Like 
the unmoved mover of physical motion, the summum bonum is 
the final goal of human action, a self-sufficient and continuous 
activity desired for its own intrinsic worth. It is 'something 
final,' 'always desirable in itself and never for the sake of 
something else.' 38 It is 'the most continuous' and 'the most 
self-sufficient' form of activity. 39 On the basis of these criteria, 
which are exactly the same criteria which define the unmoved 
mover, Aristotle concluded that the highest good was the 
activity of rational contemplation. In its pure form man can 
only approximate it, he felt, but the divine can and does 
embody it. 'Therefore, the activity of God, which surpasses all 
others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human 
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activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be 
most of the nature of happiness.' 40 
The whole conception of the summum bonum, then, was a 
direct function of the Aristotelian theory of motion. The 
summum bonum was, in effect, the unmoved mover of human 
behavior, the psychological incarnation of the primum mobile. 
And both the summum bonum and the unmoved mover were 
expressible in the same symbolic paradigm: the image of 
eternal, self-sufficient, rotatory motion. This symbolic form, 
in turn, was both the preeminent formal expression and the 
ultimate foundation of the closed and finite Aristotelian cosmos. 
It is, therefore, only logical for Hobbes to reject the con-
ception of the summum bonum, for it is the expression in the 
realm of psychology of a theory of motion which he has dis-
carded. The new model of inertia removes the need for the 
unmoved mover in the realm of physics, and within the 
Aristotelian format of isomorphism between physics and 
psychology (which, we have argued, Hobbes tacitly accepts) 
it simultaneously removes the need for postulating a summum 
bonum in order to interpret human action. Hobbes is merely 
following out the logical implications within the formal 
framework of the Aristotelian cosmological paradigm of his 
radically transformed idea of motion when he declares that 
'the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind 
satisfied. For there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme) nor 
Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books 
of the old Morall Philosophers.' 41 Felicity is not repose, for 
nothing is really 'at rest' in the classical sense in Hobbes's 
universe. Instead, happiness is itself a form of endless, linear 
motion, 'a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to 
another, ... a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after 
power, that ceaseth only in Death.' 42 
.In short, the new concept of inertia, carried to its full logical 
conclusion in the setting of an integrated cosmological paradigm 
that takes the nature of motion as its foundation, breaks open 
the eternal closed circle which symbolized the classical cosmos. 
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The symbol of the new, infinite, inertial universe is instead the 
endless horizontal line. Physically, linear nonfinite motion 
replaces circular eternal motion; and in the human realm the 
transformation is formally identical. The eternal circular motion 
of fulfillment and contemplation is broken open and becomes 
the linear motion of endless striving. Hobbes's fundamental 
psychological model is a human equivalent of the law of inertia. 
Hobbes gives his conception of human action as endless 
striving its symbolic expression in his image of life as a race. 
It is essential to this image, moreover, as Hobbes quite clearly 
sees, that this race be seen as having no particular direction, 
and indeed no finish line at all; the only aim of the competitors 
is to be in the forefront of the perpetual chase. 
The comparison of the life of man to a race, though it hold 
not in every part, yet it holdeth so well for this our purpose, 
that we may thereby both see and remember almost all 
the passions before mentioned. But this race we must 
suppose to have no other goal, nor other garland, but 
being foremost, and in it: 
To endeavour, is appetite ... 
To consider them behind, is glory .. . 
To consider them before, is humility .. . 
To lose ground with looking back, vain glory ... 
To be holden, hatred ... 
To turn back, repentance ... 
To be in breath, hope ... 
To be weary ... , despair ... 
To endeavor to overtake the next, emulation ... 
To supplant or overthrow, envy ... 
Continually to be out-gone is misery. 
Continually to out-go the next before, is felicity. 
And to forsake the course, is to die. 43 
It would be difficult for anyone to improve upon the classic 
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simplicity and power of this symbolic characterization ofhuman 
life. At the very outset of the modern era, Hobbes has produced 
the model of the 'rat race,' and he has done so within the 
context of a world view which provides it with a profound 
cosmological foundation. There are two significant corollaries 
of this model of human behavior, moreover, which are worthy 
of note: the universalization of anxiety and the relativization of 
political ends. 
An irremediable anxiety, first, is the overriding subjective 
attribute of the man caught up in the paradigmatic race. 
His life is one of ultimate and endless striving, without any 
telos to fulfill his quest. He must run, but he has no resting 
place for his goal. While in one sense it is accurate to say, as 
Eric Voegelin has, that the seventeenth century destroys the 
tension that characterized the Aristotelian cosmos- the tension 
of the dialectic between potential and actual- in another 
sense it universalizes tension; for what is destroyed is not the 
striving, but the telos which made the strife resolvable. In 
human terms, then, the proximate anxiety of the finite human 
organism generated from its not-yet-fulfilled condition turns 
into the ultimate and unresolvable anxiety of the racer who is 
condemned to run continually after a nonexistent fullfillment. 
The modern Sisyphus pushes his boulder across an endless 
plain. 
Second, the image of the race embodies the relativization of 
political ends in Hobbes. That is, since there remains no 
absolute goal of human and political life, that which remains 
is simply the wholly relative goal of being ahead of the other. 
Politics becomes a zero-sum game in which one man's success 
involves another man's failure, one man's power another man's 
impotence, one man's glory another man's shame. There is 
here no common good or community, but only individual 
competition for scarce or mutually unattainable goods. 
All life, Hobbes says, is a quest of 'power after power,' and 
man's felicity consists of the continual attainment and exercise 
of power. But the very definition of power is given in relative 
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terms. 'Power simply is no more but the excess of the power of 
one above that of another: for equal powers opposed, destroy 
one another.' 44 Power is a form of dominion, rather than 
simply a form of absolute strength. For man naturally loves 
dominion over others, 46 and the strengths of two men will 
clash rather than augment one another. Power is that which is 
left over, the resultant which is produced by a parallelogram of 
conflicting forces. 
Moreover, without a structuring and limiting telos to govern 
it, power becomes autonomous. It becomes an end in itself, 
rather than a means to final fulfillment. Or, to put it slightly 
differently, the 'contentment in proceeding' which power 
permits is itself the only kind of fulfillment there is left in 
Hobbes's inertial psychology of motivation. As a consequence 
ofbecoming an end in itself, power feeds upon itself insatiably, 
having no objective other than still more power. Hobbes calls 
once more upon the model of physical motion to characterize 
this pattern of insatiability: 'For the nature of Power, is in this 
point, like to Fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion 
of heavy bodies, which the further they go make still the more 
haste.' 46 Formally, this pattern of the endless quest for power 
after power recalls Plato's conception of the soul dominated by a 
master passion and foreshadows Marx's comments about the 
insatiably accumulative drive of capitalist man. Both 
resemblances are more then fortuitous. 
The case of glory, upon which Hobbes places considerable 
emphasis, especially in his earlier works, provides a further 
excellent and significant instance of this relativization of 
political ends. All men, though some to a more immoderate 
degree, love glory, which is 'joy, arising from imagination of a 
man's own power and ability.' 47 However, glory, like the 
power whose imagining is its source, is a relative phenomenon. 
'If all men have it no man hath it, for it consists in comparison 
and precellence.' 48 And since 'all society is either for gain or for 
glory,' 49 further substantiation is given to the overall Hobbesian 
depiction of politics as a zero-sum game. 50 
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In sum, Hobbes's vision of the human passions and their 
manner of operation is profoundly shaped by his basic paradigm 
of motion. The means by which this structuring impact takes 
place is not so much substantive or deductive, which would be 
logically impermissible, but formal and analogical. The basic 
model of motion easily penetrates the conception of e-motion. 
Moreover, the model of motion shapes the conceptualizing of 
human behavior through the intermediary conception of 
nature, as well; for on the one hand motion is the key to the 
understanding of nature and on the other hand passion 
('naturall passion') is one modality of the uniform operation of 
homogeneous nature. This pattern of analogical penetration, 
moreover, merely replicates the formal pattern found in 
Aristotle, who also conceptualized human behavior as one 
species of a universal pattern of movement. 
Although Hobbes's analogical reasoning follows the pattern 
set by Aristotle, the concrete view of human behavior which 
results from the substantively radical transformation in the key 
conception of motion is far different from the classical view. 
The natural passions which govern men, being inertial, make 
human society an arena of colliding power drives. Bereft of 
any natural end or fulfillment, the fundamental human passion 
for power is infinite and insatiable; 'like the motion of heavy 
bodies,' the further it goes it makes 'still the more haste.' 61 In 
its boundlessness and disorderliness, passion is but another 
expression, though a critical one, of the boundlessness and 
disorderliness of nature as a whole. Acting through its em-
bodiment in the wellsprings of human action, it is ultimately 
nature itself that produces the zero-sum game of political life. 
This conclusion may be reached, Hobbes feels, by inference 
from the concept of nature directly, by inference from the 
nature of the passions, or simply from experience. 62 
The dissociative, antisocial natural passions are not in 
themselves sinful. 63 They nevertheless constitute a deep 
predicament of overwhelming practical significance. Nature, in 
the guise of passion, is not, as Aristotle conceived it, the inspira-
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tion to and motivating force behind the creation of political 
society. It is the problem rather than the solution. It places 
man in the miserable condition where irreconcilable and 
insatiable passions contend against each other, offering only the 
prospect of war and disaster unless they are checked. 
The task of politics in the Hobbesian world, then, is pre-
eminently the task of containment- containment of the natural 
forces which produce a life that is, in the famous phrase, 
'solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.' 54 Nature, which 
presents man with his political predicament, will not save him 
from it. It will not do so, first, because it does not possess a 
principle of order, and second, because it has no principle of 
creativity. Nature will not transform the passions into emotions 
which can create and sustain community. The only hope for 
man in facing up to his political dilemma, therefore, is to 
control the consequences of natural passion by an institutional 
force of his own creation, that is, by a work of artifice. 
Natural passion, although it is the source of man's political 
predicament and is unable to extricate man from this pre-
dicament, nevertheless does make its contribution to man's 
potential political deliverance. The political containment of the 
dissociative force of human passion must itself be a work of 
artifice, but passion does provide the impetus for this enterprise. 
Man finds within himself one natural passion which drives him 
into the creation of Leviathan; and that is, as Leo Strauss has 
capably demonstrated, the overriding fear of violent death. 
Indeed, it is necessary to Hobbes's entire political program 
that some feature of the human psychic economy be found to 
perform this motivating function. For unless some component 
of man's natural passion is able to provide this impetus, 
Hobbes's political theory could be only a counsel of despair. 
It is not enough, given Hobbes's naturalism, for it to be 
necessary that man create a sovereign to extricate himself from 
the calamitous situation in which nature places him; it must 
be possible, as well. And this possibility is contingent upon the 
presence of some natural human desire which can impel man 
N 
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to undertake the burdensome steps and to make the necessary 
sacrifices which are intrinsic in this creative effort. The state 
is itself a work of artifice, a product of man's intellect and will; 
but man's will is a 'worke of Nature' and the motive power 
behind the state must therefore be found there. 
The political creations of man are not part of the human 
quest for the summum bonum, for there is no summum bonum in 
Hobbes's world. Instead they are inspired by a summum malum, 
the prospect of meeting a violent death. In the Aristotelian 
and Scholastic view, man acted politically because he was 
naturally motivated to reach his end, his telos. In Hobbes's 
view, man acts politically because he naturally wishes to avoid 
meeting his end. No neater expression than this could be found, 
perhaps, of the difference in the perception of political behavior 
between those who inhabited a finite universe which moved 
toward a fulfilling end and Hobbes, who inhabited an infinite 
universe which embodied a restless quest for continual motion. 
Man's natural passions, Hobbes feels, embody potentially 
conflicting tendencies which begin to become manifest under 
the circumstances of social interaction. Man begins with the 
inherent desires for dominion and eminence. Since these 
passions are intrinsically unattainable without frustrating the 
same passions in others, however, they quickly beget bitter 
contention and strife among men. Contention and strife in 
turn produce a new specter: the possibility, even perhaps the 
probability in such a setting, of violent death. At this point, an 
even more fundamental desire, heretofore latent, comes into 
play. All joy, whether it consists in gain, glory, or power, pre-
supposes life. The threat to life itself, therefore, arouses the 
negative expression of man's most basic desire- the drive for 
self-preservation, for the continuation of the 'motion of limbs.' 
In Hobbes's account, then, the genetically prior libido 
dominandi dialectically generates an opposing passion which is 
even more fundamental-the fear of violent death. It may seem 
strange to suppose, in this fashion, that the ontologically prior 
emotion, the most basic and fundamental desire, is chrono-
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logically secondary. However, this view is well substantiated by 
the facts of human psychic development. Although his actions 
are governed in part by organic drives which are self-preserva-
tive, the child's conscious desires take life for granted; they are 
oriented toward gratifications of various sorts, not toward the 
mere continuation of life. It is only later, at a heightened level 
of reflexive ego-awareness and under the impact of significant 
examples from experience, that the individual begins to 
absorb the contingency of his very existence, to appreciate the 
fact that he will die eventually and might even meet a violent, 
premature end. Life is logically prior to joy, but the quest for 
joy antedates the quest for self-preservation in the human 
consciousness. 
As Strauss observes, Hobbes sees man as beginning life in a 
kind of dream world, blissfully unaware of his most basic need. 
'Absorbed in the race after the happiness of triumph, man 
cannot be aware of his dependence on the insignificant primary 
good, the preservation oflife and limb; failing to recognize his 
bodily needs, man experiences only joys and sorrows of the 
mind, i.e. imaginary joys and sorrows .... Living in the world 
of his imagination, he need do nothing, in order to convince 
himself of his superiority to others, but simply think out his 
deeds for himself.' 55 Only under the impact of painful ex-
perience does the reality principle begin to make itself felt. 
'He can awaken from this dream-world and come to himself 
only when he feels in his own person- by bodily hurt-the 
resistance of the real world. By damnorum experientia man becomes 
reasonable.' 56 
Hobbes's hope for the foundation of a commonwealth that 
can secure peace for man and save him from the destructive 
consequences of his passion for power and glory rests upon the 
belief that, to borrow Freud's terminology, the reality principle 
can overcome the pleasure principle. Hobbes hopes and believes 
that the fear of violent death is stronger than the love of 
eminence. Once the facts are in, the relations of cause and 
consequence demonstrated, there will be a hierarchy of intensity 
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within the human passions which parallels the logical priorities 
of the ends involved. Since self-preservation is logically prior 
to any enjoyment whatever, then, the passion to avoid a 
violent death will override the genetically prior natural passion 
for dominion. The fear of the summum malum is the great 
pacifier, the impetus for the establishment of political order. 
Having considered the nature of man in Part One of the 
Leviathan, Hobbes begins Part Two, 'Of Common-wealth,' 
with the following paragraph which aptly summarizes this 
hopeful conviction: 
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally 
love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduc-
tion of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see 
them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their 
own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; 
that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable 
condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as 
hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when 
there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them 
by feare of punishment to the performance of their 
Covenants, and observation of those Lawes of Nature set 
down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters. 67 
For Hobbes, then, the foundation of the commonwealth is a 
sober awareness of the nature and consequences of human 
passion, conjoined with the motivating force of the· summum 
malum. The origin of political wisdom is not eros, in Hobbes's 
view, but fear. If men are able to build a secure and lasting 
society, they will do so on the basis of aversion rather than 
affection. 'We must therefore resolve, that the original of all 
great and lasting societies consisted not in the mutual good 
will men had towards each other, but in the mutual fear they 
had of each other.' 58 In fact, Hobbes sees eros as the problem, 
not the cure; for the erotic forces in Hobbesian psychology are 
purely those of the dark eros. The affections of man are 
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egocentric, exhaustively a manifestation of the Augustinian 
amor sui. 59 
On the basis of his analysis of human passion, then, Hobbes is 
able to complete the justification of his political program. He 
has answered the questions which concluded the last chapter. 60 
Man, the political (chess) novice, blunders into political 
disaster because he is governed by the natural passions for 
power and glory that cannot be satisfied in society. He will 
succeed in saving himself from the disastrous consequences of 
his natural passions, however, once he recognizes the causes and 
consequences of his actions, because the original disaster 
brings to life the previously tacit passion for self-preservation. 
And this desire for the preservation of the 'motion of limbs,' 
while it is genetically secondary, is logically prior and therefore 
motivationally dominant once it is aroused. 
Therefore, man's passions are both his curse and his potential 
salvation. What is needed to make man's political salvation an 
actuality is the 'true and certain rule of our actions' 61 which 
Hobbes feels he has provided. His philosophy, in his view, 
supplies that foresight necessary to make man's fear politically 
efficacious. Cognizant both of his precarious situation and of 
the causes of his dilemma, man will naturally move to create a 
sovereign power by mutual covenant. 'This is the Generation 
of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speake more reverently) 
of that Mortal God, to which wee owe under the Immortal 
God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him 
by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the 
use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by 
terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all, to 
Peace at home, and mutual ayd against their enemies abroad.' 62 
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7 
Conclusion and Methodological Postscript 
It has been generally recognized that the brilliant and perverse 
political theory which Hobbes produced marked a revolu-
tionary departure within the tradition of political thought. 
What has not been generally appreciated is the systematic 
nature of this revolutionary departure. For the relationship 
between Hobbes and the regnant tradition from which he 
came and against which he reacted was not simply that of a 
major change or a sharp divergence. Hobbes's political theory 
was not merely different from the previously entrenched 
Aristotelian paradigm. It constituted instead a highly sys-
tematic transformation of the established viewpoint that 
paralleled and borrowed from that viewpoint even while 
refashioning it radically and dramatically. Contesting the 
substance of the established Aristotelian paradigm of natural 
and social reality point for point, Hobbes nevertheless tacitly 
adopted the basic framework and pattern of interrelationships 
predicated by that paradigm. 
This phenomenon of reaching radical conclusions by using 
a new focal model in the context of an accepted tacit con-
ceptual matrix I earlier designated as 'paradigm transforma-
tion.' This study has been intended to exhibit this pattern of 
systematic transformation through its form as well as through 
its explicit propositions. The formal carry-over from the 
Aristotelian model of reality into Hobbes's world view is 
manifested in the systematic and persistent parallelism which is 
present when both are given an exposition which follows the 
'logic-in-use' behind them. 
This largely tacit paradigm matrix shared by Hobbes and 
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Aristotle was a perceptual framework which structured the 
basic relationships conceived to obtain among the data under 
investigation. Both philosophers assumed that nature was an 
integrated whole which encompassed all immanent existence, 
including man. Man was the preeminent work of nature, but 
he was part of nature nevertheless. Epistemologically, know-
ledge was conceived as the power of cognition isomorphic to the 
natural world it sought to understand. And the potentialities 
and limitations of political life were irreducibly structured by 
the potentialities and limitations of the natural order in which 
it was embedded. 
Moreover, both Hobbes and his illustrious theoretical pre-
decessor and antagonist shared the assumption that the funda-
mentally integrated natural world was composed of two 
essential components: a principle ofmovement and a substance 
or substances within which movement took place. The pivotal 
conception for both of them was that of motion. Hobbes agreed 
with Aristotle that the one appropriate starting point for natural 
philosophy was the knowledge of what motion was all about. 
Against this background, the remarkably extensive and re-
volutionary impact of the new concept of inertia which Galileo 
inspired becomes intelligible. For Hobbes, this single conceptual 
change opened up a whole new world-or, to put it another 
way, this one bold intellectual stroke had to his mind made 
possible for the first time an accurate understanding of the 
world. When the fulcrum of a giant intellectual leverage system 
is changed, the whole system is transformed. This is what 
Hobbes recognized, and the recognition elated him because it 
resolved old conceptual dilemmas and confusions and opened 
new possibilities. This radical gestalt-switch in the perception 
of motion posed for him the question which became the starting-
point for his own philosophical explorations: 'what happens to 
the Aristotelian world when the focal model which governed 
it is rejected?' That Hobbes pursued the answer to this problem 
thoroughly and systematically has been, I hope, demonstrated 
in the preceding chapters. 
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Hobbes, of course, was unable to generate a complete political 
theory out of the new cosmological paradigm which he elabora-
ted. In the first place, he had to import into his speculations 
attributes of human nature which he derived from his observa-
tions of life around him, since the new cosmological paradigm 
was quite devoid of human substance-it was 'non-anthropo-
morphistic,' as Strauss says, and therefore not an adequate 
foundation for a philosophy of things human. And in the 
second place, there is always some slippage in even the most 
systematic political thinker between his governing ontology 
and his political prescriptions. All sorts of intermediate and 
contingent judgments as to appropriate and effective means of 
attaining given ends, assessments of the practical political 
context, and so on, intervene between one's basic world view 
and his concrete political policy choices. Hobbes is no exception 
to this rule. 
Nevertheless, the new cosmological paradigm which Hobbes 
articulated in response to the transformed conception of motion 
had a profound impact on even his political ideas by establish-
ing the basic parameters within which they had to operate and 
the basic problems with which they had to deal. A world of 
'rest-less' motion which had no telos contained restless men who 
had no summum bonum. And human psyches which were so 
relentlessly inertial, insatiable, presented an acute political 
predicament on which Hobbes centered his attention. As 
Hobbes saw it, dispelling the illusion of the satiable ego 
necessitated the recognition that untutored nature was a force 
for political disorder rather than, as Aristotle felt, a source of 
political coherence. The foundation of a stable polity, then, 
had to be a work of artifice rather than an expression of nature. 
The Leviathan was that 'artificial man' which was needed as 
the political logos; his (nominalist and artificial) utterance 
made the world habitable for men whose nature would have 
led them otherwise to collective self-destruction. 
Man's political hopes, therefore, lay in the realm of artifice, 
in social forces and institutions ofhis own making. Nevertheless, 
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unless this possibility were to be a free-floating fantasy, it had 
to have some foundation in the natural givens of man's exis-
tence. And while Hobbes related that he often felt quite 
pessimistic that his life-raft to struggling men would ever be 
grasped, he was not in his view indulging in purely utopian 
exhortation. Hobbes's artifice is like Thomas Aquinas's grace: 
it transcends nature, but does not (and indeed cannot) abolish 
it. The Leviathan stands above the chaos of the ungoverned 
state of nature; yet he must find his footing in it. 
Again, Hobbes remained consistent with his basic cosmologi-
cal paradigm, if indeed he was not positively inspired by it, 
when he identified this natural footing of his Leviathan. One 
leg of the Leviathan, to extend the metaphor, stands upon 
natural right and the other leg stands upon the fear of violent 
death. The former provides the legitimacy of Leviathan, the 
latter provides the possibility. These two crucial foundations of 
Hobbes's theory were appropriately and perceptively em-
phasized by Leo Strauss in his analysis of Hobbes. What 
Strauss seemed unable to perceive, however, perhaps because 
of his excessively stringent criteria of what constitutes an 
acceptable nexus between natural and civil philosophy, is that 
Hobbes's conception of natural right and his conception of 
human motivation are shaped to be commensurate with his 
general paradigm of nature. Strauss tends to depict natural 
right in Hobbes as an a priori moral presupposition and to 
consider his view of human motivation as the product of purely 
empirical observations. While Hobbes may well have had 
multiple inspirations for these central components of his 
political theory, I believe that both of them fit perfectly with his 
central paradigm of inertial motion. Natural right grew out of 
man's 'natural necessity to seek bonum sibi,' and the fear of 
violent death was the converse of man's 'natural inclination' to 
persevere in his motion. 
In the Introduction I suggested that some of the analytical 
concepts put forth by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific 
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Revolutions were useful in seeking to understand the structure 
of Hobbes's thought and its relationship to the Aristotelian 
tradition which it sought to displace. And, indeed, I have used 
some of the Kuhnian vocabulary throughout this study. I 
also suggested that certain emendations and adaptations of 
Kuhn's ideas were helpful in using them in the context of 
political theory. 
This is not the proper place for a full-scale consideration of 
Kuhn's ideas and their adaptability to the social sciences. 
However, in light of the increasing interest in Kuhn by social 
scientists representative of several fields, 1 and in light of Kuhn's 
own emendations to his original expression of his ideas, 2 a 
few reflections on this problem are in order, especially as they 
relate to this specific study. 
One of the central criticisms of Kuhn, relevant to our 
concerns here, has been that the fundamental concept in his 
thesis-that of the paradigm-is vague, ambiguous, and con-
sequently difficult to put into operation. 3 The basic problem 
here is not so much that Kuhn gave a very vague definition of 
a single thing, but rather that he used the same term to refer 
to a whole family of interrelated things. The term paradigm is 
applied by Kuhn, for example, to a 'standard illustration,' a 
'concrete scientific achievement,' a 'set of received beliefs,' and 
a 'theory,' among other things. 
Margaret Masterman, in fact, in an astute analysis, has 
claimed to discern as many as twenty-one different senses in 
which the term paradigm was used in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. 4 A significant number of these allegedly multiple 
senses of paradigm are largely semantic, however. As Master-
man herself says: 'It is evident that not all of these senses of 
"paradigm" are inconsistent with one another: some may even 
be elucidations of others.' 5 Nevertheless, after all the semantic 
problems are dispelled, there remain some real distinctions, 
not merely verbal ones, to be made among the different 
phenomena which Kuhn lumped under the heading of 
paradigm. 
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After refining out the purely semantic multiplicity of uses of 
paradigm, Masterman arrives at a threefold categorization of 
distinguishable things, all of which Kuhn had referred to as 
'paradigms' in his original work. These are: I) 'metaphysical 
paradigms' -sets of basic beliefs, organizing principles behind 
perception, etc. ; 2) 'sociological paradigms'- scientific achieve-
ments accredited by the scientific community to be used like a 
judicial precedent; 3) 'artefact paradigms'- actual textbook 
examples which are the concrete models to be emulated. It can 
be argued, moreover, that the second of Masterman's categor-
ies, 'sociological paradigms,' actually refers more to a significant 
dimension or setting for the problem of scientific revolutions 
than to a different type of intellectual construct on a par with 
the other two. Scientific communities serve as the locus of and 
authority behind the establishment of paradigms, but they are 
not themselves paradigms. 
We are left with two intellectual phenomena which were 
placed under the single label of 'paradigm' in Kuhn's first 
edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The first of these is 
the constellation of basic beliefs, presuppositions, conceptual 
assumptions, that structure the categories and interrelation-
ships into which the data of scientific investigation are placed-
the 'metaphysical paradigm.' The other is the concrete prob-
lem solution-the 'artefact paradigm' -which is taken as a 
suitable model for further explorations and interpretations. 
And indeed, Kuhn has himself affirmed that a similar twofold 
distinction is useful and necessary: 'Most of those differences 
(in the use of the term 'paradigm,' as enumerated by Master-
man) are, I now think, due to stylistic inconsistencies (e.g. 
Newton's Laws are sometimes a paradigm, sometimes parts of a 
paradigm, and sometimes paradigmatic), and they can be 
eliminated with relative ease. But, with that editorial work 
done, two very different usages of the term would remain, and 
they require separation.' 6 
Kuhn's distinction, which he then elaborates, goes basically 
as follows. The first sense of 'paradigm' refers to a whole com-
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plex of deeply engrained beliefs and perceptions shared by a 
scientific community. This is the paradigm as 'disciplinary 
matrix.' 7 The second sense of 'paradigm' refers to one of 
the key constituent components of this disciplinary matrix, 
namely, to the 'concrete problem-solutions' that serve as 'shared 
examples' for members of a given scientific community. These 
'exemplars,' Kuhn contends, constitute the central and most 
novel aspect of his thesis; and they are the component of the 
disciplinary matrix for which the term paradigm is most 
appropriate philologically. (The other constituent com-
ponents of the disciplinary matrix, Kuhn says, are 'symbolical 
generalizations,' 'shared values,' and what he had referred to in 
the first edition as the 'metaphysical parts of paradigms.') The 
two senses of 'paradigm,' then, in Kuhn's revised formulation, 
are related as part to whole. The exemplar (paradigm 2) is a 
centrally important element of the disciplinary matrix 
(paradigm I). 
There is, then, considerable overlap, but some slippage as 
well, among the distinctions made by Masterman, those made 
by Kuhn himself, and those which were made in the Introduc-
tion to this volume. Like Kuhn in his self-revision, I suggested 
that a paradigm might best be conceived as a complex whole, 
which contained several constituent elements. When the thesis 
of this study refers to the 'transformation of a cosmological 
paradigm,' therefore, it is this complex whole paradigm which 
is referred to. Essentially, this is what Kuhn now chooses to 
label the 'disciplinary matrix,' and it bears resemblance to the 
notion of Weltanschauung or 'world-hypothesis.' 8 
For purposes of analysis, I then suggested that it was possible 
to distinguish at least two functionally related components of 
this full-scale paradigm. The first of these was a kind of bare-
bones formal perceptual skeleton which served at a very simple 
and fundamental level to provide the framework for the more 
concrete substantive components of the paradigm. This frame-
work was designated the 'tacit matrix' of the paradigm, signify-
ing both its essential cognitive function and the usual mode of 
0 
2IO THE POLITICS OF MOTION 
its functioning. The coincidental choice of the same term, 
matrix, by both Kuhn and myself is perhaps unfortunate, 
since we are not using it with the same referent. For Kuhn, 
the matrix refers to the complex whole paradigm, whereas I 
use the term to refer to one of the constituent elements of the 
whole. Moreover, none of the constituent elements of the full-
scale paradigm which Kuhn delineates is quite identical with 
what I had in mind. This lack of correspondence need not, I 
think, be a cause of great concern nor an indication that one 
of us is wrong; it simply indicates that it may be useful to break 
down the constituents of paradigms differently in areas which 
have different subject-matter. 
The other analytically distinct component of the overall 
paradigm which I identified in the context of this study was 
designated the 'focal model.' I suggested, as reflected in the 
formal parallelism but substantive divergence in the exposition 
of Aristotelian and Hobbesian thought, that Hobbes had 
adopted the matrix of the Aristotelian paradigm but radically 
changed its content. The key to this change lay, it was sug-
gested further, in Hobbes's adoption of a new 'focal model,' 
namely, the Galilean model of motion. Here my concept of the 
focal model has a very close correspondence to one of Kuhn's 
concepts in his breakdown of the constituent elements of his 
'disciplinary matrix.' By 'focal model' I intended to convey 
something basically the same as what Kuhn calls an 'exemplar': 
the concrete puzzle-solution which serves as the analogical 
source of more extensive inquiry or of a more extended theory. 
This notion also corresponds quite closely to Masterman's 
'artefact paradigms.' 
There are, then, and there will continue to be, some con-
ceptual vagueness and semantic confusion in the Kuhnian 
vocabulary. Some commentators have suggested that these 
problems raise grave doubts about the wisdom of trying to use 
this vocabulary in the social sciences. 9 Two appropriate 
rejoinders may be entered, however, against this counsel of 
discouragement. First, it is questionable whether these problems 
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are insuperable. It is not at all impossible progressively to sort 
out the various meanings of the actual terms, to refine them, 
and to indicate the nature of their interrelationship. The 
preceding few paragraphs, indeed, constitute one example of 
this process of conceptual refinement and clarification, which 
Kuhn and others have already begun and which will un-
doubtedly continue. And second, the demand for absolute 
conceptual clarity in the early stages of the development of an 
analytical frame of reference is based on a misunderstanding of 
the nature of scientific advance. Conceptual clarity must come, 
but in due time. The meaning of a word, as Wittgenstein has 
admonished us, is its use; it follows that the uses of a concept 
or a 'language-game' must be explored before its meaning can 
be established. In the beginning of its deployment, a scientific 
concept generally is and must be open-ended. Premature 
closure in the name of clarity is both impossible and self-
defeating. Abraham Kaplan, drawing upon the support of 
Freud, has stated the case succinctly: 
In short, the process of specifying meaning is a part of the 
process of inquiry itself .... For the closure that strict 
definition consists in is not a precondition of scientific 
inquiry but its culmination .... I do not think that Freud 
was merely rationalizing the shortcomings of his own 
semantic patterns in making explicit this methodological 
precept: 'We have often heard it maintained that sciences 
should be built up on clear and sharply defined basic 
concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most 
exact, begins with such definitions .... It is only after 
more searching investigation of the field in question that 
we are able to formulate with increased clarity the scienti-
fic concepts underlying it, and progressively so to modify 
these concepts that they become widely applicable and at 
the same time consistent logically.' 10 
The genuinely relevant demands to levy against a family of 
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ideas in their early stages is not for definitive clarity but for 
insight and fruitfulness. When measured by these criteria, the 
framework which Kuhn has developed seems to me to come out 
rather well. 'Insight' and 'fruitfulness' are not, of course, 
subject to quantification, so each must make his own evaluation. 
Perhaps the primary virtue of using the paradigm concept 
and its attendant ideas lies in their capacity to operationalize 
the essential findings of gestalt psychology in the context of 
epistemology. As Michael Polanyi noted at the outset of 
Personal Knowledge, 'scientists have run away from the philoso-
phic implications of gestalt.' 11 Similarly, most interpretation 
of political theory proceeds in a very piecemeal fashion, dealing 
with ideas about the state, or authority, or obligation as though 
they were autonomous concepts which could be treated in 
serial fashion, isolated from the other aspects of the theory. 
Perhaps this form of analysis has its uses. And perhaps in the 
case of some theorists this is all that can be done. However, 
most really powerful political theories, 'epic' theories as Wolin 
calls them, attain their stature precisely because of their 
capacity to integrate these varied components into a coherent 
vision of the political world. 
As Kuhn reminds us: 
Neither scientists nor laymen learn to see the world 
piecemeal or item by item .... The Copernicans who 
denied its traditional title 'planet' to the sun were not only 
learning what 'planet' meant or what the sun was. Instead, 
they were changing the meaning of 'planet' so that it could 
continue to make useful distinctions in a world where all 
celestial bodies, not just the sun, were seen differently from 
the way they had been seen before. The same point could 
be made about any of our earlier examples. To see oxygen 
instead of dephlogisticated air, the condenser instead of the 
Leyden jar, or the pendulum instead of constrained fall, 
was only one part of an integrated shift in the scientists' 
vision of a great many related chemical, electrical, or 
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dynamical phenomena. Paradigms determine large areas 
of experience at the same time. 12 
The same basic point, I think, needs to be made in relation to 
political theory. A political theory is not, except derivatively, 
a set of propositions. It is instead an integrated vision of the 
political world- the structure of its components, the relation-
ship of these components one to another, and the relationship 
of this whole to its larger context. Hobbes did not simply differ 
with Aristotle on certain political issues; he actually saw 
politics in a whole different way than did Aristotle. The strength 
of Kuhn's concepts is that they are appropriate for the analysis 
of integrated perceptual gestalts of this sort. 
For similar reasons, moreover, the vocabulary of 'paradigm,' 
'crisis,' 'anomaly,' and so on, can illuminate the dynamics of 
change and development within political theory. There does 
exist in the process of theory construction, both in the 'hard' 
sciences and in political science, a kind of dynamic logic of 
discovery, which is not really accounted for by Aristotle's 
account of formal logic, by Mill's or Bacon's accounts of 
induction, or by Hempel's account of 'hypothetico-deduction.' 
Kuhn's concepts, in contrast, do capture some of this dynamic, 
perhaps because they are grounded in an appreciation of the 
complexities and ambiguities of perception. To understand a 
given datum as an anomaly or a given intellectual achievement 
as an exemplar is to see at the same time the impetus to and 
the source of other theoretical problems or constructs which 
follow logically. In the context of this study, for example, 
perceiving Galileo's model of motion as a new examplar which 
overcame certain anomalies in the Aristotelian paradigm 
simultaneously enables one to perceive the paths by which 
Hobbes was drawn to some of the conclusions he reached. 
Kuhn's emphasis upon the functions of 'exemplars' may also 
prove helpful in the context of political theory. This aspect of 
Kuhn's framework, which he now considers to be the most 
novel part of his book, 13 explains the power that specific 
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concrete examples may attain in the formulation of theory. 
While Kuhn tends to describe these exemplars in the context of 
natural science as solutions of particular problems or puzzles, 
it is possible to broaden the reference of this concept somewhat 
in the context of political theory. For the political theorist, a 
particularly striking historical event, political act, or political 
actor often seems to perform the perceptually catalytic func-
tions described by Kuhn. For Plato, for example, the con-
frontation of Athens and Socrates delineated in the Apology 
provided the essential perception of order juxtaposed against 
disorder that structured his more systematic political reflections. 
And for Hegel, as well as for Burke, the French Revolution 
provided a specific concrete case which precipitated and 
governed the structure ofhis philosophy.14 
It might be suggested, then, that one essential part of under-
standing the structure and logic of a particular political theory 
might be the identification and elucidation of the key examples 
which function as paradigms for the theorist's vision. This kind 
of investigation, moreover, might prove especially helpful in 
comparative analysis. For example, as I have suggested else-
where, 16 the contrast between Hobbes and Enlightenment 
liberalism poses an interesting problem: both conceived 
themselves to be articulating the political implications of the 
scientific revolution, but they reached radically different 
conclusions. While there are many causes of this apparent 
paradox, part of the problem may be resolved by an apprecia-
tion of the functions of exemplar paradigms. For while Hobbes 
took Galileo's solution of the problem of motion as his exemplar 
of nature, the Enlightenment liberals took Newton's solution 
of the problem of gravitational force as revelatory of the 
activity of nature. A world conceived sub specie gravitation is 
obviously a very different place than a world conceived sub 
specie inertia. The former world is a much more orderly and 
coherent one, and the predicament of political man in such a 
world is not so dire. Instead of having to extricate himself from 
the chaos of 'meer nature,' as Hobbes put it, he can instead 
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simply follow Diderot's exhortation to 'return to nature' and 
all else will be given unto him. Says Diderot: 'Return to Nature 
from which you have fled; she will console you and dispel all 
those fears which now oppress you. Submit to nature, to 
humanity, and to yourself again; and you will find flowers 
strewn all along the pathway of your life.' 16 
If one sees nature in this light, as a principle of order and 
coherence, like the force of gravitation, he is not likely to be on 
the road to Leviathan. If anything, he is more likely to be on 
the road to laissez-faire. Indeed, Adam Smith wrote with 
unabashed admiration of the Newtonian system 17 and per-
ceived the world as an 'immense machine' which God had 
'contrived and conducted ... so at all times to produce the 
greatest possible quantity of happiness.' 18 On these premises, 
so far from being forced to ingenious political artifice in order 
to escape the manifest disorder of nature, political man is 
counseled to avoid resort to artifices, which will interfere with 
the course of nature's benevolent designs: 'Projectors disturb 
nature in the course of her operations on human affairs, and it 
requires no more than to leave her alone and give her fair play 
in the pursuit of her ends that she may establish her own 
designs .... Little else is required to carry a state to the highest 
degree of affluence from the lowest barbarism but peace, easy 
taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest 
being brought about by the natural course of things.' 19 Smith, 
Diderot, and others such as Priestley and Condorcet, did not 
deduce their political precepts straight from Newtonian 
mechanics, of course. But Kuhn's insight into the functions of 
exemplar paradigms in theory construction helps us to see the 
analogical force which Newton's law of gravitation had for 
them. Moreover, some of their striking contrasts with that other 
interpreter of the political implications of the new science, 
Hobbes, are clarified at the same time. 
It is too early to render any final judgment on the entirety of 
Kuhn's provocative analysis of scientific inquiry. For example, 
it is not yet clear whether Kuhn's model will be able to 
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provide a satisfactory account of the process of 'verification,' of 
the reasons for scientific 'progress,' or of the rational grounds for 
choosing one paradigm over another. 20 Later clarification may 
dispel some of the criticisms which have been leveled against 
Kuhn on these issues. Or it may be that Kuhn's framework 
cannot provide an acceptable answer to some of these problems. 
Nevertheless, it is not too early, I believe, for an appreciation 
of the genuine heuristic value of some of Kuhn's central insights 
and suggestions. 
In the case of this study, the application of Kuhn's categories 
was largely ex post facto. The basic thesis and most of its elabora-
tion had already been completed before I first encountered The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn's ideas, therefore, did not 
contribute to the original formulation of the study; and the 
book could undoubtedly have been written without it. Never-
theless, Kuhn's model contributed materially to the final 
product in several ways. In the first place, Kuhn's insights 
served to consolidate and to clarify some of the basic analytical 
contentions of the work. In doing so, moreover, they provided 
an appropriate vehicle of exposition- a language which has 
been disseminated widely enough that its use may facilitate 
communication. And finally, Kuhn's model served as an 
essential heuristic tool in expanding the scope of the argument: 
the crystallization of the central pattern of 'paradigm trans-
formation' led, for example, to the extension of the argument 
which is embodied in Chapter Five. 
One final word about the world ofThomas Hobbes: in some 
ways we still inhabit it. Hobbes's specifically political recom-
mendations have hardly been widely embraced, but some of 
the fundamental aspects of his paradigm persist into contem-
porary ideas and problems. Hobbes limits the rational faculties 
of man to the process of 'computation'; and we debate whether 
human knowing involves any powers not possessed by 'thinking 
machines.' Hobbes depicts the psyche as a conglomerate of 
positive and negative motions, appetites and aversions; and 
twentieth-century psychological behaviorism builds its psyche 
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out of 'stimulus-response' arcs. 21 Hobbes argues that 'what-
soever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it, 
which he for his part calleth good'; 2 2 and we discuss the 
'emotive theory of ethics,' which holds all ethical statements to 
be an expression of merely subjective preference. Hobbes 
dissolves the telos of human striving and thereby makes anxiety 
an irremediable condition; and contemporary man worries 
aloud about his 'age of anxiety.' Hobbes says that life is like a' 
race that has 'no other goal, nor other garland, but being 
foremost'; 23 and we ponder how we might escape the 'rat 
race.' 
It is probably true, as E. A. Burtt says, that 'it has been 
worth the metaphysical barbarism of a few centuries to possess 
modern science.' 24 However, there are more than purely 
speculative dangers inherent in the persistence of this 'meta-
physical barbarism': it may contribute to political barbarism. 
For, as Michael Polanyi has warned, there are certain political 
implications which follow from a Hobbesian cosmology that 
displaces man. 'Then law is no more than what the courts will 
decide, art but an emollient of nerves, morality but a conven-
tion, tradition but an inertia, God but a psychological necessity. 
Then man dominates a world in which he himself does not 
exist. For with his obligations he has lost his voice and his 
hope, and been left meaningless to himself.' 25 
The logic of the seventeenth century's cosmos may lead to 
Leviathan, as Hobbes suggests. It may be implicated in 
behaviorist utopias of social engineering. 26 It might lead, as 
some have argued, to a politics of nihilism and violence. 27 Or 
men may be able simply to suspend the logic of their funda-
mental beliefs and govern their political actions by a common 
sense which they somehow know to be wiser than their theory. 28 
In any case, the logical political implications of the Hobbesian 
seventeenth-century world view are not exceptionally inviting. 
One would prefer some other choice than that among the 
Leviathan, the Possessed, or Walden Two. 
The difficulty is that a prevailing paradigm is never, as 
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Kuhn explains, utterly discarded until an equally comprehen-
sive paradigm is discovered which can function in its stead. 29 
And, despite some strikingly important additions and altera-
tions to it, the 'characteristic scientific philosophy which 
closed the seventeenth century ... is still reigning.' 30 
We may be witnessing, however, the gradual emergence of a 
new cosmological paradigm-one that would restore man to a 
place in the world. 31 Whitehead thought so; and others have 
made a similar claim. 32 The sense of impending crisis in the 
regnant paradigm seems already to be present, in any case. 
As Kuhn says, 'today research in parts of philosophy, psycho-
logy, linguistics, and even art history, all converge to suggest 
that the traditional paradigm is somehow askew.' 33 
If this indeed be the case, then it is especially important that 
we understand the contours and the foundations of the seven-
teenth-century world view. For the development of a new 
paradigm can proceed with clarity only if the structure of the 
paradigm which it seeks to displace is clearly perceived. As 
twentieth-century men, therefore, we have practical as well as 
purely theoretical reasons for the kind of inquiry embodied in 
this study. Just as Thomas Hobbes clearly understood the world 
ofAristotle, we must understand the world ofThomas Hobbes. 
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